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Introduction 1 
Introduction 
Theoretical accounts of stimulus structure can be used to predict the percep-
tual organization of stimuli. This thesis examines the perceived organization 
of simple line drawings using Leeuwenberg's (1971) Structural Information 
Theory (SIT) as a starting point. With respect to the recognition of spoken 
words, the importance of the rhythmic organization of sentences as predicted 
by Martin (1972) is investigated. 
Three issues will be considered in this thesis. The first question is 
whether an experimental method can be developed to decide between two 
options: the first option is that the perceived organization is inherent to the 
perceptual representation (or the perceptual code) of stimulus structure. The 
alternative option is that the perceived organization is one that is added in 
later stages (e.g., while reflecting on one's impressions). In the latter case, 
organization as perceived can be called an epiphenomenon; the actual per-
ceptual process could involve a completely different organization, or even 
none at all (cf. classification on the basis of distinctive features or template 
matching). To decide between these options in our experiments, we will use 
SIT to predict effects of organization in primary perception of structure (the 
initial access to the representation of structure), while separating such effects 
from secondary organizational effects due to prolonged or post-access pro-
cessing. Note that "access" is used in this thesis in the sense of "becoming 
available", rather than denoting the activation of an already established repre-
sentation. If the organizational aspect can be shown to belong to primary 
perception of structure, a second and a third issue becomes relevant. 
The second issue is concerned with organization and the completeness 
of representations. Most patterns, even very simple ones, allow alternative 
perceptual organizations. On page 7 it is shown that alternative organizations 
of a pattern correspond to alternative descriptions in terms of a coding lan-
guage such as SIT, and that each of these descriptions is incomplete in the 
sense that it does not allow a reconstruction of the pattern including all struc-
tural regularities that were initially present. To the extent that SIT codes 
reflect perceptual representations, this could imply that the visual system has 
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to choose between alternative perceptual representations of such a pattern, 
none of which fully specifies its structure. However, this theoretical incom-
pleteness of each separate representation does not fit in as such with our abil-
ity to make an accurate drawing of (simple) patterns after viewing. That is, it 
is in conflict with the fact that the structure of the particular pattern seems to 
be represented uniquely and completely. This conflict would be resolved by 
assuming the existence of a second representation apart from the one that is 
phenomenally dominant, supplying all the information that is lacking in the 
dominant one. In Structural Information Theory, this second representation is 
called complementary. The second empirical question is: can it be shown 
that the complementary representation is concurrently present in primary per-
ception although it is suppressed by the dominant one? 
This brings us to the third issue. If it can be shown that the internal struc-
ture of the stimulus is completely represented in primary perception, it 
becomes interesting to ask whether the relation between its proper structure 
and that of earlier perceived patterns (its external structure) is equally impor-
tant. In other words, the third question is whether the perceived organization 
depends entirely upon an analysis of the stimulus structure that is immedi-
ately given, or instead is subject to substantial change due to context. This is 
called the issue of the autonomy of perception. 
In the following sections of this introduction, theoretical notions underlying 
the three central issues will be considered. It will be argued that perception 
must be equivalent to making a description of regularities in the environ-
ment, rather than an analogue registration of geometrical information. It will 
subsequently be shown that the notion of organization is essential to under-
stand how perceivers arrive at a perceptual representation of visual and audi-
tory structure. Structural Information Theory will be introduced as an 
advanced attempt to quantify stimulus structure and a convenient means to 
demonstrate and define completeness and the principle of complementarity. 
Subsequently, previous attempts to test the first two of the above questions 
(inherence and completeness) will be discussed, emphasizing an experimen-
tal method that yields effects of primary perception and a form of data analy-
sis that corrects for post-access biases. This particular method and analysis 
will turn out to be particularly useful to investigate the third question, the 
autonomy of the perception of stimulus structure. Finally, the specific ques-
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tion addressed in the five following chapters is stipulated as well as the 
respective experimental approach to be followed in each of them. 
Organization 
The production of our perception is an organized world. On a large scale, we 
consciously distinguish objects and establish meaningful relations between 
these objects. Thus, mental representations at the highest "cognitive" level 
can be understood as structural descriptions of the environment (Minsky, 
1975). The power of this idea is manifest in working models of parts of 
human cognition: the expert systems of artificial intelligence (Minsky, 
1975). 
However, to what extent is it also productive to regard perceptual repre-
sentations as being equivalent to structural descriptions? We are generally 
less conscious of an internal structure within the perceived objects; as a rule, 
we experience a particular object or event as a unified whole. Accordingly, 
the process of perception, following which we arrive at the mental represen-
tations, has been seen as the formation of a pattern of brain activity which is 
somehow isomorphic to the object. This is what Gestalt psychology has sug-
gested (Koffka, 1935) and what reappears in the distributed representation in 
some (neural) network models (Ballard, Hinton & Sejnowski, 1983). Dis-
tributed representations are naturally coupled to distributed processing. As 
such, these models indeed have attractive properties which line up with work 
in computational vision research (Marr, 1982) on the processing of local 
aspects of the image (e.g., surface properties such as distance and slant). At 
present, however, the notion of distributed representations does not seem to 
advance our understanding of clearly non-local perceptual aspects such as 
organization, beyond what has been formalized in feature-recognition models 
(Pinker, 1984). Specifically, it appears that for any local feature (for example 
a T-junction) that can be specified, a pattern can be found in which that fea-
ture is physically present but perceptually hidden by an (atypical) embedding 
context (cf. Buffart, Leeuwenberg & Restie, 1981); these models are hard 
pressed to account for these global, organizational effects in a consistent 
way. 
Alternatively, perception may be compared to the production of a struc-
tural description: an expression specifying parts and (spatial) relationships 
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among them. This seems to be the appropriate approach to model what must 
be seen as the central task of perception: the classification of a pattern as an 
instance of a set of structurally equivalent ones. For instance, in reading we 
do not respond to a particular retinal stimulation, but to an equivalence class 
of stimulations which relate to a specific perceptual category (e.g., a particu-
lar character) in a many-to-one fashion (Neisser, 1967). Sutherland (1968) 
listed a number of feats of the perceptual system supporting the description 
metaphor. These feats are the abstraction from variations in brightness, size, 
retinal position, local distortions, type of contour and surface. This becomes 
evident, for example, in our stable perception of the global organization of 
complex scenes under variation of the components, in confusions of structur-
ally similar shapes, and in perceptual learning via schemata. The importance 
of the structural description metaphor is also testified by the effect of differ-
ent reference frames (Rock, 1983; Palmer, 1983) and by the capacity to seg-
ment a picture in different ways. An important class of theories based on 
structural descriptions are coding models. 
Coding models 
The explicit description of structure is the aim of coding models. Coding 
models were first developed within limited domains. For instance, Simon and 
Kotovsky (1963) quantified the complexity of Thurstone letter series used in 
intelligence tests. Series were coded by capturing internal regularities using 
a small set of coding rules. The complexity of the resulting code was used as 
a predictor of the complexity of the series. Combining neurophysiological 
findings and early work on picture languages used in machine vision, Suther-
land (1968) was one of the first to sketch a coding model of non-linear (two 
and three dimensional) visual patterns. He made the essential step from the 
image to a code by writing a simple line drawing as a linear sequence of 
symbols. These symbols stand for the primitive components of the pattern, in 
this case lines and angles, defined with Hubel and Wiesel's feature detectors 
in mind. 
In principle, a symbol sequence may preserve an arbitrary amount of 
metrical information. A symbol may stand for a particular line of an exact 
length under a given angle at a specific place in the visual field. However, it 
is a basic tenet for coding models (McKay, 1950; Leeuwenberg, 1973) that 
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describing the structure of a pattern presupposes the abstraction from particu­
lar instances in two ways. In the first place, different lines of about—for 
example—the same length have to be assigned the same symbol. Secondly, if 
two components are not taken to be identical, different symbols have to be 
assigned to these two components, merely indicating their non-equivalence 
without preserving how much they differ. In other words, structural descrip­
tions in these models are based on the information that the components are 
either identical or different: they are based on identity relations (Buffart, 
Leeuwenberg & Restie, 1983). 
But we do not have a description, or code, without coding rules. Ignor­
ing metrical differences, the identity relations implicit in the pattern are actu­
ally described by the application of coding rules. For example, the pattern 
"А А А В В" can obviously be described—given the two "abstraction condi­
tions" listed above—by the code "3 *(A),2 *(B)" (assuming iteration as a cod­
ing rule). This implies an organization of the pattern which incorporates 
"A A A" as one part and "В B" as another one. Although the number of pos­
sible coding rules is vast—and coding models indeed differ in their choice of 
rules—it is clear that the application of coding rules results in a description 
which defines a specific organization of the patterns. Thus, organization 
seems to be a general consequence of expressing identity relations in struc­
tural descriptions, not specific to models which map a visual pattern onto a 
linear sequence of symbols, and independent of the set of coding rules actu­
ally endorsed. 
As Sutherland did, SIT starts with a translation of the pattern into a linear 
sequence of descriptive symbols (standing for angles and lines). Coding rules 
can then be understood as reduction rules, reducing the initial sequence to a 
shorter one with fewer descriptive symbols. Note that this is indeed a techni­
cal encoding-scheme, not a model of a two-phased process of perception. 
The result of this reduction phase is the maximally reduced or final code 
upon which to base experimental predictions, e.g., about the preferred inter­
pretation of patterns. To do so, the reduction rules have to be applied in an 
exhaustive fashion. In contrast to models emphasizing economy of the 
encoding process (see Hatfield & Epstein, 1985; see also chapter 2), SIT 
does not assume any fixed order of application of the reduction rules. Differ­
ent exhaustive paths of encoding lead to different final codes. The attractive 
feature of having more than one code of a pattern is that it fits nicely into the 
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ability of (visual) perception to organize most (line-) patterns in several dif-
ferent ways. The problem is that, in general, we perceive only a single orga-
nization with a strong preference over all other ones. Thus, a criterion is 
needed to select which fînal code of all possible ones is the best. In other 
words, the question to be answered is: what is the guiding principle of the 
encoding mechanism? 
Minimum principle 
A central assumption of Leeuwenberg's coding theory, SIT, and one alluded 
to by Sutherland, is that the best code is the one with the smallest number of 
descriptive elements: the minimum code. This selection criterion is the appli-
cation of a very general principle: the minimum principle, which states that 
the human visual system is directed towards the simplest representation pos-
sible of a given pattern. The minimum principle is rooted in the notion of 
Prœgnanz underlying the various Gestalt Laws of perceptual organization. 
The principle was invoked by Hochberg and McAllister (1953) who gave it 
its present name. These authors sought to predict the perceived two or three-
dimensionality of drawings of Necker cubes and similar patterns. The mini-
mum principle as propagated by coding theories is much more than a techni-
cal prescription of how to derive codes. Least of all, it is the prediction that 
perception favours simple representations as such. Instead, it is closely linked 
to what we stated to be the fundamental condition for representing stimulus 
structure: the specification of identity relations between descriptive symbols 
referring to pattern elements. In terms of an encoding scheme, many identity 
relations are covered in the initial symbol sequence, but only implicitly. In 
contrast, in the best, or minimum-code, a maximal amount of identity rela-
tions is expressed explicitly. In other words, the minimum code of a pattern 
describes more identity relations than another one, which will always contain 
more descriptive elements. Collard and Buffart (1983) have given a formal 
exposition of this idea. In their work, an important consequence of code 
reduction becomes clear: the incompleteness of a code and hence the need 
for a complementary code. 
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Complementary organization 
Consider, for example, the pattern "А А В A". It contains three identity rela­
tions between the three pairs of A's. Assume the following set of (two) rules: 
iteration and symmetry (s). Then three codes are possible. One code 
expresses the iterated appearance of the first two A's: "2 *(A) X Y"; each of 
the other two expresses a symmetry: a symmetry of two A's around one dif­
ferent element in "X s(A,Y)" and a symmetry of two A's around two differ­
ent elements in "s(A,(XY))". By now it will be clear why the elements not 
covered by a rule are replaced by "X" and "Y": the only feature covered of 
these elements is that they are not identical to any of the other elements. The 
important point is that each of these codes corresponds to a different, mutu­
ally exclusive, organization of the symbol sequence. According to SIT, each 
of these codes is incomplete. In the iteration code, for example, the informa­
tion that the last element is identical to the first two elements is absent. As far 
as this code is concerned, "А А В A" cannot be distinguished from 
"А А В С". However, perceivers are able to discriminate and retain such pat­
terns, and much more complex ones at that. In principle, for each particular 
pattern a (complex) reduction rule can be defined which completely covers 
all of the structural regularities in the pattern. Thus, there is nothing that for­
bids one to invent a coding rule "xxyx" in order to describe pattern 
"А А В С" completely by: "xxyx(A,B)". However, in that case a very large 
set of reduction rules has to be assumed, in fact, one for each class of pat­
terns. Instead of one 2-D or 3-D template for each perceptual object (Neis-
ser, 1967), one would have one rule. This is of course implausible. If, alter­
natively, only a limited number of rules is allowed (see Buffart, 1987, and 
Van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1988, for a formal and psychological founda­
tion of the choice of the limited set of rules used in Structural Information 
Theory) the incompleteness of many 1 structural codes has to be solved, or 
compensated for, in another way. Such incompleteness would be compen­
sated for if, besides the minimum code, other codes are supplied, covering all 
of the structural identities not covered by each one of them alone. Collard 
and Buffart (1983) emphasize the need for an extra code and named it the 
principle of complementarity. Preferring the latter account of the apparent 
1
 SIT, for example, claims that the codes of about 90% of all patterns with 10 
descriptive elements are incomplete (Mellink & Buffart, 1987). 
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completeness of perception, our conclusion is that if perception is engaged in 
the specification of regularity based on identity relations, more than one 
code, or representation, should be entertained for the majority of patterns. 
Primary perception of structure 
For a considerable number of perceptual tasks, successful predictions have 
been made on the basis of the minimum code as to which organization 
human observers prefer to assign to a given stimulus (for an overview, see 
Leeuwenberg & Buffart 1983). Furthermore, the frequency with which the 
preferred and the second-best organization are reported could be related to 
the relative complexity of the corresponding codes, which supports the 
notion of complementarity. But what is the relevance of these successes for 
our understanding of human perception? 
The subjects in most of these studies indicated which organization they 
preferred after prolonged viewing. It may be suspected that part of their 
responses reflect an ad-hoc strategy to accommodate to the inferred task-de-
mands ("be geometrically logical", "be creative" etc.); the subject is given 
ample time to go through a complex, piecemeal confirmation procedure of 
these "cognitive" solutions. In other words, in order to gain insight in the 
actual perceptual representation, it is necessary to employ an experimental 
method which allows one to detect and eliminate such ad-hoc, post-access 
strategies. 
"Cognitive" solutions are less likely to confound the results in studies 
following the Gotlschaldt tradition by using variations of the embedded-fig-
ures test (Reed & Johnsen, 1975; Bower & Glass, 1976; Palmer, 1977; Van 
Tuijl, 1980). Typically, a line drawing is shown that allows multiple orga-
nizations: the target pattern. This is followed by a test pattern of which sub-
jects are asked to decide as fast or as accurately as possible whether or not it 
is a component of the target pattern. The main point of chapter 4 is to show 
that such a task still yields a multitude of effects, some of which are clearly 
unrelated to the perceived organization of the target pattern. For example, 
lest patterns with a "good" shape may yield a bias to respond "yes"; similar-
ity of local details of target and test pattern may have the same effect. 
The possible confoundings due to strategies and biases are even more 
important if one wants to decide whether the postulated complementary 
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codes correspond to simultaneously present representations, or to subsequent 
representations, or to no distinct psychological entities at all. It is clear that 
this issue cannot be settled by the relative frequency of responses accumu-
lated over many trials, patterns and subjects. A more stringent test seems to 
be required. 
SIT has often been advocated as a representation theory: a theory about 
the final result of perception. How this result is reached is not the domain of 
SIT. Buffart (1987) and Restie (1982) take this argument further and state 
that one should not tap responses that depend only upon the first few seconds 
of processing: these are deemed to reflect "early" perception governed by 
non-structural properties of (sensory) mechanisms. Considerable time might 
be needed to reach the true minimum interpretation. Yet, we give subjects 
only a minimum amount of time. By doing so, we want to look at a hypothet-
ical stage, which we will call primary perception of structure: the first 
moment that the representation of stimulus structure becomes available, or, 
as it is called in this thesis, the initial access to that representation. There-
fore, we want to exclude all effects of semantic, associative or other memory 
factors operating in "post-access" stages. The principal method to study this 
stage has two elements: (a) a very fast presentation of two patterns (for 
example, within 50 milliseconds) probing early representations and (b) a cor-
rection procedure eliminating effects of prolonged processing resulting in 
preferences for particular perceptual alternatives and in response biases. 
To demonstrate the existence of primary perception of structure is the 
main goal of this thesis. It is, however, altogether possible that such a stage 
of representation does not exist in a recognizable form, distinguishable from 
the rest of the system. For instance, Marr's (1982) "primal sketch" is the 
highest level of description in his model that can be recovered from the 
image only, but it describes local surface information rather than organized 
structural components. Witkin and Tenenbaum (1983, p. 532), on the other 
hand, argue in favour of a truly perceptual representation that does instantiate 
an organization. They contrast the primal sketch stage with "intermediate" 
vision: the structural decomposition transcending the representation of local 
surface characteristics, but still without the need to draw on specialized, 
semantic knowledge. 
The term primary perception suggests that the relevant processes are fin-
ished within a fixed time, say within the 150 milliseconds generally thought 
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necessary for a conscious impression to arise, after which the initial orga-
nization may not be found in an unconfounded status. There are two reasons 
why this may not be so. First, the primary structural representation need not 
be erased by later interpretations, but, as a rule, may instead be incorporated 
into more elaborated representations (see chapter 4). Second, it depends on 
the particular display—for instance, on the absence of noise, on the complex-
ity etc.— whether or not longer periods of scanning a pattern are necessary to 
"sample" enough information for any organization to arise. However, we 
will focus on early processing effects in a specific experimental paradigm 
(using a very short presentation and very simple patterns that can be per-
ceived "at a single glance" in chapters 1, 2 and 4) in order to avoid the above-
mentioned problems connected with less restricted paradigms. On the 
response side, effects of prolonged processing are eliminated by applying the 
response-bias correction that will be developed in chapter 2 and extended in 
chapter 4. Unbiased reaction times to "same" responses are measured in 
chapter 3. In the case of speech perception (chapter 5), reaction times are 
measured in a phoneme-monitoring task, which is a so-called on-line tech-
nique, adopted also with the objective of increasing the sensitivity to early 
processing effects. 
We will now present a brief overview of the goal and method of each of the 
studies described in chapters 1 to 5. 
In Part I, consisting of chapter 1, it is attempted to link early processing 
effects to perceived organization in order to demonstrate that organization is 
inherent to perception rather than an epiphenomenon. As in the embedded 
figures test, a complete pattern is presented followed by one out of several 
possible subpattems. At the end of such a trial, the subject is shown all sub-
patterns and then is required to indicate which one of the subpattems has 
actually been presented. The difference from the traditional embedded fig-
ures test is that recognition is measured at about threshold level: the two pat-
terns are each presented for only 10 milliseconds and they are separated by a 
very short interval. This is equivalent to a masking paradigm. Accordingly, 
short intervals yield poor scores, whereas with long intervals the task is much 
easier. On the basis of Structural Information Theory pairs of a complete pat-
tern and a subpattem are selected which, presented in one order, have a 
mutually exclusive organization. Presented in the reversed order, however, 
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the perceptual representation of the first pattern is predicted to be able to 
reinforce a latent interpretation of the second one. By systematic variation, 
the shortest interval can be found at which a comparison between the two 
orders of presentation results in an effect on the correct recognition of the 
subpattem. This difference can be assigned to the role of pattern organiza­
tion. Thus, an impression is gained of the time needed to process the stimuli 
from a sensory registration into a representation that implies a perceptual 
organization. 
Completeness is the issue addressed in Part Π, comprising chapters 2 and 
3. In chapter 2, a complete pattern and a subpattem are presented, like in 
chapter 1. The purpose now is to investigate the presence of the non-pre-
ferred second-best code which, according to the principle of complementar­
ity, has the special function of eliminating the incompleteness of the pre­
ferred code. If it has that function, we expect the second-best organization to 
correspond to a suppressed but concurrently present interpretation, instead of 
merely reflecting a subsequent alternative interpretation which happens to be 
preferred less often. Others have endorsed the notion of subsequent interpre­
tations, even for ambiguous or "multistable" patterns, such as the Necker 
cube with its reversible depth organization. Clearly, if a non-preferred orga­
nization can be shown to be concurrently present, the alternative organiza­
tions of a perfectly ambiguous pattern may be assumed to be concurrently 
present too. In order to exclude confounding effects not belonging to primary 
perception, a bias-correction procedure based on the distribution of the errors 
is introduced. 
According to SIT, the complementary code considered in chapter 2 con­
tains the necessary information to achieve the complete description of the 
structure of a pattern. Just like the minimum code, it does not contain metri­
cal information. A special type of complementary code is considered for the 
simple linear arrays of identical elements that will be used in chapter 3. In 
order to discriminate between such arrays, metrical information (the number 
of elements) is essential. Consider an array of regularly spaced identical 
characters, for instance two rows of letters, one of three A's and one of five. 
It is informative that the two arrays have an identical number of elements, 
but structurally, the size of a difference in their number does not matter, so 
that the difference between three and five A's is the same as between three 
and six. Yet, human perceivers can readily and accurately perceive and dis-
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criminate between such arrays. How is this possible? A solution would be to 
formulate a complementary code that does preserve number. In this chapter 
an attempt is made to formulate a complementary code of such linear arrays 
in terms of the spatial ordering of the elements. It results in a unique code for 
arrays of different length without resorting to a numerical code such as 
"5 *(A)". A prediction derived from the properties of these complementary 
codes is that the complexity of arrays of increasing length increases stepwise 
rather than gradually. This is an interesting prediction as it relates to the 
observation that perceivers can state the number of elements in small arrays 
almost immediately, whereas from a certain number of elements upwards 
they have to count. The above prediction is tested in a same/different task. 
The subjects are requested to indicate as fast and as accurately as possible 
whether two successively presented arrays contain an equal number ele-
ments. 
In Part III, consisting of chapters 4 and 5, the third main issue of this the-
sis is addressed: the autonomy versus context-sensitivity of the initial orga-
nization. In our definition, primary perception of structure does not necessar-
ily draw on sources of information other than the stimulus immediately 
present. Still, this does not exclude the possibility that primary perception 
can be altered before any stimulation. In chapter 4 this is formulated as the 
possibility that context may prime the perceptual system during the access 
phase, rather than contributing only to a post-access phase. In this chapter, 
many experimental manipulations are combined in an attempt to bias primary 
perception in favour of one or another organization of a simple line pattern. 
Subjects are led to expect a particular organization by starting a trial with a 
special prime: a pattern in a segmented (exploded-view) version correspond-
ing to but one of the various possible organizations of the complete pattern. 
The question is whether this prime, and the expectation it should evoke, 
changes the initial organization of the complete pattern shown a few seconds 
later. 
In chapter 5 another method is used to investigate autonomy in early per-
ception, in this case with respect to the recognition of spoken words. It has 
often been stated that speakers of languages such as English and Dutch 
appear to impose a certain rhythmical structure on their sentences. More 
technically, their sentences would be "stress timed": The important words, 
spoken with considerable stress, are assumed to be produced according to a 
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regular temporal organization, or "rhythm" (Martin, 1972). Once locked into 
the rhythm of a sentence, a listener would be able to anticipate the important 
words to follow, and to process them more efficiently. We will test the latter 
role of the global temporal organization for word recognition by artificially 
speeding up or delaying a stressed word. The subjects have to react as fast as 
possible upon the occurrence of a specific phoneme placed at the beginning 
of that word. Known as phoneme-monitoring, this task is one of the few that 
are considered to allow for a measurement of the speed of word-recognition 
relatively uncontaminated by post-access effects (Cutler & Norris, 1979). 
Care is taken not to introduce any phonetic discontinuities which would con-
taminate the results. This is achieved by replacing, in the recorded sentence, 
the word preceding the stressed word by another recorded word differing in 
length. If the rhythm creates an effective expectation, this artificial manipula-
tion of the temporal structure should delay the detection of the target pho-
neme in that word. 
Each of the five chapters to follow is written as an independent paper, each 
with an independent discussion of the results. An on-going overview of the 
findings, emphasizing the implications for SIT, can be found in the prefaces 
introducing each Part. 
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PARTI: INHERENCE 
Preface 
Part I consists of only chapter 1. To show that organization is inherent in the 
initial representation rather than being an epiphenomenon of later stages, a 
special recognition task is used. The stimulus that has to be recognized, the 
subpattem, is presented for 10 milliseconds, followed or preceded by another 
pattern, the complete pattern, with a very short interval in the range of 0 to 60 
milliseconds. All contours of the subpattem fall on the same area of the 
screen as those of the complete pattern. This task is clearly one that yields 
many sensory effects. These effects have been described in the extensive lit-
erature on masking (Michaels & Turvey, 1979). Calis (1981, 1983, 1984), 
however, showed that such a masking paradigm can also reveal early 
("microgenetic") phases of perceptual classification (e.g., during face-recog-
nition). In his conception, the first stimulus triggers an hypothesis-testing 
process. With an appropriate interval between the two stimuli, this perceptual 
hypothesis is tested on information from the second stimulus. In case of a 
confirmation, more specific hypotheses can be triggered. In case of a discon-
firmation (rejection), the process is disrupted and has to start anew, leading 
to a loss of information of the first stimulus or, in other words, to the first 
stimulus suffering from backward masking by the second one. Thus, if one 
has a theory to predict which hypotheses are triggered by the first stimulus 
and which subsequently are confmned (or rejected) by the second one, mask-
ing effects can reveal states of knowledge "within" perception. This theory 
will be SIT and the perceptual knowledge that we will look for is knowledge 
of structural properties of patterns leading to a perceived organization. 
As in most studies of this thesis, SIT provides a convenient framework 
because it is a theory of the representation of perceptual structure. The pre-
dictions in chapter 1 are formulated in terms of the code reference function 
that is part of SIT's coding model. Code reference is SIT's way of account-
ing for the role of context on perception. Code reference enables one to code 
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a sequence of patterns by re-using the structural code of a pattern for the cod-
ing of a subsequent pattern. This can result in a lower overall information-
load than if both patterns are assigned separate codes. If code reference 
indeed is more efficient, the two patterns are predicted to receive compatible 
perceptual organizations. For another sequence (in chapter 1 the same pat-
terns presented in the reversed order), code reference can be more expensive 
than two separate codes; in that case it is not the best (minimum) solution to 
code the second pattern in terms of the first code and the prediction is that the 
two patterns will lead to incompatible organizations. In sum, on the basis of 
SIT we predict that the interpretation of the second pattern can be different 
depending on which code of the second pattern yields the lowest overall 
information-load within the context of the code of the first pattern: Unambig-
uous patterns can be behave as if their shape is ambiguous. 
As will be stressed in the Epilogue after Part III, SIT is a theory of per-
ceptual representations and it does not readily provide a model of the process 
of perception. SIT does not specify under what circumstances reference to 
earlier perceived patterns will be made. For one thing, it is obvious that not 
all patterns ever perceived in an individual's lifetime are equally relevant: 
There is an upper limit to the effect of context. This issue will be dealt with 
in Part III. In the first study we will focus on the lower limit: the time needed 
for the processing of a pattern before it can tum into a relevant context for 
patterns that are presented later on. As it was formulated in the Introduction, 
a goal of the first study is to establish the time needed to process the first 
stimulus from a sensory registration into a representation that implies a per-
ceptual organization. This is also the lower temporal limit to the context 
effect. If this lower limit turns out to be sufficiently small compared to the 
latency of reasoning-like processes, it would add to the conclusion that such 
an experimental method can reveal aspects of the primary perception of 
structure. 
Acta Psychologica 59 (1985) 91-102 
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KNOWLEDGE WITHIN PERCEPTION: MASKING CAUSED BY 
INCOMPATIBLE INTERPRETATION * 
Emanuel LEEUWENBERG, Lucas MENS and Gé CALIS 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Most people and some scientists assume that knowledge does not affect the perceptual representa-
tion of a pattern but merely may change its evaluation afterwards An experiment was set up to 
show that the perceptual representation itself depends on an interaction with immediate context 
information, even in the case of clearly unambiguous patterns. In each trial two patterns were 
presented successively for 10 msec on the same place with an onset ¿synchrony between 10 and 70 
msec Presented in one order, the perceptual representation of the firsl pattern was predicted to be 
able to reinforce a latent interpretation of the second one For the same patterns presented in the 
reversed order, however, no such interaction was predicted Subjects had to identify one of the two 
patterns of a pair The number of correct identifications differed for the two opposed orders of 
presentation as predicted The effect was present with stimulus onset asynchronies as short as 30 
msec This gives an indication of the rate at which pattern interpretations can be developed 
According to Rock (this issue) the perception of a pattern is open to 
context only if the 'autochthonous' perceptual organization - as 
processed in isolation - would already incorporate the organization as 
induced by the contextual bias. In other words, acquired knowledge can 
only reinforce a latent interpretation. This imphes that context can only 
have an effect if the pattern itself is, at a perceptual level, multi-inter-
pretable or ambiguous. In fig. 1 such a situation is presented. Pattern В 
in isolation can be interpreted as a square with a line but also as two 
triangles. Within the context of pattern A however the last interpreta­
tion will be preferred. 
In the present study an attempt is made to show that even the 
interpretation of unambiguous patterns may be altered due to the effect 
of knowledge about context. In fig. 2 both patterns are unambiguous. 
* This research was supported by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure 
Research (Z W.O.). 
Mailing address: E Leeuwenberg, Dept. of Experimental Psychology, University of Nijmegen. 
Montessonlaan 3, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
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А В 
Fig 1 Pattern В by itself is ambiguous it is perceived either as a square plus a line, or as two 
triangles However, in the context of pattern A, pattern В is organized as two triangles 
Pattern A is by preference perceived as a zigzag and pattern W as three 
triangles (Collard and Leeuwenberg 1981). In the context of A however, 
subjects may report that pattern W looks like a zigzag plus a line. But 
of course, simple phenomenological reports are not enough to prove 
true perceptual effects of context. Response biases or demand char­
acteristics have to be excluded. Therefore we will present stimuli such 
as pattern A and W tachistoscopically and look for more direct indices 
of processing. Before full treatment of the experiment, a short digres­
sion into the motives and role of this experiment seems useful. 
Not only are several scientists proponents of the view that perception 
is greatly impenetrable by conscious knowledge, but they also hold that 
perceptual processes are fundamentally different from those underlying 
logical reasoning or higher cognitive functions in general (Fodor 1983; 
Kanizsa and Gerbino 1982). We do not disagree with them on the point 
of impenetrability. However, we do want to show that within the 
perceptual module, states of acquired object knowledge interact in a 
fashion similar to that during logical reasoning. It is argued here that 
perceptual representations themselves are constructed under a tendency 
of the system towards the simplest representation of the given pattern 
or event (i.e. the minimum principle). It is shown by Buffart (Buffart et 
al. 1981) that the simplest interpretation has the unique quality of 
Л Л Л ЛЛЛ 
A W 
Fig 2 Pattern W by itself is not ambiguous it is perceived as three triangles Nevertheless, it is 
shown that in the context of pattern A, pattern W tends to be organized as a zigzag plus a line 
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accounting for a maximum of all sorts of regularities within the pattern. 
This is also defended for demonstrations which seem to support Kanizsa 
and Gerbino's position that patterns are not organized in the simplest 
way. The present experiment is in line with a series of studies by Calis 
(Calis and Leeuwenberg 1981; Calis et al. 1983; Calis et al. 1984). In 
general, he demonstrated that even the most primary stages of percep­
tion show reasoning-like characteristics. 
As an introduction to the experiment the first of four sets of stimuli 
which are presented in fig. 3 will be discussed. Set 1 contains six pairs 
of stimuli (WA,...,CW). In each pair there is one 'Whole pattern' W 
from which the other three patterns А, В and С are derived by deleting 
the same amount of line segments. А, В and С are called subpatterns of 
pattern W. In the experiment the two patterns of each pair are 
presented sequentially as depicted in fig. 3. It is important to note that 
stimulus presentation was not at different places on a screen but such 
that the two patterns were maximally overlapping. Each pair will now 
be described in detail. 
A W: The sequence AW was already mentioned. The pattern code of A 
was said to be a good point of departure for the perceptual organiza­
tion of pattern W. Therefore this sequence is called 'compatible'. A 
code-theoretical account can be found in Collard and Leeuwenberg 
(1981). According to their analysis it is simpler to interpret the AW 
pair as two variants of a zigzag (Information Load = 6) than as the 
two unrelated entities of a zigzag and three triangles (Information 
I „„A _ ON 
WA: Pair WA contains the same patterns as pair AW but it evokes a 
different interpretation. The simplest code of the first pattern W is 
equivalent to an organization of three triangles. This code, however, 
is not very useful for coding the subsequent pattern A. It is com­
plicated to transform three triangles into a zigzag. The reason for this 
is that if a zigzag has to be described departing from a code of the 
three equilateral triangles, the internal regularity of each triangle in 
this code has to be abandoned: Each of the base lines which is 
integrated in the code of an equilateral triangle has to be separated in 
order to reach a code of a zigzag. Since a common organization is 
lacking for sequence WA and two distinct interpretations emerge, it 
is called ' incompatible'. 
BW: In the preceding pair WA, the incompatible order started with the 
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Fig 3 Pairs of patterns which were subsequently presented in the experiment In each of the 4 sets 
there are three pairs in two opposed orders In the first two experimental pairs ihe relation between 
the pattern organizations shows an asymmetry WA is incompatible. AW is compatible. WB is 
compatible and BW is incompatible Both WC and CW are compatible 
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whole pattern. In BW, also incompatible, the whole pattern comes 
last. Here pattern В with its peculiar V-shapes is of little use for the 
three triangles which follow. 
WB: Starting with three triangles, the subsequent complex pattern В 
can now be profitably perceived as three triangles lacking some line 
segments. Therefore this sequence is called 'compatible'. 
CW and WC\ In contrast with the preceding pairs this combination of 
patterns is compatible in both orders of presentation. Both are 
interpreted by preference as triangles irrespective of order. Below it 
will be shown that CW and WC are control sequences. 
In order to be able to list our predictions it is necessary to give a brief 
indication of the procedure. Subjects were shown a pair of patterns, 
each of which was presented for 10 msec with varying onset intervals 
between both patterns in the range of 10 to 70 msec. After that, 
subjects had to identify the subpattern. After each pair of flashes all 
subpatterns included in the experiment were shown as response alterna­
tives. 
The general prediction is that the number of correctly recognized 
subpatterns depends upon the compatibility between pattern interpreta­
tions. As compatibility can be varied using the same pictures (eg. AW 
versus WA), a number of other effects on recognition is controlled for. 
One important factor remains: Later patterns of a pair are prone to be 
more easily identified than the first ones, due to a recency effect 
(Michaels and Turvey 1979). Therefore, control pairs WC and CW 
which do not differ in compatibility are introduced. As a result of 
recency we predict that if С is the later member ot a presented pair it 
will be recognized more often than when it is the first one shown. This 
effect of recency leads to the following prediction: иг > си·. In this 
equation lower-case letters represent the number of correct identifica­
tions in the corresponding conditions. 
The general prediction above can be given more vividness by a 
tentative model of the effect of compatibility in the four experimental 
pairs. In a previous study using the same presentation of stimuli (Mens 
1983), it was shown that compatible pairs of the type WB were 
relatively often perceived as two separate patterns and the incompatible 
pairs BW as one single pattern. We suppose that first patterns in such 
incompatible pairs are masked by the second pattern. This is in line 
with the commonly found backward (type B) masking (Michaels and 
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Turvey 1979; Bachmann and Alhk 1976) from which first stimuli suffer. 
In fact, the clerk-customer metaphor of backward masking (Turvey 
1978), with its explicit role of a central processor's attention strategy, 
seems a good perspective from which to appreciate the present account 
of masking. In these studies, stimuli were used which are generally 
incompatible by our definition. We predict that subpattems in BW 
pairs will be difficult to recognize. In our notation: wb — bw > 0. For 
the incompatible pair WA we expect a suppression of the first pattern 
WA. We assume that this will enlarge the 'Prägnanz' of the second 
pattern A. This assumption as such is not supported by any accepted 
evidence, but we take this facilitation as a natural consequence of the 
replacement of one interpretation by a very distinct other one due to 
incompatibility. Thus we predict: wa - aw > 0. The general prediction 
can be formulated as: 
wa — aw Φ wc — cw, and 
wb — bw Φ wc — cw. 
Our account of specific effects would yield: 
wa — aw > wc — cw, and 
wb — bw > wc — cw. 
Experiment 
Method 
Material 
Sixteen line drawings as presented in fig 3 were copied on slides, resulting in bright 
figures against a dark background Two Random Access projectors were positioned so 
that the two patterns of a pair overlapped maximally Projection was slightly out of 
focus in order to compensate for small imperfections in overlap The visual angle 
subtended by the patterns was about 7 degrees The experimental room was dimly lit 
In fig 4 the lay-out of the response panel is given. All subpattems are depicted above 
the corresponding response keys A starting key is provided at the lower left side Next 
to each set of three subpattems is a 'don't know' key which could be chosen in case of 
severe doubt 
Procedure 
Thirty students of the University of Nijmegen, most of them in their first year, 
served as 5s Each 5 was tested individually After a training session of thirty trials 
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Fig. 4. Response panel. The task was lo identify the subpattcrn in each presented sequence and to 
indicate the answer by pushing Ihe corresponding key The keys in the right column are used in 
case of severe uncertainty. 'S' is a self-packed starting key 
two experimental sessions followed of about thirty minutes with a short break in 
between. Trials were self-initiated. After the starting key was pressed, immediate 
presentation of the two patterns (10 msec each) followed with one of 7 different onset 
asynchronies (SOA). These SOA's vaned between 10 and 70 msec with steps of 10 
msec. A trial was completed when the S selected one response key. The instruction was 
to delect which of the 12 possible subpatlerns had been 'flashed' together with the 
whole pattern. There was a time limit of 10 sec bui no emphasis on speed. Ss were run 
twice through the complete series. This resulted in 3 x 4 x 7 x 2 = 168 trials arranged 
in one random order. 
Results 
In fig. 5 the percentages of correctly identified subpatterns are presented as the average 
of the four sets shown in fig. 3. The base axis represents SOA. Above and below the 
curves the types of stimuli are depicted which gave rise to these curves. All upper 
curves refer to sequences with the subpattem last, all lower ones with subpatterns first. 
This indicates the general effect of recency. 
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Fig 5 Results averaged oser the 4 sets of fig 1 onl\ the patterns of set 1 are depicted The curses reflect the percentage correct idemificalions 
of the subpatterns for several stimulus onset asynchronies The difference between the upper and the lower curse for each experimental pair (a 
b) is larger ( ρ < 0 001 ) than for the control pair (c) Hence an effect of compatibility of pattern interpretations is obtained 
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Curves marked with asterisks indicate incompatible sequences. The larger gaps 
between curves in figs. 5a and 5b relative to the gap in fig. 5c can be interpreted as the 
effect of compatibility. In other words, the results are in agreement with the general 
prediction. 
Analysis of variance showed the following: 
wa-aw<wc-cw, F(l, 29) = 22.88, ρ < 0.0001 (effect in fig. 5a); 
wb-bw>wc-cw, F ( l , 29) = 17.96, ρ < 0.0002 (effect in fig. 5b). 
The two analyses on the average results described above were performed for each one 
of the four sets of fig. 3. The general trend was preserved in all eight cases but in three 
cases no significance was obtained (p > 0.05). These three are: set 2 - column 1 and 2; 
set 3 - column 2. 
Analyses were performed on the overall results for each SOA separately. The effect 
of compatibility in fig. 5a was significant at SOA's of 20, 30, 50 and 70 msec 
(p < 0.01, 0.001, 0.001, 0.05). In fig. 5b all SOA's larger than or equal to 30 msec 
yielded significant surplus (p<0.05, 0.001, 0.01, 0.01 and 0.01). It can be concluded 
that the predicted effect of incompatible contexts occurs with SOA's as short at 30 
msec. 
Alternative approaches 
There are five stimulus-features which could have been alternative sources of the 
effects found above. They are all more or less confounded with the property of 
compatibility. 
Firstly, the control patterns WC and CW of fig. 3 are all closed figures. Indeed, 
pairs consisting of closed complete patterns as well as closed subpatterns showed less 
ч A A 
ΛΖ .\A λ contrast 
В 
»: 
contrast 
angles = 7 .í:angles 
Fig 6 Four examples of calculation of contrast- and angle-gradients. The dots in paitern A and В 
indicale the points of contrast between subsequent patterns in an experimental sequence The dots 
in pattern С and D indicate the amount of angles which appeared or disappeared. 
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effect of order than pairs with open subpallerns (F(l, 29) = 18.50, ρ < 0.0002). How­
ever, no such interaction of order of presentation with closure is found within the first 
column of fig. 3 (without the confounding variable of compatibility). Furthermore, 
closure of subpatterns did not have a main effect on their identification (F(l, 29) = 2.56, 
ρ < 0.1206). 
Secondly, the existence of a feature-detector which would be sensitive to contrast 
gradients at junctions can be assumed. In figs. 6A and 6B the dots indicate the points 
of change in contrast. However, the number of contrast points was not related to total 
percentage correct identification, nor did it interact with order of presentation. 
Furthermore, no effect was found of the amount of angles which (dis)appearcd 
between the two stimuli (see figs. 6C and D). No effect was found of the complexity of 
the separate patterns as specified by a structural information measure (cf. Buffart et al. 
1981), nor of an estimated spatial frequency gradient. 
Discussion 
The main conclusion is that the perceptual organization and subsequent 
identification of a pattern can be drastically altered within the context 
of another one immediately preceding it, even when both patterns 
clearly are not ambiguous as such. 
This context effect is not anchored in a special property of the 
stimuli but is dependent upon the perceptual tendency towards the 
simplest interpretation: one which accounts best for the regularities 
within the patterns. Even unambiguous patterns are interpreted accord­
ing to what at any moment is computed to be the most economical 
representation of the given stimuli. Thus even unambiguous patterns 
are multi-interpretable. Therefore, within perception, special kinds of 
knowledge are at work: knowledge about structural properties of pat­
terns and knowledge in the form of rules to manipulate and combine 
these properties. 
The appearance of the effect of compatibility with SOA's as short as 
30 msec deserves separate discussion. This supports that such a short 
time of extra processing of the first stimulus is sufficient to produce a 
code which represents the first pattern as distinct from what comes 
after it. In other words: the temporal resolution of the central pattern 
processor seems to be as small as 30 msec with simple stimuli as these. 
However, this conclusion is one out of several possible ones. For 
instance, there are about 100 msec involved in the transfer of retinal 
information to the central brain. During this time lag, any sort of 
interference may have occurred, which might delay further processing. 
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We assume, however, that these time lags are equal for the different 
stimuli It is also possible that the two subsequent patterns in each trial 
are stored in a buffer in the given order If so, the pattern interpreta­
tions might be built up in a time far beyond 30 msec central processmg, 
and the present data would be explained by nonperceptual selective 
forgetting instead of visual masking In our opinion, this presentation 
of the matter requires a train of assumptions far less parsimonious than 
the one we proposed in order to explain the results Given such a 
complete storage, why would the incompatible sequence not be coded 
m the reverse - compatible - order9 And, putting it more strongly, how 
can the relation between masking and SOA be explained"7 
If one accepts that a first pattern code is active from about 30 msec 
onwards, a final point can be made about the position of the minimum 
principle These 30 msec hold equally for the W patterns in this 
experiment as for the В patterns В patterns are more complex than W 
patterns Thus it seems that there is no compelling relation between the 
complexity of a pattern and the duration of encoding On the other 
hand, embeddedness experiments show two things (van Tuyl and 
Leeuwenberg 1980) Firstly, the detection of a subpattern in a larger 
pattern requires a long time if the description of the embedding pattern 
according to its minimal organization is simpler than the description in 
terms of the subpattern Secondly, these search times were in general 
much longer than 30 msec Thus one is forced to conclude that the 
excess time needed to perform a difficult embeddedness judgment 
cannot be simply accounted for by assuming a longer primary processing 
staee In our onimon reartion timp« in іл«к<. surh я« thece reflect 
decision processes and a test phase of the preferred code This is 
supported by double-stimulation experiments done by Calis and 
Leeuwenberg (1981) and in agreement with experimental findings of 
Boer (1982) He concludes the global pattern aspects are dominant with 
respect to details during a code test phase but not during the encoding 
process itself 
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PARTII: COMPLETENESS 
Preface 
From Part I we conclude that the experimental method presently used is ade­
quate to show early processing effects that can be attributed to the primary 
perception of structure. Because of this method, any explanations in terms of 
sensory masking, local features, or as in terms of biases due to cognitive 
reconstructions of the stimuli are implausible. 
On the basis of SIT codes, we were able to predict in which cases the 
representation of the first stimulus is an effective context for the interpreta­
tion of the subsequent pattern, and in which cases not. From the results we 
concluded that even the organization of unambiguous patterns may to some 
extent depend on context. However, there is one aspect that needs to be clar­
ified. The predictions of the preceding study were based on a comparison of 
the information loads of SIT codes of the sequence with and without code-
reference. Although code-reference is only a technical means to derive pre­
dictions (SIT not being a process theory), it suggests a perceptual process dif­
ferent from the sequential hypothesis-testing model adopted by Calis (see the 
Preface to Part I). Does this comparison ГПГГРЧПППН tn an actual perceptual 
choice between two alternative representations of the stimulus sequence? 
This can not be concluded from the results of the precedmg study. The 
(incompatibility of the two patterns can perceptually be established in a 
purely sequential fashion (cf. Calis & Leeuwenberg, 1981): A hypothesis 
triggered by the first stimulus tested on sensory information of the second 
stimulus. It is possible that confirmation of this hypothesis does not depend 
on the adequacy of concurrently available alternative hypotheses. Instead, 
confirmation can result from some unknown satisfaction-criterion being 
reached. In the study reported in chapter 2, an attempt is made to show that 
primary perception does entertain concurrently available alternative pattern-
organizations. In other words, the first study showed that unambiguous pat­
terns are mulli-interpretable; the following study shows that they are also 
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ambiguous in the sense that alternative organizations are present in percep­
tion, "hidden" beneath the dominant organization. To this end, the method of 
chapter 1 is refined in chapter 2 by choosing specially selected pairs of a 
complete pattern and a subpattem. The subpattems are closely matched with 
respect to their structural complexity. More importantly, one of the subpat­
tems corresponds to the preferred organization of the complete pattern and a 
second subpattem to one that is almost as good: a second-best organization 
of which the SIT code has the property of complementarity. By also applying 
a response-bias correction, we hope to be able to show the hidden concurrent 
presence of the second-best interpretation. 
On a more theoretical level, the goal of the chapters in Part Π is to find 
support for an important implication of adopting a coding model such as SIT: 
As has been argued in the Introduction, for most patterns there is not a single 
code that covers the structural regularities completely. Therefore, SIT pre­
dicts that for an adequate or complete representation, more than one percep­
tual organization is required. So again experimental evidence of the concur­
rent presence of a hidden alternative organization is required. In addition, 
SIT's measure of the perceptual strength of alternative organizations is based 
on the ratio of the corresponding codes, suggesting concurrent presence once 
more. 
In the Introduction structural and metrical information have been 
opposed as two different aspects of patterns. Structural codes were described 
as being possible only if one abstracts from metrical differences. The central 
question of chapter 3 is whether the completeness of representation is only 
relevant for purely structural properties of a pattern. Therefore a somewhat 
more metrical type of representation will be investigated. The task of the sub­
jects is to maintain for a short period an exact impression of the number of 
identical elements in a row in order to compare it with the number of ele­
ments in a second row. Such a numerosity judgement obviously is not repre­
sentative for purely metrical tasks (such as weight estimation), but it does 
require a completeness of representation that is different from the structural 
one of chapters 1 and 2. Therefore, a specific coding model is proposed. 
Instead of replacing identical elements by one symbol (as in a SIT code), the 
relative position of pairs of elements is completely specified, This insures 
that each element is represented distinctly from the others, which implies that 
the aspect of number is represented completely. 
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Preference judgments about alternative interpretations of unambiguous patterns 
can be explained in terms of a rivalry between a preferred and a second-best 
interpretation (cf. Leeuwenberg & Buffart, 1983). We tested whether this sec-
ond-best inteipretation corresponds to a suppressed but concurrently present 
inteipretation or whether it merely reflects an alternative view that happens to 
be preferred less often. Two patterns were presented immediately following 
each other with a very short onset asynchrony: a complete pattern and one out 
of three possible subpattems of it, corresponding to the best, the second best, 
or an odd interpretation of the complete pattern. Subjects indicated which sub-
pattem was presented by choosing among the three subpattems shown after 
each trial. The scores, corrected for response-bias effects, indicated a relative 
facilitation of the second-best interpretation, in agreement with its predicted 
"hidden" presence. This result is more in line with theories that capitalize on 
the quality of the finally selected representation than with processing models 
aimed at reaching one single solution as fast and as economically as possible. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In general, we are nol confused about the shape of things. Our knowledge of 
natural objects as well as the overwhelming redundancy in the visual input 
helps us to establish one firm shape interpretation at a time. Artificial pat-
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tems can be given alternative interpretations but often only under prolonged 
viewing conditions (for example, when searching for the hidden face in a 
drawing of a tree). Some very unusual patterns, specially designated as 
ambiguous ones, are seen in two ways spontaneously, but not simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, below we will refer to some aspects of the perception of 
unambiguous patterns that may be explained by assuming the simultaneous 
presence of a second, "hidden" interpretation. "Ambiguous" patterns, in this 
view, are special only because the alternative interpretations are of about 
equal strength and therefore readily perceived at least some of the time. Our 
aim is to find experimental evidence which may help to decide between two 
options: (a) Alternative shape interpretations of any pattern are generated one 
after the other, when they are generated at all; and (b) more than one shape 
interpretation is concurrently present, even when an unambiguous pattern is 
perceived. 
These options may be put in a broader perspective that includes two 
opposing views on perception. The first view emphasizes aspects of the pro-
cess of perception and holds that, for instance, its speed and economy favor 
Option 1. The opposing view focuses upon the structural quality of a final 
representation. First some phenomena and views favoring the first option 
will be given. 
Option 1. Processing Minimization and Subsequent Interpretations 
A relevant issue is the phenomenon of reversible figures. The two ways to 
see the Necker cube, for instance, seem to be incompatible. Only one is 
experienced at each moment. A straightforward explanation of this phenom-
enon relies on the assumption that the underlying representations are also 
incompatible and become active only one at a time. This assumption under-
lies one line of models built around the concept of neural satiation (Orbach, 
Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963; Kawamoto & Anderson, 1985). Satiation causes a 
decay of the sensory support for the interpretation "in residence," followed 
by a shift into another global state of the system representing the alternative 
interpretation. Kawamoto and Anderson used a network model as a natural 
means to formalize such a parallel process. The appeal of network models in 
current perceptual theories is related to the general idea that perception mini-
mizes processing costs by instantiating a locally cooperative hill-climbing 
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procedure (Attneave, 1982) or a similar massively parallel system (for a 
review, see Ballard, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1983). This class of models 
seems to be compatible with properties which are frequently ascribed to per-
ception, namely, that (a) it is not confused by general cognitive convictions; 
(b) it is computationally shallow, avoiding complex inferences; and (c) it is 
based on reliable visual features. These properties explain why perception is 
extremely fast. Furthermore, the computability of the envisaged procedures 
increases the plausibility of such approaches. 
As a typical consequence of processing minimization, one would not 
expect the concurrent presence of other representations of a pattern besides 
the dominant one. For example, Hatfield and Epstein (1985, p. 162) state that 
"Attneave's formulation suggested that the minimum principle guides the 
construction of a single (most economical) representation ...." In a similar 
vein, Perkins (1983) remarks that: "minimal search suggests that the human 
perceivcr proceeds along paths of highly reliable recognitions and inferences 
in order to avoid backup or construction of parallel alternatives." (p. 357) 
and: "the human procedure seems to pursue only one [interpretation, LM] at 
a time, attempting another only if the first fails, as in case of viewing the 
Penrose triangle" (p. 358). An extreme position with respect to this issue is 
represented by the Gibsonian direct pick-up of invariants as it does not imply 
the concept of interpretation in the first place, let alone that of concurrent 
ones. 
Ootion 2. Structurfll OnHmization and Concurrent Internretat!ons 
As early as 1850, Herbart proposed that the degree to which one interpreta-
tion of an object dominates other ones is the result of an overall competition 
between all representations of that object generated by the visual system. He 
proposed an "easy" differential calculus which formalized such a mechanism. 
Although Herbart intended this idea primarily for simple sensations, his 
theory gives a clear demonstration of the idea that (a) the conscious percept 
is but one out of a host of subliminal candidates, and (b) that the dominant 
percept may vary in strength depending on competition raised by alternative 
representations. The first aspect is given a somewhat different formulation in 
theories of perception which assume that the preferred interpretation involves 
a selection out of alternative ones. The likelihood principle (von Helmholtz, 
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1867/1962) is an account of perception with a "selective", hypothesis-testing 
quality to it. Gregory and Gombrich (1973), a modem proponent of the like­
lihood principle, states about the Necker cube reversal: 
Spontaneous change implies that not only must there be in operation the cur­
rent or reigning hypothesis—which is the present perception—but also there 
are more or less ready-formed rival hypotheses waiting to challenge and over­
throw the reigning hypothesis (p. 93). 
Another selection criterion is the minimum principle (Hochberg & McAlisler, 
1953; see also Hatfield & Epstein, 1985). In studies based on the minimum 
principle in the context of a coding model (Leeuwenberg, 1971), both the 
presence of the hidden interpretation and the competition it raises to the pre­
ferred one play central roles. Again, perceived ambiguity is seen as a mani­
festation of a more general principle of subliminal competition. The same 
rivalry also has been used to explain phenomenal differences between vari­
ants of unambiguous patterns. A demonstration is given in Figure 1, which 
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Figure I. The strength of the preferred occlusion interpretation (A) increases 
from Interpretation 1 to 3; this can be related to the decreasing simplicity of 
the alternative mosaic inteipretation (B). 
shows two possible interpretations (A and B) for three variants of a pattern. 
The occlusion interpretation (A) is clearly preferred for Variant 3 in Figure 1, 
is somewhat less clear for Variant 2 and is considerably less for Variant 1. 
Note that Organization В is simplest in 1, less simple in 2 and most com­
plex in 3, while Organization A is the same in all three cases. Preference 
judgments for this phenomena and for a variety of others (for an overview 
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see Leeuwenberg & Buffart, 1983) have been explained on the basis of the 
ratio between the simplicity of two formal descriptions (or "codes"): the sim-
plest one (A), which captures a maximum of figurai regularities, and the sec-
ond best (B), which expresses regularities not covered by the simplest repre-
sentation (in the case of Figure 1, the mosaic interpretation). The 
second-best code may, therefore, be called "complementary" to the best code. 
However, one might also argue that such preference judgments involve pro-
longed processing and subtle comparisons of subsequently generated inter-
pretations (Option 1). Our aim in this report is to find more direct evidence 
for the concurrent presence of an alternative interpretation (Option 2). Given 
the importance of the rivalry between the prefened and second-best interpre-
tation referred to above, we think it justified to search for the hidden pres-
ence of that second-best interpretation in particular. In effect, we will con-
trast the presence of the second-best interpretation with that of a third, rather 
unlikely, interpretation which may be assumed not to be generated at all (but 
see the General Discussion). 
Concurrent Activation of Word Meanings and Priming 
The idea of simultaneously activated interpretations has gained more atten-
tion in the linguistic area of word recognition than in visual perception. 
Reviewing theories about lexical ambiguity, Simpson (1984) stressed that 
"word-level ambiguity may be viewed as a critical, special case of more gen-
eral word recognition processes" (p. 316). The interpretation of a word, even 
one that is judged to be unambiguous, is concluded to be the result of an ini-
tial activation of many (perhaps all) possible meanings constrained by fre-
quency and/or sentence context. One of the most frequently used methods to 
establish initial word-ambiguity is that of the semantic priming task. Charac-
teristic for such a task is that a lexical response (for example naming) must 
be given to a test word which is preceded by an ambiguous word (which, in 
turn, is preceded by a disambiguating context). Response facilitation is taken 
to indicate that the test word matches one of the meanings of the ambiguous 
word. Thus, with the test word one "probes" which interpretations are acti-
vated by the preceding stimulus (Conrad, 1974; Neely, 1977). By varying the 
time between the ambiguous word and the test word, one typically finds that 
the initial ambiguity disappears within a fraction of a second (Tanenhaus, 
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Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979). It may be clear that a similar method for vis­
ual patterns would be appropriate in order to decide between Options 1 and 
2. Below, we will introduce such a method. 
Probing Visual Interpretations 
In several studies the relative goodness of alternative interpretations has been 
investigated using a part-probe or embedded-figures detection task: Subjects 
have to decide whether or not a particular pattern is part of a "complete" pat­
tern presented before or after it (Gottschaldt, 1929; Reed & Johnsen, 1975; 
Palmer, 1977; Van Tuyl, 1980). As a rule, a hierarchy of good, reasonable 
and bad parts can be obtained instead of a strict dichotomy between, for 
instance, one good part corresponding to the preferred organization and all 
other parts which are equally bad. However, the methods used (phenomenal 
report, reaction times) do not exclude the effect of postperceptual processes 
of a problem-solving kind. More strictly controlled are object superiority 
studies which show facilitated detection of a tachistoscopically presented 
small part when it is followed by a second line drawing, which together add 
up to a structured (3-D) object (McClelland & Miller, 1979; Weisstein & 
Maguire, 1978). In the experiments to be reported, we use a part-probe task 
with very short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) in order to minimize the 
effects of extended postperceptual classifications. Furthermore, a forced-
choice recognition response is used which enables the application of a strict 
control on response bias effects. 
Figure 2 shows one of the complete patterns of the experiments. Several 
segmentations can be made for this pattern. Segmentation A corresponds to 
the preferred interpretation for most viewers, and В corresponds to the sec­
ond best, while С represents an unlikely interpretation of the complete pat­
tern. 
We probed for the presence of interpretations by examining recognition of 
a subpattem (S) which will be presented after the complete, or whole, pattern 
(W) with a short SOA (Condition W-S). The position of the subpattem 
matched the position of the corresponding part within the complete pattern. 
In other words, when presented simultaneously, the subpattem would fuse 
completely with the complete pattern. Recognition scores were established 
by presenting subpatlems A, B, and С after the fast presentation of the com-
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Figure 2. A complete pattern (W) and three subdivisions representing the best 
(1), the second best (2) and an unlikely interpretation (3). (The visibility of 
subpattem A, B, or С presented shortly after the complete pattern [condition 
W-S] is assumed to reflect the concurrent presence of the corresponding inter­
pretation. Note: Complete pattern [W] and subpattem [S] are presented with 
maximal overlap.) 
plete pattern and the subpattem and by asking the subject to indicate which 
of these three was presented in the sequence. We discerned four factors con­
tributing to the recognition scores. 
1. Lnhibitien. Because of the short SOA, the recognition of the subpaiicru 
was expected to be more difficult than if presented without the complete pat­
tern. Therefore, we use the term facilitation only in a relative sense—that 
is—only to refer to a relative advantage or disadvantage for one of the sub-
patterns over the others. 
2. Response bias. Complete patterns are, by definition, larger and thus 
more conspicuous than the subpatterns. We expect that the complete pattern 
would induce a considerable response bias irrespective of the subpattem that 
was actually displayed. In fact, we established in three ways (see Experiment 
1) that the organizations related to subpatterns A, B, and С are preferred in 
the order: A > В > С. Complete patterns that did not fulfill this requirement 
were excluded from the analysis. Thus, we expected a similar response bias. 
To accommodate this, we developed a special correction method based on 
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the distribution of incorrect responses to uncover the "true" recognition of the 
subpattems. 
3. Preference. Apart from inducing a postperceptual response bias, differ­
ences in the preference for the three organisations may also be immediately 
effective and change the true, bias-corrected recognition of the corresponding 
subpattems. If so, we expected it to result in a decreasing score: A > В > С. 
4. Concurrent presence. The main goal was to discern the effect of a hid­
den interpretation if it was concurrently present. Drawing from semantic 
priming studies, we expected the recognition of a subpattem to be facilitated 
if it fits into one of the interpretations of the complete pattern which is active, 
be it the preferred one or the second best. Two possible assumptions concern­
ing the presence of the second-best interpretation can be distinguished, corre­
sponding to the two options introduced above: it is either absent (Option 1) 
or present (Option 2). These possibilities may be symbolized as: 
A(l) B(0) C(0) and A(l) B(l) C(0) respectively (note that C[0] in both 
cases holds under the assumption that Interpretation С is not accessible). 
Thus, any facilitation of the recognition of subpattem В relative to that of 
subpattem С may be seen as an indication of the concurrent presence of the 
second-best interpretation, in line with Option 2. 
Unfortunately, an intermediate score for subpatttem В has two reasonable 
alternative explanations. First, we already mentioned that preference may 
give similar results. Second, the recognition scores will necessarily be aver­
ages over subjects and trials. It has to be taken into account that the Subpat­
tem В may yield an intermediate score, not because it is concurrently present 
and hidden, but because it is the only one present on a minority of trials (and 
perhaps even for some subjects only). This is the third possibility concerning 
the presence of the subpattems, roughly symbolized by: A(l) B(l/2) C(0). 
We refer to it as a probabilistic presence. It is inspired by the observation 
that the proportion of time an alternative configuration of a multistable pat­
tern is perceived is a direct function of the probability that it will be per­
ceived initially (Sadler & Mefferd, 1970). We will evaluate these two alter­
native explanations by comparing the scores for the W-S order of 
presentation (complete pattern first and subpattem second, the main condi­
tion) with the scores for the reversed order of S-W. The relative preference 
for the corresponding interpretations of the complete pattern can be assumed 
to be equal in the two conditions. As for probabilistic presence, the idea is 
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that in the S-W condition, the subpattems are initially interpreted as being 
distinct objects, without any specific relation to the complete pattern and 
therefore without an effect on its mterpretation. A probabilistic presence 
would then result in the same relative frequencies of occurrence of the alter­
native interpretations as in the W-S condition: A(l) B(l/2) C(0). Therefore, 
it would also not predict any specific difference between S-W and W-S. 
In sum, of the four factors, only one is predicted to result in an extra facili­
tation of subpattem В when it is presented after the complete pattern, relative 
to the reversed (S-W) condition: the concurrent presence of the second-best 
interpretation (Option 2). This will become evident as an interaction between 
subpattems and order of presentation. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Material. In the following, we will use the term W-pattern to refer to a 
complete pattern and the term S-pattern instead of subpattem. Four sets of 
W-pattems and S-pattems are depicted in Figure 3. From each W-pattem 
three S-pattems are derived. 
The S-pattems contain an equal number of line lengths (e.g., five elements 
in the first set and two elements in the fourth set of Figure 3) and are meant 
to be of about equal complexity. In a control condition Sub-only, complexity 
indeed appeared to be balanced: The recognition of an S-pattem A, B, or C, 
followed by an overlapping mask (a rectangular grid), differed only margi­
nally (see Table 1). 
The S-pattems are intended to be compatible with the preferred interpreta­
tion (A), the second-best mterpretation (B), and a very unlikely interpretation 
(C). This relative order is established in a pilot study where 10 subjects were 
given three copies of each W-pattem and were asked to produce three phe­
nomenal subdivisions of the W-pattem (best, second best, third best) by 
marking some of the segments. The segmentation corresponding to the 
S-pattem of Type A was produced by nearly all subjects as the best segmen­
tation for each of the W-pattems; S-pattems of Type С were indicated in only 
a few cases. S-pattems of Type В yielded intermediate scores for a majority 
of the subjects. The four sets of Figure 3 are selected out of eight sets, 
because for these four the three S-pattems were chosen with the same reía-
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Figure 3. The four figure sets of a complete pattern (top) and three subpattems 
used in the experiments. (Subpattems are indicated by fatter lines in this figure 
only. The subdivisions in row A, B, and С correspond to the preferred, the sec­
ond best and an unlikely interpretation of the complete pattern. A coding 
model has been applied to obtain complexity measures of the subdivisions 
[bottom right hand comer]. Complexity is calculated as the number of descrip­
tive parameters of the structural codes of the components [letters, see Appen­
dix]). 
tive preference (A > В > С) in a control condition consisting of a tachisto-
scopic presentation of the W-pattem without an S-pattem. Furthermore, the 
relative preference is also consistent with the complexity of subdivisions of 
the W-pattems as calculated using the coding rules proposed by Leeuwen­
berg and Buffart (1983, see Appendix). This amounts to three independent 
tests which confirmed the order of preference between the three S-pattems 
for the four W-pattems that were selected. Four other sets failed to produce a 
consistent relative preference and were therefore discarded from the analysis. 
Wirelike patterns are chosen because surfaces—although they are prob­
ably more common stimuli—would introduce a number of confounded 
aspects. It seems very difficult to construct three surface segmentations of the 
same complexity and the same area. 
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The patterns were computer generated on a display (Vector-General Dis­
play Series 3, Model 2D3 with P4 phosphor), positioned at a distance of 2 m 
in front of the subject. Luminance of the patterns was adjusted so that they 
were clearly visible when presented for 10 msec in isolation without causing 
prominent after images. The visual angle subtended by a stimulus was about 
2°. The position on the screen of the S-patlems matched that of the corre­
sponding part of the W-pattem. The room (and the display) was moderately 
tube-lighted. A response panel was provided with a starting key and three 
keys corresponding to three response alternatives. 
Procedure. Fifty students of psychology participated and received a small 
payment. Each subject was tested individually. After a training series of 20 
trials, 248 trials were administered in a random order, which took about 30 
min. Trials were self-initiated. After the starting key was pressed, a fixation 
point appeared for 600 ms, followed by an empty screen for 300 ms. Then 
the two patterns (10 ms each) were presented, with one of four different 
SOAs: 20, 40, 60 or 100 ms. One second after the second stimulus the three 
S-pattems (А, В and C) belonging to the specific W-pattem, were displayed 
in a random order, from which the subject had to identify the subpattem 
which was presented in the flash together with the complete pattern. No 
feedback about the response was given. (In the training series, however, after 
an error the stimuli were shown once more but now for 1 s each). There were 
four conditions. In Condition W-S (96 trials: 4 SOAs χ 8 Figure sets χ 3 
S-pattems) a pair S-W was presented; Condition S-W was identical but now 
with the S-pattern first and the W-pattem second. In Condition Sub-only (24 
trials: 8 sets χ 3 S-pattems) an S-pattem was shown followed by a grid of 9 x 
9 lines which completely covered the S-pattem (SOA 20 ms). In Condition 
Complete-only (32 trials: 8 sets x 4 repetitions) a W-pattem was shown, so 
that none of the three alternatives was actually presented in the flash; sub­
jects did not report noticing this. 
Results 
The percentages of correctly recognized S-pattems for Condition W-S and 
the control Condition S-W are presented in Figure 4a and 4b, pooled over 
figure sets (see Figure 3) and subjects. Each of the four base axes in Figure 
4a and 4b represents the three S-pattems А, В and C, measured with four dif­
ferent SOAs. 
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Figure 4. Percentages of correctly recognized subpattems A, B, and С in 
Experiment 1. Panel a: Condition W-S, complete pattern first, subpattem sec­
ond. Panel b: Condition S-W, reveised order of presentation. 
The results are clearly dominated by an overall bias in favor of the better 
S-pattems (A > В > С). This bias cannot easily be explained by assuming a 
difference in dctectability of the S-patterns as such: Although in condition 
Sub-only S-pattems of Type A seem correctly recognized somewhat more 
often than those of Type В and Type С (26.6%, 24.0%, and 24.2%, respec­
tively), these scores do not differ significantly, F(2,4)=0.469, p<.70. In Fig­
ure 5a the "true" recognition scores are given after a bias correction has been 
applied (bias correction per figure set). The correction procedure is discussed 
below. 
The corrected scores for the S-W order differ from those of the W-S order. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed and the following two 
effects were significant. The recognition scores were better for larger SOAs, 
F(3,9)=37.711, p<.001. Order of presentation (W-S versus S-W) interacts 
with S-pattem, F(2,6)=13.725, p<.01. Further analyses showed that this inter­
action was mainly due to S-pattems A and B, F(l,3)=29.442, p<.02, while 
the interaction was not significant for В versus C, F(l,3)=7.278, p<.08, and 
for A versus C, F(l,3)=6.702, p<.09 (figure set as the error variable). 
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W—S Asynrhrony (msec) 
V 
A B C A B C A B C A B C 
20 40 60 100 
S—W Asynchrony (msec) 
Figure 5. Proportion ρ of correctly recognized subpattems in Experiment 1 
after a response-bias correction. Panel a: Condition W-S (complete pattern 
first, subpattera second). Panel b: Condition S-W (subpattem first, complete 
pattern second). 
We conclude that recognition of S-pattem В in the W-S condition is facili­
tated, as predicted on the basis of the assumption that the concurrent presence 
of the second-best interpretation of the complete pattern increases the visibil­
ity of the corresponding subpattern B. 
Bias correction. At all SOAs, the А, В and С scores in Figure 4a and 4b 
reflect the intended preference of the corresponding interpretations: A > В > 
С. Table 1 shows that part of this ordering is due to a response bias: the 
errors indicate a bias towards the "better" S-pattems. The raw scores are sep­
arated into two components: a probability р}- of recognizing S-pattem (/') and 
a bias Vj for response alternative j . Hits (on the diagonal) are fitted accord­
ing to the following expression: 
Pi + (l-Pi)x(Vj)/(V
sum
), 
where V
sum
 is 1 + V(2) + V(3) (and i=j). Errors (off-diagonal scores) are fit­
ted according to the second component only: 
(l-Pi)x(Vj)/(V
sum
), 
(where /*/'). The best fitting ρ and V values are determined by using an itera­
tive chi-square minimalisation (program Minuit, Cem, Geneva). Thus we 
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Table 1 
Uncorrected Scores in Experiment 1 for Conditions W-S and S-W 
Subpattern 
A 
В 
С 
Respon: 
a 
74 
42 
45 
зе category 
Ь 
17 
46 
25 
с 
9 
13 
29 
Note. Underlined values represent correctly recognized subpattems. The 
scores are pooled over conditions W-S (W-pattem first, S-patlem second) 
and S-W (reversed order of presentation). Values are in percent. 
have a response-bias correction revealing "true recognition" scores based on 
the overall enor-distribution. Below we will give some arguments for the 
necessary independence between "recognizing" (p) and "not-recognizing" (1 
-p). 
Each subject may have a different bias distribution V\· for each of the four 
figure sets. Thus it would be optimal to calculate the Vs for each of these 50 
x 4 cases separately and to use these Vs to correct the data per order of pres­
entation (W-S and S-W) and SOA. However, the V estimation and the subse­
quent calculation of ρ need a considerable number of observations in order 
not to produce spuriously extreme values of V and ρ (corrections per subject 
and figure set yielded p-distributions that were bimodal and often extremely 
skewed). Only at the level of figure sets there were enough observations for 
the bias correction to yield stable results. First the V values were computed 
for each figure set from the responses on all SOAs and both orders of presen­
tation. Then, with these Vs the ρ values were computed on each level of SOA 
and order. 
The correction requires independence between recognizing (p) and not-
recognizing (1 - p). Three observations indicate such an independence. First, 
the results of Condition Complete-only are shown in Table 2 for the four fig­
ure sets together with the V: values. These measures correlate strongly (r 2 
=.91). In other words, the responses in Condition Complete-only as well as 
the errors in Condition W-S and S-W seem to be made only on seeing the 
W-pattem; not reporting the right S-pattem does seem to be based upon 
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Table 2 
Scores in Condition Complete-only and Bias Values Computed for the W-S 
and S-W Conditions 
Figure 
set 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Score 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
a 
Bias 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Response 
Ь 
Score 
(%) 
47 
52 
59 
22 
category 
Bias 
.68 
.52 
.69 
.25 
Score 
(%) 
40 
7 
29 
21 
с 
Bias 
.55 
.08 
.34 
.21 
Note. For each figure set the results of condition Complete-only (a W-pat-
lem without an S-pattem) is presented together with tlie computed bias val­
ues for the W-S and S-W conditions. Bias values are proportions of those of 
response category a. 
being in a state of completely not-recognizing the target. Second, the error 
distribution was consistent over S-pattems. For each figure set and each 
order of presentation one error-score (a not-underlined cell in Table 1) was 
predicted using the error distribution in the other five cells. Although the cor­
relation between predicted and observed values was weak (r 2 =.32), the aver­
ages did not differ, l(7)=-0.61, p<0.56. Third, at an SOA of 20 ms (both in 
W-S and S-W) the S-pattems and the W-pattem can be expected to fuse into 
one stimulus, with some line elements extra bright due to luminance summa­
tion. However, this does not seem to have resulted in differently perceived 
W-pattems for each specific S-pattem. The V:-distribution for each of the 
four figure sets at SOA 20 ms is very similar to that of all four SOAs (r 2 
=.82,p<0.01). 
Effects of the previous trial. Trials were presented in a random order. 
Therefore, in about one out of every eight trials the stimuli were selected 
from the same figure set as in the immediately preceding trial. Frequently 
reported sequential effects on serial reaction time (e.g., Soetens, Boer, & 
Hueting, 1985) make it plausible that such a repetition of trials also will 
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affect recognition scores. Applying the bias correction will tell more about 
sequential effects. 
The S-pattem chosen on trial л - 1 (the previous trial) has a considerably 
increased chance to be selected on trial n, as can be seen in Table 3. (Analy­
ses according to what S-pattem was actually presented on trial η - 1 yield 
Table 3 
Sequential Effects: Uncorrected Scores and Computed Bias Values 
Response on trial η 
a b e 
Response on Score Score Score 
trial n-1 (%) Bias (%) Bias (%) Bias 
Experiment 1 
a 53 1.0 30 0.7 17 0.2 
b 39 1.0 45 1.5 16 0.4 
с 39 1.0 27 0.9 34 1.4 
Experiment 2 
a 52 1.0 30 0.4 18 0.2 
b 39 1.0 35 0.8 26 0.5 
с 42 1.0 32 0.6 26 0.5 
Note. The effect of the choice of subpattem chosen on trial я-1 on the 
choice on trial η for runs of trials with the same W-pattem. Uncorrected 
scores are given in percent; computed bias values as proportions of those of 
response category a. 
similar but weaker effects and are not reported). However, the same 
response-bias correction procedure as described above (although in an 
extended version) makes it plausible that this sequential effect can be com­
pletely assigned to the response-selection phase. Comparison of Tables 3 and 
4 shows that in case of the same figure sets the Vs are increased, in contrast 
to the ρ values which appear unaffected on the whole (Table 4). 
Hidden figures are ever present 49 
Table 4 
Sequential Effects: Bias-Corrected Scores (p) 
Response 
trial n-
a 
b 
с 
a 
b 
с 
on 
-1 
Response on 
a b 
Experiment 
51 14 
38 20 
53 26 
Experiment 
41 36 
46 49 
56 56 
1 
2 
trial η 
с 
29 
16 
9 
27 
42 
43 
Note. The effect of the choice of subpallem on trial и-1 on the choice on 
trial и for runs of trial with the same W-pattem. Values are in percent. 
In the W-S order of presentation the complete pattern seems to activate the 
preferred A interpretation and the complementary В interpretation, facilitat­
ing the recognition of the corresponding subpatterns A and B. However, two 
problems have to be dealt with. The results for nearly simultaneous presenta­
tion in the previous experiment (SOA 20 ms) are somewhat unclear, both in 
Condition W-S and S-W. The gradual decrease from A to С seems to be a 
mixture of the data from the more extreme SOAs in both Conditions. Second, 
one can wonder whether the bias correction on the level of each figure set (F) 
instead of each combination of subject and figure set (S χ F) did not distort 
the outcome. Therefore the experiment was replicated with the main purpose 
of collecting many repeated measurements. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Eleven subjects were run four times through a set of trials consisting only of 
figure sets 1 to 4 of Experiment 1 but each set was used two times. Thus 
eight replications were collected. 
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Results 
The scores were corrected in two ways: once for each F as has been done in 
the previous analysis (Figure 6a and 6b, solid lines), and once for each com-
7ч 
I I 
A B C A B C 
subpatlern 
100 60 
' ' ' 
Л 
A B C A B C 
W-
40 20 
S Asynchrony (msec) 
_ i _ 
A B C A B C A B C A B C 
20 40 60 100 
S - W Asynchrony (msec) 
Figure 6. Proportion ρ of correctly recognized subpattems in Experiment 2 
after a response-bias correction. Panel a: Condition W-S (complete pattern 
first, subpattem second). Panel b: Condition S-W (subpattem first, complete 
pattern second). (Bias corrections on two levels of aggregation of the data are 
compared: Solid lines = bias correction for each combination of subject and 
figure set; broken lines = for each figure set pooled over subjects, as in Experi­
ment 1.) 
bination of S and F (interrupted lines). The close similarity between the two 
sets of corrected scores is an indication that the bias correction of the data of 
Experiment 1 for each F only is equivalent to a correction on the "optimal" 
level of S and F. 
The ordering of scores over S-pattems for large SOAs in the S-W order is 
stable and similar to the response bias. Here, as in Experiment 1, another pat­
tern emerges, but now already at 20 ms in the S-W order. ANOVAs were 
performed on the three larger SOAs of S-W (100, 60 and 40 ms; Group 1) on 
the one hand, and three successive SOAs (S-W = 20; W-S = 20 and 40 ms; 
Group 2) on the other hand. In general, the same effects appeared as in 
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Experiment 1. Larger SOAs yield better scores for all three contrasts (A vs. 
В, В vs. C, and A vs. C, p<.01, in each case) and group interacted with S-pat-
tem only in the case of S-pattems A and B, F(l,3)=14.963, p<.05. No other 
effects were significant, which means that the interaction of group and S-pat-
tem is stable over figure sets. 
Runs of trials with stimuli selected from the same figure set now occurred 
twice as often as in the main experiment reported above. Again, the 
increased tendency to choose the same S-pattem in such a run can be 
ascribed to the bias component. No indications of facilitated "true" recogni­
tion are found (Tables 3 and 4). 
An ANOVA on the raw data showed that practice interacted with only one 
other factor: The percentage of correctly recognized S-pattems A did not 
improve with practice as much as did В and C, F(6,286)=3.42, p<.01) per­
haps partly because of a ceiling effect (A is recognized correctly in about 
80% of the trials) and partly because subjects became aware of the less obvi­
ous response alternatives (B and C) and their assumed equal frequency. 
Discussion 
The response bias correction does not seem to be overly sensitive to differ­
ences between subjects. Its application on the results of Experiment 1 seems 
to have been correct. However, the correction is based on a high threshold 
model assuming an independence between recognition and (educated) guess­
ing. High threshold models have been questioned on detailed second-guess 
data in a signal-detection setting (Coombs, Dawes and & , 1970; p. 189). 
However, we already argued that in the present study, the error responses 
were made on the basis of recognition of the W-pattem only. The indepen­
dence of the bias and the recognition component is underlined by the analysis 
of the sequential data: A repetition of stimuli did not improve recognition, 
but it did increase the bias toward the same response category. A conven­
tional signal-detection analysis, on the other hand, would not be optimal for 
these recognition data. To our knowledge, it requires a separate treatment of 
the hits and false alarms for each response category. However, the false 
alarm rate in one category depends on the bias for another category. These 
dependencies can be accounted for by combining the error distributions of all 
three response categories into one integral distribution, as has been done in 
the present analysis. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We probed for the presence of interpretations of an unambiguous pattern (W) 
other than the preferred interpretation by looking at the recognizabilily of 
subpattems (S) of that pattern presented immediately before or after it. The 
recognition scores, corrected for response biases, are presented in Figure 5 
(Experiment 1) and Figure 6 (Experiment 2). Both sets of data show a facili­
tation of the recognition of the second-best (B) subpattem in the W-S condi­
tion relative to the S-W condition. That is, the S-W curves are more L-shaped 
than the W-S curves. We want to explain this interaction on the basis of the 
concurrent presence of the second-best interpretation (Option 2). In the intro­
duction, we have already given arguments why we explain it neither on the 
basis of the relative strength of the alternative organizations nor by allowing 
for a probabilistic one-at-a-time dominance of the A or the В interpretation. 
We will now consider other alternative explanations of the data. 
Masking 
The paradigm of the present experiment is similar to that of studies directed 
at visual masking. Given the range of onset asynchronies which we used, 
numerous theories of masking predict an inhibiting effect of the complete 
pattern on the subpattem and vice versa. In fact, this is one of the reasons that 
the presence of (hidden) interpretations could only result in a facilitation of 
the recognition of compatible subpattems relative to that of incompatible 
subpattems. To explain the particularly good recognition of the В subpattems 
in the W-S condition in terms of visual masking, we want to point out that 
aspects of a more or less primitive nature on which В subpattems may differ 
from the other subpattems are of primary importance. We want to argue that 
our material is balanced with respect to at least some low-level aspects gen­
erally assumed to play a role in masking. The subpattems within each set 
were balanced with respect to the length of the constituting lines. In addition, 
the area enclosed by the smallest convex envelope was exactly the same 
within each set. Together, these two aspects made it safe to assume that 
brightness differences (Turvey, 1973) and differences in spatial frequency 
(Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976) were negligible. It is our estimation that the 
same holds for "eccentricity", although there are small differences: Subpat-
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tem A of the left-most set in Figure 3, for example, is presented somewhat 
more parafoveally than, for instance, subpattem С of the same set; this may 
cause this particular A subpattem to be less susceptible to masking (Breit-
meyer, 1980). Lateral inhibition or perhaps "metacontrast" may arise 
because of contrast gradients at points where lines appear or disappear from 
subpattem to complete pattern or vice versa (Lefton, 1973). Again, figure 
sets were sufficiently balanced in our estimation. 
Features and Similarity 
The subpattems may have differed with respect to a host of other, more 
structural features. Hellige, Walsh, Lawrence, and Prasse (1979) established 
that from a SOA of 20 ms, a letlerlike pattern was recognized better to the 
extent that it had less featural similarity with a mask presented after it. With­
out attempting to define featural similarity, we may assume that the similar­
ity between a subpattem and complete pattern can be symbolized as: i(W,A) 
> i(W,B) > i(W,C). Our overall results (better recognition of more similar 
subpattems) clearly run against those of Hellige et al. This need not be a con­
tradiction if Hellig et al. did not really measure featural similarity but simply 
the effect of the degree of overlap between target and mask. Overlap has 
been shown to attenuate target identification (Michaels & Turvey, 1979, 
Experiment E4). Instead of featural similarity, the term template similarity 
seems more appropriate with respect to their effects. Our complete patterns 
overlapped the subpattems entirely, so the results of Heilige el al. do not 
seem to bear on the present results at all. 
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that our materials were 
not properly balanced with respect to some figurai features. In fact, it is una­
voidable that alternative organizations of a pattern differ more or less on 
aspects of a more local nature. We cannot discuss this problem thoroughly 
because the number of feature descriptions of even the simple patterns 
presently used is unlimited (Fu, 1972). However, we did inspect our materi­
als with respect to this problem in two ways. First, what we assume to be the 
effect of a hidden pattern organization may have been the result of differ­
ences in similarity due to a relatively good match of essential features of the 
preferred organization and the В subpattems which the С subpattems lacked. 
We assessed the extent to which subpattems were compatible with or vio-
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lated the most plausible "essential features" of the preferred organizations: 
vertices, line continuations and part boundaries. В subpattems are on the 
average only slightly more compatible than С subpattems (33% vs. 27%, 
compared with, of course, 100% for the A subpattems) and violate only mar­
ginally less of these essential features (52% vs. 61%; 0% for A). Second, 
subpattems may differ irrespective of the relation with the preferred orga­
nization (note that the term similarity does not apply here). Most important, 
subpattems В did not differ from A and С with respect to two so-called 
"primitive features" or "textons" (Julesz, 1981; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; 
Treisman, 1986): the number of line tenninators and orientation. Only the 
amount of "closure" is somewhat less for В than for A and С (see, for 
instance, Figure 3, second set from the right). It is possible that this resulted 
in В subpattems that are more vulnerable to masking (especially in the S-W 
condition). However, we want to remind the reader that the analysis of the 
results shown in Figure 6 did not reveal an interaction between figure sets 
and the differential effect for the В subpattem. 
We want to conclude with the remark that the concept of similarity 
remains vague, all the more when one considers that (he advantage for (he 
concurrently present В subpattem can be said to be the result of its similarity 
to one of the (hidden) organizations of the complete pattern. We want to 
stress that the latter use of similarity relates to an aspect common to the per­
ceptual organization of both complete pattern and subpattem, and not to a 
correspondence between local (geometric) features. 
Masking Due to Incompatible Interpretations 
In an earlier study (Leeuwenberg, Mens, & Calis, 1985), indications were 
found that even with SOAs as small as 30 ms, the first of two tachistoscopi-
cally presented patterns may be detected with difficulty when the organiza­
tion of the second pattern cannot easily be expressed in terms of the first one. 
Such an effect of "incompatible" interpretations does seem to be in agree­
ment wi(h (he declining recognition curves in the present condition S-W. It 
is what one expects on (he basis of the relative preference for the three orga­
nizations. On (he other hand, the W-S results deviate from such an explana­
tion. Instead of preference, the concurrent presence of A and В interpreta­
tions is what we take to be the explanation. 
Hidden figures are ever present 55 
Anticipation 
One may suspect that subjects have learned to adapt to the task by anticipat­
ing the A and the В subpattems before each presentation (either by conscious 
anticipation or in a more involuntary way). We have three arguments against 
such a learned anticipation. The first is that anticipation—at least par­
tially—has been identified and accounted for. As stated before, subjects 
tended to choose the same subpattem as they did on the immediately preced­
ing trial in the occasional instance that identical complete patterns were pre­
sented on subsequent trials (Table 3 and 4). This, however, proved to be a 
bias without an accompanying increase in the corrected scores. It may be 
assumed that knowledge of alternative subpattems developing over a larger 
number of trials would share its workings with that of the short-term recall of 
the immediately preceding trial. If that is correct, long-term learning appar­
ently affects the true, corrected recognition scores as little as does the imme­
diate sequential effect. The second argument against an explanation in terms 
of learning is that an analysis of the raw scores of Experiment 2 showed that 
the recognition of both subpattems В and С improved with practice more 
than that of subpattem A, instead of an improvement for В only. The third 
and last argument is that anticipation as such is not sufficient to explain the 
difference between the S-W and the W-S order of presentation. 
There are aspects of the results which do indicate a sensitivity of the (bias-
corrected) recognition to differences in the procedure of Experiments 1 and 
2. The curves of the two experiments differ with respect to both the SOA at 
which the presence of the alternative interpretation is assumed to become 
effective, as well as the relatively good recognition of the В subpattem in the 
S-W condition of Experiment 2. We do not claim to be able to account for 
these differences, but we do want to make one suggestion. One distinctive 
aspect of the procedure of Experiment 2 was that we used four instead of 
eight figure sets as Experiment 1. This might have resulted in a less demand­
ing task, leaving resources free for a more extended processing of the com­
plete pattern. In that case, second-best interpretations may occasionally be 
preferred, which is similar to the relative freedom to shift from one percep­
tual organization to another under prolonged viewing. 
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Finally, a word about the relevance of the present results. Besides the tachis-
toscopic presentation, the nature of the material may be deemed artificial and 
leading to results of little importance. Indeed, the need to balance the subpat-
tems for as many local features as possible has led to the use of wirelike pat­
terns that do not suggest surfaces, occluding edges, and such. Still, our com­
plete patterns are equivalent to some natural shapes such as leafless trees and 
scratches on a hard surface. Furthermore, wirelike patterns are involved in 
numerous phenomena often used to demonstrate important aspects of percep­
tion (e.g., the Necker cube). One has also to consider the body of research 
using letters and digits. 
We have presented an indication of the concurrent presence of a hidden 
shape interpretation. Although we think that such a hidden interpretation is 
more compatible with the view that perception optimizes the representation 
of structure than wilh the view that it minimizes processing costs, it is far 
from decisive. The present results do not tell us how the visual system selects 
these interpretations. The possibilities still vary widely. For instance, in an 
initial encoding phase, a very large set of interpretations may be generated; 
on the other hand, it could be that in general no superfluous interpretation is 
generated at all and that the system immediately converges on the small set 
of the prefened and (one) alternative inlerpretalion(s). The latter would 
imply some sort of minimization after all. In any case, it is possible that we 
have shown only the outcome of shape encoding, not how this outcome is 
achieved. 
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Appendix 
Table Al 
The complexity of components of the A, B, and С subdivisions of the four figure sets 
(Experiments 1 and 2) is calculated on the basis of the coding rules proposed by 
Leeuwenberg (1971). Letters refer to components depicted in Figure 3. 
Component Code Reduced code Information 
load 
a 
b 
с 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
к 
1 
qmam 
qlam 
qmambm 
gm 
qm[am]m 
gm[amam]m 
qmamam 
qlamal 
qmambmbmam 
qmamambmbm 
qS (m, a) 
q<m><ab>m 
qS(m, [am] ) 
qS(m, [2(am)]) 
q2 (ma)m 
qS(la,m) 
q(S (<m><ab>,m) 
q<m><2 (a) 2 (b) >m 
qamalbmlamalm —»· q< (S (la,m) ) >< (bm) (m) > 
r r l ятпятл ГЬтпТ r» r r l 9 I а™\ Г т К І τ-, 
-i * / L j г 
4 
4 
5 
2 
5 
б 
5 
5 
б 
7 
8 
а 
Note: q=position and orientation; 2(χ)=χχ·, <x><yz>xyxz; []=biftircation operator, 
—»=reduction of left code into right code; .=parameter contributing to the load. 
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The Perceptual Representation of 
Array-Element Position: 
Grouping and the Span of Apprehension 
Lucas H. M. Mens and Emanuel L. J. Leeuwenberg 
University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
When looking at an array of identical and regularly spaced elements (e.g. a 
grating), one becomes aware of a severe limitation in the number of elements 
that can simultaneously be attended to, testifying a limited span of apprehen-
sion. A small number of elements allows for a representation of each individ-
ual element; many elements yield a texture-like impression. A coding model is 
presented as a tentative explanation of this limited span of apprehension. In 
the model, the relative position of pairs of elements is completely specified 
with binary ordering relations. Only a limited possibility of combining binary 
relations on one hierarchical level is assumed. The model predicts that the 
"individuated" representation of 4 to 6 elements requires a representation of 
deeper hierarchy than one of 1 to 3 elements, but less deep that still larger 
anays. In a same/different task, subjects indicated whether two successively 
presented arrays of identical and equidistant shapes contain an equal number of 
those shapes. As predicted, the reaction times increased sharply between 3 and 
4. Some support for the predicted discontinuity between 6 and 7 is also pre-
sented. Instead of indicating a fixed capacity, the limited range of processes 
such as subitizing and focal perception may well be explained by structural 
constraints—such as the ones imposed by the present model—on the format of 
representation. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about the representation of positional information in a visual 
array. A tentative model will be presented in which the ordering relations 
between the individual elements of a linear array are explicitly represented in 
A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at the eight European Conference 
on Visual Perception in Peniscola, Spain, 1985. An abstract can be found in Percep-
tion, 1985,14, AIO. 
This research was supported in part by the Netherlands Organization for the 
Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.). 
The authors wish to thank Noud van Kniysbergen for his assistance in these 
experiments. 
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a propositional code. Constraints will be formulated which lead to the pre­
diction of a discontinuous increase in representational complexity with the 
number of array elements, modelling the discontinuous increase in perceived 
complexity. 
In his classical study on grouping effects in visually perceived forms, 
Goldmeier (1936/1972) notes the fundamentally different appearance of Fig-
C (8) D (5) 
E (3) F (β) 
Figure I. The effect of the number of elements on number-preserving similar­
ity judgements. Eight of 11 subjects judged A to be more similar to С than to 
E: only 5 judged В to be more similar to D than to F. Similar data from Gold­
stein (1972/1936, p.48) are: 7.5 out of 10 for A,C and 3 out of 12 for B,D. 
ure J В as opposed to Figure JA. In Figure 1A, each element seems to be a 
unique shape in its own right, while the elements in IB are only part of the 
"material" of the global percept. Accordingly, subjects judge A as more simi­
lar to С than to E, while В is judged to be more similar to F than to D. Look­
ing at an element in В gives one the impression that the visual system cannot 
establish the position of each element unequivocally. As a result, it is diffi­
cult to discern all elements of the array simultaneously, which results in a 
texture-like appearance. In contrast, JA seems to allow for an "individuated" 
perceptual representation of each element. 
One may wonder whether the number of elements is the crucial differ­
ence between A and B. It certainly is not the only factor. Kimchi and Palmer 
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(1982) emphasize that decreasing the absolute size of the elements may 
induce a shift towards texture-like appearances. One can observe a possibly 
similar phenomenon by decreasing the brightness of a random-dot display to 
a very low level. This leads to an increase of perceived numerosity. The 
common cause may be a decrease in the sensory signal/noise ratio. Thus, 
absolute size seems to be a factor but probably only in nearly-threshold 
cases. Another possible factor is the size of the elements relative to the size 
of the array as a whole (compare Figure 2A and 2B). In a pilot study we 
established that the relative size had only a very small effect on the number 
of number-preserving similarity judgements. Therefore, the number of ele-
ments as such does seem to be a crucial factor, within the limits of sensory 
sensitivity. Of course the limited capacity to discern perceptual elements is 
directly linked to the old concept of the span of apprehension (see Craik & 
Levy, 1976) and to later operationalisations which have led, for instance, to 
the magical number(s) of STM. However, the model which we want to pro-
pose is intended for visual perception, and not for the rehearsal of verbal 
material, so we will not discuss the various theories of item association 
within a STM list (see McNicol & Heatcote, 1986). We will merely quote 
Shiffrin (1976) who states that "order information may be more basic than 
item mformation in short-term retention" (p. 203) and that "the advantages of 
chunking and spacing, and the improved retention of positional information 
may result from active processing on the part of the subject.." (p. 204). It is 
exactly the need for active processing of positional information which we 
think is basic to the problem of perceptually keeping many elements apart 
from each other. We propose the chunking of elements into a hierarchical 
code as the only way of coping with larger numbers of elements. 
Another indication of the limited ability to retain positional information 
can be found in a study of Attneave and Curlee (1983) who asked subjects to 
imagine a point wandering in a matrix according to spoken instructions. 
After twelve of these instructions, the final position in (imagined) matrices of 
size 3 *3 was correctly indicated in about 90% of the trials, whereas matrices 
of size 4 *4 and larger proved to be considerably more difficult. Performance 
on the larger matrices improved when the subjects were instructed to use a 
(hierarchical) structuring into smaller sub-matrices. The authors argue for 
the equivalence of imagined and perceptual positional information; a pixel-
like representation is dismissed. 
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Figure 2. Six arrays were constructed using varying number (3 versus 7) and 
lengths of lines (1, 2 or 3 units, compare 2A and 2B). Two arrays were derived 
from each array A and B, both three times as large: arrays С and D are simple 
enlargements and therefore preserve the number of elements; in E and F the 
spacing between the lines is the same as in A and B, keeping the (local) texture 
constant. Subjects had to indicate whether С (D) or E (F) was more similar to 
A (B). The number of elements in A and В had a strong effect on the number-
preserving responses (that is, С and D), but the length of the elements in A ver­
sus B, and therefore the relative size of the elements, did not. 
Also indicating a limited span of apprehension are studies on number 
perception. Here too, small numbers of elements are processed in another 
way than large numbers. Reaction times of a naming task for displays within 
the range of 1 to about 3, 4 or 5 elements (depending on mode of presenta­
tion and on the analysis) are shorter than those for larger arrays. The seem­
ingly "immediate" perception of the numerosity of small sets of elements has 
led to the coming of the term subitizing. Several authors have made an 
attempt at explaining subitizing. Following Woodworth and Schlosberg 
(1954), in some studies fast subitizing responses are predicted for over-
learned configurations of elements (e.g. 4 is a quartet; Mandler & Shebo, 
1982; Simons & Langheinrich, 1982). Others have proposed a bottleneck 
Representation and apprehension 65 
due to some limited capacity, be it in the number of receptive fields acting as 
"counting units" (Atkinson, Campbell & Francis, 1976), or in the number of 
slots in short-term memory to keep track of which items have been counted 
(Averbach, 1963). It has also been claimed that subitizing is but one manifes-
tation of a general process of discrimination, special only because with small 
numbers of elements, the uncertainty of discrimination does not exceed a 
critical threshold (Woodworlh & Schlosberg, 1954; van Oeffelen & Vos, 
1982). The actual value of this threshold is empirically established. Finally, 
Klahr (1976) has to be mentioned who modelled subitizing in an algorithm 
which attempts template matches of increasing size until a template big 
enough for the stimulus is found. Then the number response is derived from 
an iteration index. The maximal size of the template is a free parameter, esti-
mated on the basis of subitizing data. 
What all these explanations do not give is a principled account for the 
range of arrays which can be subitized; a theory about representation and 
associated processing is lacking. Below we will propose a model about limi-
tations on the representation of positional information which may partly 
explain subitizing. It is only a partial explanation because with respect to 
subitizing it is important to distinguish between the initial phase of the per-
ceptual encoding and retention of the pattern, and the subsequent phase of 
number retrieval. These processes probably have distinct functional and 
developmental bases, as is indicated by the following two facts: young chil-
dren do not subitize, but instead start with counting even very small arrays 
(Gelman & Gallistel, 1978); on the other hand, even infants of age 2 show 
dishabituation if an array of 2 changes into one of 3 but not if larger arrays 
are used (Starkey & Cooper, 1980; Strauss & Curtis, 1981; Anteil & Keating, 
1983). Therefore, an early form of the "immediate apprehension" of a small 
number of items does seem to exist, independent of the ability to derive a 
numeric label from this perceptual knowledge. We want to focus on the per-
ceptual process, not on the arithmetical and verbal second one. 
We will restrict ourselves to the "immediate apprehension" of horizontal 
arrays of identical vertical lines. The advantage of such linear arrays is that 
the global outline qualitatively stays the same with varying numbers of ele-
ments. The reason for the restriction to identical elements is that they can be 
kept apart solely on the basis of their individual position, as they do not differ 
in (meaningful) content. More specifically, we assume that the preferred 
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shape representation of the presently used materials is independent of the 
number of elements (it is, roughly speaking always "an array of identical ele-
ments"), and that the task demands a second representation which does pre-
serve the numerosity. In this respect, it is convenient to think of this second 
representation as being complementary, supplying information relevant to the 
task lacking in the first representation (Collard & Buffart, 1983). Note that 
"an array of identical elements" also seems to be an appropriate characterisa-
tion of the texture-like interpretation. This implies that we assume that the 
two interpretations (the individuated one discerning each element and the 
texture-like one) differ only in the presence of the complementary represen-
tation which allows for a more complete representation. 
In the following, we propose a model for an individuated representation 
which is complete with respect to the ordering relations. We will predict the 
processing load for a given array-length from the model. At this point we 
want to emphasize that, although one may instruct subjects to be accurate, 
one cannot prevent that a texture-like representation is used which is incom-
plete but which offers an "easy way out", especially with very large and/or 
briefly presented arrays. We will also see that conditions differ in discrimin-
ability on the basis of such a texture-like representation. 
A tentative model of positional information in a linear array 
Our aim is to model the representation of a series of elements in such a way 
that information about the number of elements is preserved. In the introduc-
tion, we have already dismissed a coding in terms of spatial coordinates. 
Another possible solution would be to assume an early counting process gen-
erating explicite numbers as output. Pattern "I I", for example, can be coded 
as "2 *(l)". The problem then is how to distinguish "2" from another number, 
say "4". We see two options. The first is to represent the numbers in an ana-
logue dimension, which re-introduces the shortcoming of a discrimination 
account discussed above and which, implicating a dense symbol system 
(Pylyshyn, 1984, p. 199), is not meaningful in a cognitive view of mind. The 
second way to distinguish numbers is by reference to knowledge of arith-
metical rules (e.g. "4=2+2"), which we consider to be inaccessible to percep-
tion. Instead of using numbers, we will encode geometric information in a 
discrete symbol scheme using a binary proposition which may be thought of 
as: -is-left-of- (cf. Sutherland, 1968; Foster, 1985). For convenience, the 
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symbol "<" will be used to represent this relation. Using the notation a for 
the first element and b for the second, sequence "I I" can be coded as 
"{a<b)". Both a and b are to be understood as place tokens expressing the 
presence of an (unspecified) perceived object at a certain position a and b 
respectively. We require the code to be complete. For instance, code 
"(q<b),(a<c)" of a sequence of three elements is incomplete because it does 
not specify the ordering with respect to b and с On the other hand, code 
"(a<b),{b<c)" is complete. It may be noted that the latter code implies a 
superordinate ordering of the propositions "(a<b)" and "{b<c)". In contrast 
to coding models such as that of Foster (1985), we require such an ordering 
to be expressible using the same binary relation. In order to be able to do so, 
we introduce the notion of a chunk: each relation (e.g. "(a<¿>)") may enter a 
(a<b) {b<c) <r- Chunk Level 1 
(л- < у) <— Chunk Level 2 (redundant) 
superordinate level as one chunk x. Hence: An assumption is that the 
expressions on the first Level (that is: (a<b) (b<c)) already satisfy the com­
pleteness requirement. The reason for this assumption is that b in both 
instances denotes one and the same place token of a perceived object. As a 
result, the superordinate expression "(xcy)" is considered to be redundant. It 
(a<b) Chunk Level 1 
(x < c) Chunk Level 2 
clearly is not redundant in the following code of three elements: 
Expression " ( ж е ) " does contain new information and therefore adds an 
independent level. In Table la representative selection is given of alternative 
codes for sequences of length 2 to 8. Two possible measures of complexity 
are supplied in Table 1. The number of binary relations increases linearly 
with the number of elements, which of course is not informative. Moreover, 
the number of binary relations does not distinguish between alternative codes 
for a given number of elements. The number of Chunk Levels, on the other 
hand, displays discontinuities between 3 and 4 and between 6 and 7. Thus we 
will use Chunk Level as a predictor for the complexity of an array. 
As an alternative to the notation in Table 1, brackets may be used to indi­
cate the hierarchical nesting of levels in perhaps a more instructive way. A 
code of a sequence of 8 may be written as follows: 
( {{a<b)<{c<d)) < ((e<f)<(g<h)) ) 
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Table 1 
Alternative codes for arrays of length 2 to 8 
Length Code Number of Nunber of Preferred 
relations levels 
2 (a<b) 1 1 · 
3 (a<b) (b<o) 
χ y 2 1 » 
(a<b) 
(x < c) 2 2 
(a<b) (o<d) 
(x < У) 3 
(a<b) (b<o) 
(x < d) 3 
5 (a<b) (b<o) (d<e) 
(x < y) 
(a<b) (c<d) 
(x < y) 
(z < e) 
(a<b) (b<e) (d<e) (e<f) 
(x < y) 
(a<b) (e<d) 
(x < y) (e<f) 
(P < q) 
(a<b) (b<c) (d<e) (e<f) 
(x < y) 
(s < g) 6 
(a<b) (c<d) 
(x < y) (e<f) (f<g) 
(s < t) 6 
8 (a<b) (c<d) (e<f) (g<h) 
(x < y) (p < q) 
(s < t) 7 3 
Note. A representative selection of codes for arrays of 1 to 8 elements. The place 
tokens are given the letters <a,b,..,h>; Chunks are refened to by the letters <p,q,..z>. 
A selection between alternative codes (identified with an asterisk) is made on the 
basis of the number of non-redundant Chunk Levels. 
Summing up, we have proposed a representation of arrays of identical ele­
ments with the following properties: 
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(1) A code must preserve the information about the ordering completely. 
(2) Place tokens are used linking the array elements to the code. 
(3) The relative position of a pair of elements is coded in a binary ordering 
relation defined over their place tokens: "(a-is-left-of-b)". 
(4) For the complete coding it may be necessary to express the ordering rela­
tion between ordered pairs on a higher level (again using binary ordering 
relations). This amounts to the formation of Chunk Levels. 
(5) Identical place tokens in two ordered pairs bound in a (higher order) 
chunk render that chunk redundant. 
(6) The number of Levels with non-redundant chunks is a measure for the 
complexity of the code. 
EXPERIMENT 
The model presented above implies that arrays of length 1, 2 and 3 are repre­
sented without the formation of a second Chunk Level. Arrays of length 4, 5 
and 6 are represented with two Chunk Levels. Therefore, an extra load is 
predicted for arrays with more than three elements. To show this difference, 
the following task is chosen. An array (SI) made of a number (n) of identical 
line patterns is presented for 1 sec. After that, another array (S2) is shown 
containing the same number of elements (n) or a different number of ele­
ments (one less: n-1, or one more: n+l). The second array is shown for only 
150 msec to prevent the effect of subsequent eye-fixations. Subjects have to 
respond as fast as possible with a same or different response. 
A marked increase in RT of same trials is predicted for arrays with more 
than three elements in S2. In fact, the same increase is indicated by the model 
between 6 and 7 elements,1 but it is likely that increases at higher numbers 
will be obscured by another effect: as is demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2, 
larger arrays elicit an increasing tendency towards a texture-like representa­
tion which is not as accurate as the representation proposed above (as far as 
the number of elements is concerned) but which allows for a fast same/differ­
ent response. 
1
 Indeed, an infinite sequence of transitions to higher levels follows from the 
model after 3, 6, 12, 24,.. elements, characterised by: 3 *2n (л=0,1,2,.. ). 
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We expect that the option of a texture-like representation also will 
obscure the results of different trials because length and/or density differ-
ences between two arrays of unequal number are more informative. Using 
random dot displays, Foster (1978) concluded that "Different number" judge-
ments are mediated (in part) by a shape-independent representation consist-
ing of area and density features. "Same number" judgements, on the other 
hand, were found to be based on a representation of the shape of the pattern. 
Therefore, if the discontinuity is present between 3 and 4 elements in S2 for 
the different trials, we predict it to be less distinct than for the same trials. 
Method 
Materials 
Two series of patterns consisting of horizontal rows of line patterns (circles, 
triangles, squares or crosses) were presented on each trial. Series 1 (SI) con-
tained 1 to 8 elements, Series 2 (S2) contained the same number, one less or 
one more (1 to 9). S2 was always constructed using a different shape as for 
SI. These series were computer generated on a display (Vector General 
Graphics Display Series 3, Model 2D3 with P4 phosphor) positioned at a dis-
tance of 250 cm in front of the Subject. The visual angle subtended by each 
element was 0.12 degrees. The spacing between elements varied randomly 
from trial to trial. The maximal visual angle of the largest series was 4.4 
degrees. Furthermore, the eccentricity of each series was varied at random 
with a minimum of 0.4 and a maximum of 1.2 degrees visual angle in a ran-
domly chosen direction from a fixation point. All these (random) variations 
were added in order to avoid responses on the basis of the perception of 
apparent movement, the length of the array, or other (in)variant aspects not 
under study. The experimental room was dimly lit. A response panel was 
provided with a starting key and separate keys for same and different. 
Procedure 
Fifteen students of psychology participated to fulfill introductory course 
requirements. Each subject was tested individually. After a training session 
of 20 trials, 368 trials followed in a random order which took about 40 min-
utes. Trials were self-initiated. After the starting key was pressed, a fixation 
point was shown which preceded SI by 600 msec. SI was presented for 1000 
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msec followed by one of four different intervals (ISI): 0, 8, 30 or 400 msec. 
Finally S2 was presented for 150 msec. A trial was completed when the Sub-
ject selected the same or different key. Reaction times were measured from 
the onset of S2. Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. In case of 
a RT beyond 900 msec the text "Please respond faster" was displayed. 
Wrong responses were signaled to the Subject with a buzz. Each combination 
of the numbers of elements in SI and in S2 (3 *8 - 1 , no sequence of 1 and 0 
elements of course) was presented at each ISI 16 times (using each pattern 
("circle" etc.) 4 times in SI). 
Results 
The average RT's and the percentages correct for the three Conditions (one 
less, same number, one more) are shown in Figure 3. An ANOVA was per-
formed for each of the three Conditions on the median RT's of each Subject 
per ISI. (A separate analysis on the correct responses yielded very similar 
results and will not be reported.) A significant increase in RT with increas-
ing number of elements in S2 is present in all three Conditions (one less: 
F(6,392)=4.57, p<0.01; same number: F(7,448)=6.27, p<0.01; one more: 
F(7,448)=4.60, p<0.01). ISI has no significant main effect, nor does it inter-
act with the number of elements in S2. Significant differences between RT's 
for each number of elements in S2 per Condition as indicated by a Student 
Newman-Keuls test (a=0.05) are depicted in Figure 3 by the dotted lines. 
The predicted jump in RT from 3 to 4 elements in S2 is evident. 
The error rates covary with latencies, suggesting that the RT results are 
not caused by speed-accuracy trade-offs. As a whole, the errors increase 
gradually with the number of elements. There are no significant differences 
(SNK, a=0.05) between two subsequent array-lengths, except for S2: 5—»6 
and S2: 6—»7 in Condition one less. 
Discussion 
A steep increase of reaction times between 3 and 4 elements in S2 is present 
in Condition same number, as predicted. It is, however, not present in the 
other two Conditions. As stated above, the lack of a clear effect in different 
trials can easily be understood as the result of the discriminability of SI and 
S2 in these trials due to a "simple" difference in area and density. Then, a 
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Ά . RT
 ч (msec) 
600 
7 0 0 І -
"Same number' 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
# elements In S2 
6 00 -C L 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
- 50 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Figure 3. Samel different judgements times (in msec) and percentages error. 
The second array (S2) contains one element less, the same number or one ele­
ment more than the first array (SI). Subsequent RT's of a curve not connected 
by one of the horizontal lines at the bottom (see same number) differ sifhifi-
cantly (SNK grouping, a=0.05). 
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complete, "individuated" representation is not the only basis for the same/dif-
ferent response. 
The predicted extra increase in complexity from 6 to 7 elements could 
not be established. Instead, subjects seemed to make a fast but inaccurate 
response based on a less exhaustive representation of the largest arrays. In a 
subsequent experiment, we gave one of our subjects extensive practice on the 
same task (4 replications). This subject was selected because he produced the 
shortest mean latencies. The subject was pressed to make no errors, even on 
the larger arrays. In order to discourage errors on the larger arrays, only 
arrays of length 4 to 8 were administered. RT's decreased with practice 
(F(3,15)=5.59, p<0.01) but practice did not interact with the number of ele-
ments in S2, nor with the difference between the number of elements of SI 
and S2. The effect of array-length is not straightforward. See Figure 4 for 
'Same number' 
- 26 
% 
error 
Figure 4. Same/different judgement times and percentages error of subject 
CS. (four replications of the same task) for the condition same number. 
the results of the crucial Condition same number. The number of errors 
increases considerably between 6 and 7, but inspection of Figure 4 reveals a 
large drop in the RT's at the same point. Although the RT results run against 
our hypothesis, we are inclined to interpret the large speed-accuracy trade-off 
as a support for the predicted increase in complexity of the code. As argued 
before, subjects may rely on an inaccurate texture representation if it leads to 
a fast response, but the same may well happen if not enough effort or inspec-
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(ion time is available to reach an individuated representation. In spite of his 
considerable skill, this subject seemed to be able to reach that individuated 
representation for arrays beyond length 6 much less easily than for smaller 
arrays, in agreement with the predicted increase in complexity. 
It has to be noted that the 6-7 effect observed in the single subject study 
seems to have a qualitatively different basis than the 3-4 effect observed in 
the main experiment. RT's and errors in the main experiment covary with 
the number of elements in the array presented in the second position (S2, see 
Fig. 3). The responses of the single subject were clearly dominated by the 
first array (SI) instead, as an inspection of the data showes. Furthermore, of 
the three ISI's (1, 8, 30 and 400 msec) the longest ISI yielded increased RT's 
(SNK grouping, a=.05) while ISI did not have any effect in the main experi-
ment. This strongly suggests that the single subject entertained strong expec-
tations about the second array based on the perception of the first array, not 
only of the arrival time but also of the difficulty of gaining a sufficiently 
good impression. Arrays of length 7 and 8 seem to be processed in a much 
more superficial way. 
Thus, even a proficient subject who received considerable practice dis-
played considerable difficulty with arrays of length 7 and larger. We con-
clude that the span of apprehension does not shift continuously with practice. 
Firm support for the predicted transition to a higher-level representation 
between 6 and 7, however, is lacking and seems to require an even easier 
task than the present same/different judgement about two successively pre-
sented arrays. One extra piece of evidence can be found in Goldmeier's 
(1936/1972) similarity judgment studies. Goldmeier's results were gathered 
under prolonged viewing conditions. It is obvious that similarity judgements 
and individual scanning strategies will not result in clear-cut results. How-
ever, using triads such as in Figure 1, number constancy (I—»II in Figure 1) 
was preferred for up to about 6 elements. At 7 and 8 elements, density-pre-
serving judgments appear, which dominate from 9 upwards. Thus we find at 
least some extra support for the predicted increase in complexity beyond 6. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We conclude that the increase in complexity of the codes for arrays of length 
4 and larger was confirmed by the increased time taken to decide whether 
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two subsequently presented arrays contain an equal number of elements. 
Indications for the predicted increase in complexity from 6 to 7 were found 
in a marked speed-accuracy trade-off at that point. Furthermore, we believe 
that larger arrays can be perceived without excessive inaccuracy, but only on 
the basis of a complex representation constructed after prolonged viewing. 
Instead of being explained by a fixed capacity limitation ("the number of 
slots"), the difficulty which perceivers experience to keep identical elements 
apart (the "span of apprehension") is modelled as an essential limitation on 
the structure of the mental representation. 
Of the six properties of the model listed above, at least three of them 
(properties 3, 4 and 5) are straightforward assumptions while the others can 
be considered to be generally acceptable statements. It is clear that the 
present results support the model as a whole, but hardly each individual 
assumption. It is for this reason that the model still has to be considered as a 
tentative one, merely intended as a starting point in understanding the phe-
nomena at hand. One clear shortcoming in this respect is that it is far from 
evident how such a coding scheme would apply to nonlinear patterns. 
The present results point at limitations in dealing with merely a handful 
of visual items. In contrast, early retino- and spatiotopic feature maps exhibit 
a vast spatial capacity, in line with the—disputed—massive visual store: the 
icon. But of course, we did not use a feature detection task. As Treisman and 
Paterson (1984) argue, an early parallel and prealtentive stage of encoding 
may suffice for feature detection. Combining features into a perceptual 
object, on the other hand, may require focused attention in order to coordi-
nate the feature maps mvolved. Focused attention is required to an even 
greater extent for the present task (and for subitizing), where the elements 
possess no distinctive (emergent) feature whatsoever. We feel that the "indi-
viduated" representation of each element, needed to be able to respond to the 
exact number, amounts to a singular task for the visual system. 
If perception is limited in this respect, what about the introspective den-
sity of imagery? We already referred to the facilitation of subdividing the 
imagined space when keeping track of a moving spot, which was experi-
enced by subjects of Attneave and Curlee (1983). It may be the feeling of 
knowing what can be imagined, instead of the image itself, which causes the 
introspective density. Simons and Langheinrich (1982) showed that percep-
tion of the number of elements of an array is facilitated when the local parts 
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form a simple or overleamed configuration. It seems that a "hierarchical 
access-structure" is the central concept. In other words, a structured context 
may help to circumvent the severe limits of what can be kept apart within 
one "act of apprehension". 
In normal situations the number of many identical items and the ordering 
between them is unstable and not of vital importance. Nevertheless, we feel 
that the problem of focusing attention to a number of items simultaneously 
may be a very general one, shaping everyday behaviour in many instances. 
For example, a great number of sequences is grouped in a very small number 
of elements, mostly in triplets, be it action sequences ("I count to 3", ball/ 
floor contacts in sports) or conceptual sequences (three-colored traffic lights, 
upper-middle-lower, past-present-future etc). An ergonomie implication of 
the present results is that one should be aware of severe perceptual limita-
tions in cases when items differ in only one respect. Crudely stated, perform-
ance may deteriorate when more than three identical items have to be kept 
apart. 
In some respects, the present model is equivalent to one proposed by 
Wickelgren in 1967 which was brought to our notice by an attentive reader of 
this manuscript. Wickelgren explained the (hierarchical) grouping in triplets 
shown by subjects in a short-term digit rehearsel task (also observed by 
Ryan, 1969; Kahneman & Henik, 1977) with the assumption that only three 
place markers are available (begin-middle-end). This seems to be a straight-
forward ad-hoc assumption. Nevertheless, it needs to be clarified whether 
the major assumptions underlying our linear ordering model have an inde-
pendent justification. Some possibilities are infant perception studies and 
micro-genetic alterations of the arrays. 
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PART III: AUTONOMY 
Preface 
The results described in Parts I and II point to a remarkable "smartness" of 
primary perception: In Part I the interpretation of the first pattern appeared to 
be re-used in order to reach the best representation of the sequence. In the 
two chapters of Part Π, structural aspects of the stimulus (chapter 2) as well 
as a more or less metrical aspect (chapter 3) proved to be completely repre­
sented. These results were thought to support theories such as SIT that regard 
perception as being involved in an optimization of representation rather than 
a minimization of processing costs. 
However, what are the limits to such optimization? Is it not always opti­
mal to use one integral representation of as much stimuli as possible, instead 
of entertaining separate ones for each object or event? In other words, would 
not an unlimited use of context always result in the most efficient overall 
representation of structure? As stated before, SIT does not provide the 
answer. There is nothing that forbids that all codes in memory are applied in 
the processing of shape. On the other hand, arguments can be given why pri­
mary perception of shape would largly be context-insensitive, or autonomous 
(see the Epilogue after Part ΠΙ and see chapter 4). It is clear that only empiri­
cal data can be decisive. We want to distinguish context working backwards 
(the effect of a later pattern on the interpretation of one that is presented ear­
lier) from a more typical forward context. With respect to backward context, 
from chapter 1 we can conclude that it has only a very limited effect. After a 
certain critical processing time (30 milliseconds), the perceptual organization 
of the first pattern seemed to be fixed and could not be changed, even if a 
representation of the first pattern in terms of the second pattern would result 
in a more efficient code of the complete sequence. Although the results of 
chapter 2 make it questionable whether this critical time is indeed 30 millise­
conds, from chapter 1 it can be inferred that context in the primary percep­
tion of structure can hardly work backwards. Clearly, this is a limitation to 
optimization. In Part III we will focus on the role of forward context: knowl­
edge of earlier perceived patterns. With respect to the forward context effects 
established in the first study, one may suspect that these were specific to the 
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experimental conditions: a very short interval between two patterns that were 
presented on the same spot of the screen. In contrast, the effect of context on 
shape perception is generally demonstrated in situations where there are 
clearly two separate and distinguishable patterns. For instance, the perceived 
organization of pattern В in Figure 1 of chapter 1 depends on information 
gathered in previous fixations on different parts of the display. This leads one 
to expect that such context effects are the result of prolonged processing 
rather than operating during primary perception. On the other hand, in many 
of these demonstrations there is ample time for a build-up of strong and even 
consciously experienced expectancies. In various recent studies efforts have 
been made to show that in such situations context effects are present that are 
genuinely perceptual (rather than mere response biases). Only a few of these 
studies address perceptual organization as we presently define it and not all 
these studies are convincing (see chapter 4). The experimental method 
adopted in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis provides an excellent opportunity to 
investigate the effect of the context induced by a strong expectancy, while 
sharply discriminating effects on primary perception from biases in pro­
longed processing. 
In the final chapter 5, an additional study on perceptual autonomy is 
described, although in a completely different domain, namely that of speech 
perception. Speech perception is also considered a "smart" process, achieving 
something — the recovery of linguistic information from a variable and 
sloppy signal — of which sophisticated computer programs are far from 
capable. To explain the feat of word recognition, it has been proposed that 
sentences are spoken within a timing structure and that this temporal context 
enables the perceptual system to develop adequate expectancies so that 
increased processing efforts are spent at the right moments. On the other 
hand, word-recognition may depend on the acoustical information of the 
word only, and the impression that sentences are rhythmically organized may 
be based on post-acccess processing. Again we will try to focus on early 
stages of processing in order to separate context effects on primary percep­
tion (the initial lexical access) from biases in later stages. 
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Can Perceived Shape be Primed? 
The Autonomy of Organization 
Lucas H. M. Mens and Emanuel L. J. Leeuwenberg 
University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
To examine the role of expectancy on the organization of visual patterns, a 
primed tachistoscopic part-probe task was used. Sequences of a simple line 
figure F and a test pattern T, being a part of F, were shown, each during 10 
msec with an onset asynchrony of 40 msec. Subjects had to indicate which 
part of F was presented separately in the sequence of F and T, by choosing 
among three parts shown after each trial. Subjective expectancy of alternative 
organizations of F was induced by showing one of three segregated versions of 
the F pattern (or parts of it) prior to the sequence: the priming stimulus P. As 
established in a pilot experiment, these versions corresponded to the preferred, 
to the second-best and to an unlikely organization of F, respectively. Each Τ 
pattern is a good part of one of these three organizations. The detectability of 
the Τ patterns is used to "probe" the strength of the corresponding organization 
of F. Subjects were aware of the fact that Ρ and Τ were of the same type in 
50% of the trials. 
Τ patterns were correctly recognized more often in case of a correspond­
ing P. However, a response-bias correction was applied, based on the distribu­
tion of the errors, discriminating a "true" effect of Ρ and a bias due to Ρ and F. 
Ρ had a strong effect on the bias component, but not on the true score. Thus, 
no facilitation due to the prime was observed. A control experiment excluded 
se ν CHU aííeniaüve explanations of the lack of context ettect. This result sug-
gests that early stages of shape perception are very much stimulus oriented and 
resistant to external knowledge. It is argued that context effects on shape per-
ception reported in the literature are either due to a post-perceptual evaluation 
of stimuli or to a task simplification leading to selective attention to a local fea-
ture. 
This research was supported in part by the Netherlands Organization for the 
Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.). 
The authors wish to thank Martin van der Gaag for his assistance in these experi-
ments. 
We are indebted to Ar Thomassen for many helpful suggestions and incisive read-
ing of the manuscript. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Common sense tells us that we can see a particular object (say, a cube) 
because we happen to know what such things (cubes) look like. This would 
imply a close relation between knowledge of an object and its perceived 
shape. In accordance, the relation between formerly acquired knowledge and 
shape perception has often been stressed by referring to the importance of set 
on the perceived organization of patterns. The flat, meaningless blobs in 
James's picture of a Dalmatian dog suddenly change into coherent patches 
of sunlight and shade when one is told that the scene is one of a dog under a 
tree. 
Recently, efforts have been made to show that top-down effects on the 
perceived organization of a pattern can be genuinely perceptual, instead of 
merely cognitive biases. One way of doing this is to look for low-level "con­
comitant" effects: indirect effects of instruction or intention which are both 
perceptual and unexpected for the subject. For instance, when one is adapted 
to the vertical red grating of Figure la, the vertical black and white grating 
lb looks green: (he opponent-color aftereffect (McCollough, 1965). The 
Γ 
Щ 
1 
Figure 1. Adapted to red grating a, a black-and-white grating b looks green, 
as does d if one imposes organization I on it. This opponent-color aftereffect is 
not observed when looking at grating c, nor if organization Π is imposed on 
grating d (Uhlarik, Pringle & Brigill, 1977). Thus, cognition seems to affect 
shape at a perceptual level. 
aftereffect is clearly not the result of a cognitive bias. The interesting point is 
that the aftereffect may or may not occur depending on the pattern organiza-
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tion that is deliberately imposed on the black and white grating. Figure Id 
supports both the U-shaped organization (vertical) as well as the rhombus 
organization (horizontal). The aftereffect is only observed when the 
U-shaped organization is dominant (Uhlarik, Pringle & Brigill, 1977). Thus, 
a perceptual effect coupled to pattern organization induced on a cognitive 
level. A similar result has been obtained by Peterson (1986) for the per-
ceived organization of two planes in depth. These top-down effects seem to 
falsify what we may call the autonomy-of-shape hypothesis. What these 
studies have in common is that context effects are established for displays 
which are ambiguous. This is a problem. Context effects for ambiguous pat-
terns may be considered exceptions to the overall autonomous nature of per-
ception (Rock, 1985). More specifically, in case of ambiguity, one may 
assume that in an initial, autonomous stage two organizations are activated, 
one with and one without the concomitant effect, and that one of these two is 
selected afterwards in agreement with the context (Epstein & DeShazo, 1961; 
Hochberg, 1970, p. 102). 
The goal of this study is to show an effect of context which is not 
explained by a post-perceptual selection, or by any other bias. We have 
taken several precautions in order to rule out such an explanation. One of 
these will be to use patterns which elicit one clearly dominant organization. 
The question then is whether context can cause an organization to become 
dominant that would not have been perceived without that context. An addi-
tional measure to avoid post-perceptual confounding is to use an on-line 
detection task which will be introduced in the following paragraphs. 
In a seminai study, Gottschaidt (l92ò) introduced an embedded-hgures 
task to investigate the effect of prior exposure on the perceptual organization 
of line patterns. His subjects had to report the phenomenal organization of a 
line pattern (the complete pattern), both with and without prior exposure to a 
part of the pattern, which constituted a "hidden" part of the complete pattern. 
See Figure 2. Prior exposure did not alter the phenomenal organization of 
the complete pattern: the embedded figure did not catch the eye even after 
many repeated exposures to it. But, more important for the present discus-
sion, explicitly instructing the subjects to search for the parts increased the 
number of correct detections although again no effect of the amount of prior 
exposure could be established). Thus, familiarity with or frequency of expo-
sure to a particular shape does not completely dictate the perceived organiza-
tion (also see Djang, 1937; Hanawalt, 1942), but set is important. 
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Figure 2. Depending on instruction and degree of embeddedness, a target pat-
tern (I) may or may not be readily perceived as a part of the embedding pattern 
(II). Merely exposing subjects many times to pattern I does not alter the per-
ceived organization of pattern II (Gottschaldt, 1929). However, if subjects 
know that pattern I may be embedded in pattern II, pattern I is detected more 
often, possibly because I has changed the organization of II. 
However, one may raise the question to what extent these context effects 
are specific for the process of scrutinizing a rather complex pattern. What 
may be the case in the studies just mentioned is that the shape of a complete 
pattern (or part of it) is established in an initial autonomous phase, and that 
prior knowledge becomes effective only in a later phase of prolonged pro-
cessing. Borrowing from the word-recognition literature (Swinney, 1970; 
Frauenfelder & Tyler, 1987), we intend to demonstrate context effects during 
the access phase, unconfounded by post-access effects. Thus, we will use 
simple, small patterns that can be seen "in a single glance". Furthermore, the 
experimental task has to be one which allows us to monitor the access phase 
of shape encoding, and the effect of context on it. The method to do this will 
be to probe the activation of specific shape organizations on-line. At this 
point we want to make a short digression to word-recognition studies where 
on-line tasks have received much attention. 
In the semantic priming task, one stimulus (a word, part of a sentence) is 
presented shortly before a second stimulus. Facilitated processing of that sec-
ond stimulus is an indication that the first stimulus has primed (lexical) 
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entries relevant for the second one. A fine example of a study on prior 
knowledge and word recognition is that of Tanenhaus, Leiman and Seiden­
berg (1979). An ambiguous word, for instance "rose", was presented as the 
last word of one of two sentences: one which biased the verb reading ("They 
all rose") and one which biased the noun reading ("She held the rose"). After 
the sentence was heard, the subject had to name a visually displayed word as 
fast as possible. This was the test stimulus and it was compatible with the 
verb reading or the noun reading. Two delays between the ambiguous word 
and the test word were used: 0 and 200 msec. At 0 msec delay, naming 
latencies related to both readings were equally short, whereas at 200 msec 
only the reading compatible with the sentence context appeared to have sur­
vived. Thus, by measuring priming effects indirectly through the introduction 
of the test stimulus, it is possible to probe early in the process for specific 
representations (in this case word meanings), before the post-access confine­
ments due to context are effective. 
We will use the following on-line task to measure priming effects on the 
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Figure 3. Example of a stimulus presentation on one trial in Experiment 2. 
Subjects have to indicate which one of the three Τ (target) patterns — a, b, or с 
— has been displayed separately in the F-T flash. The recognition of the Τ pat­
tern is used as an indication what the perceived organization of F (the focus) is, 
in the context of Ρ (the prime). 
perceptual organization of a simple line pattern. Stimulus F and Τ will be 
presented in this order, each for only 10 msec with a small onset asynchrony 
(SOA) of 40 msec (see Figure 3). Subjects have to detect the test pattern T, a 
part of F. Their response will be a forced choice of one out of three alterna­
tives (A, B, Q. A few seconds before the tachistoscopic presentation of F, 
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stimulus Ρ (the prime) is presented. Ρ has to be remembered and in a majority 
of trials it provides a valid cue as to what Τ will be. The idea is that the 
extent to which Τ is correctly detected may tell us whether Ρ has imposed its 
organization upon F (the focus stimulus). F patterns are selected with the 
requirement that one organization is dominant (both according to empirical 
data as well as based on calculations of its complexity, see the Methods sec­
tion of Experiment 2), and a second-best organization which is not preferred 
yet attractive. Accordingly, alternative types of Ρ and Τ are constructed: type 
A, corresponding to the preferred organization of F, type B, corresponding to 
the second-best organization and type C, corresponding to an unlikely orga­
nization. A clear falsification of the autonomy-of-shape hypothesis would be 
found if priming of the second-best organization would result in a detection 
of B-type test patterns that is better than that of A-type test patterns. 
We have chosen an SOA between F and Τ of 40 msec. In two earlier 
studies (Leeuwenberg, Mens & Calis, 1985; Mens & Leeuwenberg, in press) 
it was shown that detection of such Τ stimuli can indeed convey which per­
ceptual organizations of the F pattern are currently active and that an SOA of 
40 msec is about the smallest one with which effects of the shape organiza­
tion can still be observed for stimuli of the type described. Thus there is evi­
dence that with a this set-up the initial analysis of shape can be probed. 
Beside ambiguity and post-perceptual confounding during prolonged 
processing, we wish to discuss a third hazard in studying context effects on 
shape organization. What appears to be an effect of context on the perceptual 
organization may perhaps be more properly understood as the result of selec­
tive attention for a specific feature of the test stimulus. In the present set-up, 
what Ρ in fact may do, is provide a cue to the subject so that a correct 
response may be given on the basis of the detection of merely one local fea­
ture of T. In fact, we think this a plausible explanation of effects of prior 
knowledge in detection studies such as that of Bachmann and Allik (1976). 
(Also see Lappin & Uttal, 1976, who argue that effects of prior knowledge as 
such may be understood as the result of a reduction of decisional uncer­
tainty.) It seems impossible to prime an organization of F without using Ρ 
and Τ pairs that have simple features in common, such as line-terminators on 
a particular place and in a particular orientation. In other words, for practical 
purposes, it is impossible to separate the level of pattern-organization from 
the feature-level. Therefore, we will not try to preclude facilitation of Τ 
Autonomy of organization 87 
detection due to selective attention. Instead, we will start with an experiment 
in which we deliberately induce this effect without presenting F at all. This 
will provide us with a base-line against which to compare an eventual effect 
on the organization of F. 
Finally, a fourth measure to rule out an explanation of context effects in 
terms of a post-perceptual process will be to submit the responses to a rigor­
ous response-bias correction. The correction procedure is described in a sepa­
rate section of Experiment 1. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
As has been argued in the introduction, the rationale of the present experi­
mental set-up is that T, the third stimulus, can be used to "probe" on-line the 
activity of a perceptual organization of the preceding second stimulus (F). If 
expectancy of the prime (P), the first stimulus, imposes a particular organiza­
tion on F, then we expect that detection of a Τ which fits into that organiza­
tion is facilitated. This is, of course, a rather indirect method and some prob­
lems connected to it have been mentioned. One of these is that Ρ may invoke 
selective attention for a specific feature of T, rather than changing the orga­
nization of F. We will first report on a preliminary Experiment which pro­
vides a base-line of selective attention effects. Such a base-line will enable 
us to detect and discard eventual effects of selective attention in Experiment 
2. 
We will introduce as many aspects of the procedure of Experiment 2 (the 
main experiment) as possible, without presenting the F patterns. In order to 
avoid a ceiling effect in the detection scores, a mask will be presented fol­
lowing each Τ stimulus. Two types of masks and two ways of presenting the 
Ρ stimulus will be used (see also Figure 4). In Condition physical match the 
mask is a large number of randomly generated lines; Ρ matches Τ in shape, 
orientation, size and location on the display. In Condition structural match 
the mask is a grid of orthogonal lines including ones that completely coincide 
with the lines of Τ (as F does in Experiment 2) plus a small number of ran­
dom lines; Ρ matches Τ only in shape and orientation and is larger and pre­
sented on a different part of the display, as will be made in Experiment 2. 
Being an exploration, no effort has been done to separate the effect of differ­
ent masks and types of Ρ patterns. Subjects will be encouraged to pay atten-
88 Chapter 4 
M 
Condit ion 
"structural 
match" X. -\ 
tL L Γ _| 
a b c 
"physical 
match" 
L Γ J 
a b c 
1 0 0 0 + 
500 msec. 10 
ISI 1 0 0 0 + 
100 
Figure 4. Figure 4. The two conditions in Experiment 1. Ρ is identical to Τ in 
the physical match Condition, and larger and displaced to a side of the screen 
in the structural match Condition. Two types of M have been used as well: a 
grid completely aligned with Τ (plus some random lines), or a set of random 
lines (physical match). The interval between F and Τ is adjusted so as to 
achieve 30% of errors. 
tion to Ρ by telling them that Ρ and Τ are of the same type in a majority of tri­
als (actually, in 50%). 
Bias correction 
Of course, telling subjects that Ρ is a valid cue as to which test pattern will 
be displayed will produce a considerable response bias. Furthermore, the 
response categories (especially in combination with the F patterns in Experi­
ment 2) may contribute a response bias. Recently, we described a bias-cor­
rection procedure (Mens & Leeuwenberg, in press; see also the Appendix) 
which can be adapted to the present situation. Basically, the raw scores are 
separated into a probability q(i) of recognizing T(i) and a bias V(j,h) for 
response alternative (j) due to prime (h). Errors are assumed to result from 
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the V-component only which makes it a high threshold model (Coombs, 
Dawes and Tversky, 1970). The values of the q- and V-parameters are calcu­
lated in an iterative Chi-square fitting procedure. This is done for each of the 
four sets (see Figure 5) of F, Ρ and Τ patterns separately. 
Method 
Four sets of patterns were adapted from Mens and Leeuwenberg (in press); 
see Figure 5. Segmentations of type A correspond to the unambiguously pre­
ferred organization, type В corresponds to the non-dominant but still rela­
tively attractive second-best organization, and type С to and a very unlikely 
organization. The reader is referred to Mens and Leeuwenberg (in press) for 
a description of three independent ways in which this classification has been 
supported. In short, these were: (a) Calculations of the information load of 
the codes of the three subdivisions follow the A-B-C ordering, (b) 10 Naive 
subjects all segmented copies of the F patterns always in the A fashion by 
preference, many times as a second choice in the В fashion but almost never 
in the С fashion, (c) When subjects were led to believe to be shown a 
sequence of an F and a Τ pattern, but in fact were shown an F pattern only, 
(hey showed the greatest preference for response alternative A, they choose В 
less often and alternative С still less often. 
The Τ segments are matched with respect to the number of lines of one 
unit length (e.g. five lengths for the three Τ segments in the left-most Set in 
Figure 5) and differ only slightly in complexity; (see Mens and Leeuwen­
berg, in press, their Figure 3). 
The patterns were computer generated as thin bright lines on a dark dis­
play (Vector-General Display Series 3, Model 2D3 with P4 phosphor), posi­
tioned at a distance of 2 m in front of the subject. Luminance of the patterns 
was adjusted to an intermediate level. Afterimages were not prominent. The 
visual angle subtended by a Τ and a Ρ in the physical match condition was 
about 26 minutes of an arc. Ρ patterns in the structural match Condition were 
the same pattern but twice as large. They were displaced off-centre in a ran­
dom direction for maximally 4 degrees of visual angle. The room (and the 
display) was moderately tube-lighted. A response panel was provided with a 
starting key and three keys in a horizontal arrangement corresponding to 
three response alternatives that also appeared in a vertical array. 
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Figure 5. The four sets if line figures F (top) and three corresponding target 
patterns Τ used in the experiments. Τ patterns are indicated by fatter lines in 
this figure only. The subdivision in row А, В and С corresponds to the pre­
ferred, the second best and an unlikely organization of F. In Mens and Leeuw­
enberg (in press) the choice of the three subdivisions is motivated by referring 
to judgments of subjects as well as a complexity measure (Leeuwenberg, 
1971). 
Procedure 
Thirteen students of psychology, who were paid for their participation, were 
shown physical match Ρ patterns followed by random lines and ten were 
shown structural match Ρ patterns and an overlapping mask. Each subject 
was tested individually. After a training series of 20 trials, 384 trials were 
administered in a random order, which took about one hour and 30 minutes. 
Trials were self-initiated. After the starting key was pressed, Ρ appeared for 
500 msec followed by an empty screen for 1 sec. After that second, hitting 
the starting key once more resulted in the presentation of Τ and the mask (10 
and 100 msec respectively, see Figure 4). The onset asynchrony between Τ 
and the mask was initially set at 60 msec for most subjects and 90 msec for 
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those who showed less skill during the practice session. The SOA was 
adapted after every ninth trial with steps of 5 msec in order to yield an error 
in about 1/3 of the trials. One second after the third stimulus (the mask) the 
three segments belonging to the set of Ρ and Τ stimuli were displayed in a 
random order, from which the subject had to "identify the segment which 
was presented in the flash of two patterns, just before the grid". Except for 
the training series, no feedback about the correctness of the recognition of Τ 
was given. Then, at the end of each trial. Subjects had to indicate how confi­
dent they were of their response on a 5-point scale. 
Each of the three T's in a set was presented 8 times in combination with 
each of the three P's, but T's and P's of the same type (A - А, В - В, С - С) 
twice as often (16 times). Thus, P's and T's were of the same type in 50% of 
the trials instead of 33 1/3%. In order to maximize the readiness to use Ρ as a 
clue to T, subjects were told that "P is the same as Τ in a majority of trials 
and therefore can profitably be used to see Τ more clearly". At (he end of one 
out of every three trials, subjects were unexpectedly confronted with a pat­
tern which was the same as Ρ in half of the cases and were asked to indicated 
whether or not this pattern was identical to Ρ in the last trial. It was stressed 
in the instruction that this was a second reason to remember P. 
Results and Discussion 
The percentage correctly recognized T's pooled over Figure Sets and Sub­
jects are given in Figure 6a. It is clear that T's are better recognized when 
preceded by a corresponding P, in both conditions. Part but not all of this 
facilitation can be ascribed to a bias to choose the same segment as was pre­
sented as P, as is evident in Figure 6b. The corrected recognition scores q 
(calculated for each Figure Set separately) are plotted in two ways. In Figure 
6c the score for each Ρ is given; in Figure 6d the scores of the two Ρ patterns 
that do not correspond with a particular Τ are pooled. This gives a more 
straightforward impression of the effect of P: the corrected scores are better 
in case of a correspondence between Ρ and T. This facilitation is significant 
both in Condition physical match (F(l,2)=889.0, p<0.01) as well as in Condi­
tion structural match (F(l,2)=24.9, p<0.05). Furthermore, it does not differ 
significantly between the three types of T: F(2,6)=0.036, p<0.97 in Condi­
tion physical match and F(2,6)=1.132, p<0.39 in Condition structural match. 
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Figure 6. The results of Experiment 1, with a M stimulus, without a F pattern. 
6a: Uncorrected percentage correct recognition of T. 6b: Bias values. 6c: Cor­
rected scores, for each Ρ separately. 6d: Corrected scores with (upper-case P) 
and without (lower-case P's) a correspondence between Ρ and T. The cor­
rected scores that are encircled differ from the other one(s) of a curve (SNK 
grouping, a=0.05). As can be seen in 6d (and 6c), recognition of Τ is facili­
tated in case of a corresponding P. 
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A Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test (a=0.05) has been performed 
on the corrected scores of each T. Scores that differ from the other (one score 
in 6d, two scores in 6c) are encircled. On the whole, the facilitative effect of 
Ρ in the structural match Condition is clearly less pronounced. 
In sum, priming facilitated the recognition of the Τ patteras, both when 
the Ρ pattern were of the same size as Τ and shown at the same location on 
the display, and when not. It may be concluded that this task is an adequate 
one for inducing facilitative effects due to context. 
Inspection of Figure 6c reveals that the three types of Τ (А, В and C) are 
not equally well detected: a Student-Newman-Keuls grouping of the q's of 
Condition physical match averaged over P-pattems (a=0.05) shows that Τ 
type A is better detected than the other two. We want to explain this differ­
ence as an effect of the complexity of the Τ patterns. In Mens and Leeuwen­
berg (in press), the complexity of the Τ patterns is calculated using Leeuwen-
berg's (1971) coding model. Τ patterns А, В and С are increasingly complex 
according to this calculation. Although this inhomogeneity is unfortunate, we 
have no reason to expect that in Experiment 2 it will have an effect different 
from the present one. Therefore, the difference in detectability of the three 
sets of Τ patterns need not obscure possible context effects on shape percep­
tion to be found in Experiment 2. 
In order to investigate whether Ρ facilitates detection merely because it 
provides a cue to a simple feature of T, or whether it may also affect the per­
ceptual organization, we will compare the facilitation obtained for the three 
types of Τ (A, B, C), with an F pattern (Experiment 2) and without an F pat­
tern (Experiment 1). If there are any differences, we will relate them to the 
hypothesized priming effect of Ρ on the perceptual organization of F. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Instead of the sequence of Ρ, Τ and a masking pattern of Experiment 1, we 
will now present P, a focus pattern F, and then T. The hypothesis is that the 
detection of Τ will be facilitated due to a corresponding P, not only because it 
has features in common with that Ρ pattern, but also because Ρ imposes its 
organization on F so that Τ fits into (part of) the interpretation of F and there­
fore is detected more easily. P, the priming stimulus, will consist of an F pat­
tern in an "exploded" view, that is, segmented according to one of the three 
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organizations shown in Figure 5 (with the exception of Condition 4). Sub­
jects will be informed that in a majority of the trials, Ρ will provide a valid 
clue as to which Τ will be contained in the sequence. Subjects will have a 
second reason to pay attention to P: on random occasions they will have to 
make a same/different decision about a pattern at the end of a trial which may 
or may not be the same as P. 
In four conditions, several minor aspects of the presentation of the stim­
uli have been varied (see Figure 7 and the Methods Section). The most sig­
nificant of these are the size and the complexity of the Ρ pattern. 
Method 
Four conditions were constructed in which the relation between Ρ and Τ 
becomes more and more direct. The Ρ patterns in Conditions 1, 2 and 3 are 
derived from the F patterns by displacing target segments slightly in one 
direction and non-target segments in the opposite direction (see Figure 7). In 
the structural match Conditions (1 and 2), Ρ was shown twice as large as F; 
in the physical match Conditions (3 and 4) the same size was used. In Condi­
tion 4, Ρ was merely one of the three Τ patterns. In Condition 1 only, a word 
distractor was presented between Ρ and the F-T sequence in order to elimi­
nate any after-image. This was a nonsense syllable which had to be read 
aloud. It was not presented in the other Conditions in the light of the negative 
results and in order to make the task as simple as possible. A brief acoustic 
signal was presented in case of an incorrect target recognition in Condition 1 
only. 
Procedure 
Nineteen students of psychology participated in Condition 1,17 in Condition 
2, 24 in Condition 3 and 7 in Condition 4; different subjects in each Condi­
tion. Stimulus presentation was basically the same as in Experiment 1, except 
that F-T sequences now were as follows: first F was shown for 10 msec fol­
lowed by a fixed ISI of 30 msec and finally Τ was shown for 10 msec. The 
word distractor in Condition 1 was presented for 1 sec and followed Ρ at an 
ISI of 100 msec. Each combination of Ρ and Τ was shown 6 times, except 
for the combinations of Ρ and Τ of the same type which were shown 12 
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Figure 7. The four conditions in Experiment 2. Both the presentation of Ρ 
and of the F-T sequence is started by the subject (SI and S2). Feedback of 
errors is given in Condition 1 (FB). "Jais" is a nonsense word which has to be 
read aloud in Condition 1. Not displayed are a point of fixation before SI and 
S2, and the occasional recognition test of Ρ (after R). 
times, in order to introduce a correlation between Ρ and T. The resulting 288 
trials were presented in a random order with the restriction that never stimuli 
were drawn from the same Figure Set on successive trials. As in Experiment 
1, subjects were told that Ρ could profitably be used to see the "flash" of Τ 
and the other pattern more easily. They were explicitly told that Ρ and Τ cor­
responded in a majority of trials. Further details about the procedure are 
given in the Method section of Experiment 1. 
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Results and Discussion 
In Figure 8a the percentage correctly identified target segments pooled over 
Figure Sets is shown for each Condition separately. Correspondence 
between Ρ and Τ clearly yields a better recognition in all four conditions. 
However, these percentages correct should be submitted to the response bias 
correction procedure indicated in Experiment 1. The corrected "true" recog­
nition scores q are given in 8d in a simplified way (averages of structural 
match Conditions interrupted lines, physical match Conditions drawn lines 
and also the two scores for P's that do not correspond to Τ averaged); in 8c 
for each of the four Conditions and each combination of Ρ and Τ separately. 
The bias values are given in 8b. Student Newman Keuls (SNK, a=0.05) 
multiple-range tests have been performed on the corrected scores (the q val­
ues), calculated per Figure Set. No significant effect of Ρ is obtained for the 
results as depicted in 8d. In Figure 8c, encircled q values differ from the 
other two for a particular target segment. The results of the structural match 
Conditions 1 and 2 have been pooled for the results as depicted in 8c because 
they yield highly similar (and small) effects of P. No effect of Ρ is present in 
the results of the physical match Conditions. 
The main result of Experiment 2 is that, contrary to Experiment 1, no 
significant facilitation at all due to a particular Ρ is present in the corrected 
scores, as revealed by the SNK tests and shown most clearly in Figure 8d. 
Instead of a facilitation, the only significant effect of P, found in the com­
bined results of Condition 1 and 2 (structural match), is a relatively low cor­
rected score for segment В when Ρ corresponds to segmentation A, and for 
segment A when В is given as priming stimulus (8c). 
SNKs on corrected scores averaged over priming stimuli furthermore 
show a better recognition of A segments compared to В and С segments for 
the structural match results and a better recognition of Л segments compared 
to С segments for the physical match results (again, a=0.05). A similar trend 
was observed in Experiment 1, though weaker. 
Finally, the relation between Ρ and the confidence with which Subjects 
make their response has been established for the relatively large and homoge­
neous set of results of Condition 3. As can be seen in Figure 8c, an increased 
bias does not mean less confidence (asterisks). Therefore, subjects did not 
display a deliberate strategy to choose the P-corresponding segment if they 
were uncertain. 
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Figure 8. The results of Experiment 2, with an F stimulus. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, no facilitation due to a correspondence between Ρ and Τ is 
observed (8d and 8c). Instead, in 8c inhibitory effects of Ρ seem present 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
An important point for the interpretation of the results is whether we have 
succeeded in creating an effective context, regardless what that context has 
meant for the organization of the F pattern. This seems to be the case. Our 
subjects did expect to be shown a test pattern (T) that was the same as the 
prime (P). The expectation became apparent in three ways: (a) In Experi­
ment 1 selective attention, cued by the P's, facilitated the detection of the Τ 
patterns, (b) In both Experiment 1 and 2 a strong response bias appeared in 
favor of Τ patterns of the same type as P. (c) Not only were subjects pre­
pared for a particular Τ on the basis of P, they also appeared to see such a T, 
even if it was not shown: Τ patterns of the same type as the Ρ were chosen 
with an increased confidence. Yet, the main finding is that after correction 
for response biases, no indications were found that the Ρ patterns primed a 
particular perceptual organization of the focus patterns, F (Experiment 2). 
What definitely did not happen was that the non-dominant (but relatively 
good) second-best organization, B, became dominant if primed. 
Before we discuss the fact that Ρ did not facilitate the detection of corre­
sponding T's at all in Experiment 2, two issues have to be dealt with. 
The first issue is the apparent inhibition observed in the structural match 
conditions of Experiment 2: P's priming the preferred organization. A, inhib­
ited the detection of the second-best Τ patterns, and, vice versa, P's of type В 
inhibited Τ patterns of type A (encircled points in Figure 8c). The inhibition 
did not appear in the physical match conditions, which might indicate that 
physical match primes were less effective in biasing a particular organiza­
tion. Still, the inhibition could be an unstable and unimportant effect and 
could perhaps even be an artifact. If it is not to be considered an artefact, the 
only sensible interpretation that we can make leads to the conclusion that it is 
a post-access effect. The reasoning runs as follows: In an initial access-
phase, organizations A and В are generated of the F pattern, but not organiza­
tion С (see Mens and Leeuwenberg, in press). In a later phase (post-access), 
a check is made of the consistency of the prime and the perceptual interpreta­
tion (similar notions for word recognition are Neely's "associative-matching" 
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strategy, 1976, and De Groot's "coherence check", 1983). Apparently, a 
match between the prime and one of the perceptual alternatives leads to the 
active suppression of the other alternative, while a complete mismatch has no 
consequence at all. Another argument to conclude that the inhibition is a 
post-access effect is that a genuinely perceptual effect of priming (e.g. via 
spreading activation) can be expected to be primarily facilitative. However, 
the present effect of the Ρ patterns is not facilitative, it is "costs-only". As 
such, it is more natural to assign it to a decisional component. So, instead of 
indicating a context effect, the inhibition can be understood as an extra indi­
cation of autonomy. 
The second issue is the following. Did we adequately measure the per­
ceptual organization of F? In other words: Is the detection of the Τ segments 
affected by the organization of F? We want to give two arguments that this 
was the case, (a) Using the same patterns (but without a P), task and ISI, 
Mens and Leeuwenberg (in press) were able to infer from the detection of Τ 
patterns a specific property of the shape interpretation of F, namely that the F 
patterns give rise not only to the preferred, but also to the second-best orga­
nization. Specifically, in that study A and В organizations of F appeared to 
be present, although A was more strongly preferred, (b) The interpretation 
of the inhibition effect given above depends on the assumption that Ρ pat­
terns A and В related to two different organizations of the F pattern. К the 
perceived organization(s) of F are not important, similar results as in Experi­
ment 1 should be obtained. 
Now we will consider three, more or ]счч mpthnHolnmriil objections that 
one may raise against the present conclusion. 
The bias correction may have been excessively effective, eliminating 
"true" effects of P. The bias correction procedure is based on a high thresh­
old model which means that errors are assumed to be made on the basis of 
the bias component alone (Coombs, Dawes & Tversky, 1970). This assump­
tion may not have been met. However, the notion of overcorrection does not 
seem to apply. The data of Experiment 1 have been subjected to exactly the 
same analysis as those of Experiment 2 and this did not eliminate what we 
interpreted as the effect of selective attention. Moreover, another effect was 
visible in the results of Experiment 2, even after correction, namely the over­
all superiority of detection of Л over B, and of В over С test patterns. In an 
earlier study (Mens & Leeuwenberg, in press), several arguments for the 
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validity of the same correction procedure, albeit in a simpler form (not 
accounting for a bias due to primes), are put forward. 
The abrupt and ultra-short presentation may have induced many effects 
not relevant to normal perception (Haber, 1983). For instance, it may have 
disrupted the normal influx of prior information. Causes of such a disruption 
might be a transient-on-sustained inhibition (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976) or a 
startle response (Hochberg, 1970). However, an explanation in terms of dis­
ruption is hardly compatible with the fact that Ρ in Experiment 1 did have a 
facilitating effect. Moreover, a tachistoscopic presentation seems to be essen­
tial and unavoidable if one wants to study early processing phases, as we 
have argued in the introduction. 
Is the lack of context effect specific for meaningless patterns? Since 
prior knowledge from within the shape domain does not seem to have an 
effect, it seems unlikely that knowledge from a higher level will. Still, one 
might wonder whether the anticipation of an object that has a "real" meaning 
for the perceiver can be effective. There are two sets of data which show that 
such an anticipation in general seems to result only in a more enriched (and 
perhaps speeded) "semantic" (higher-level) classification instead of in a 
change at the level of shape organization. 
(a) Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) described a case of Optic Agnosia. 
Optic Agnosia underlines the functional disjunction of knowledge about 
shape or "object-structure" and higher-level knowledge or "object-meaning". 
Patients displaying Optic Agnosia ar capable of making adequate gestural 
responses to objects, indicating that their perception of the shape of these 
objects is unimpaired, but they cannot name these perceived objects, nor give 
any functional association to them. At the same time, object knowledge in 
general is intact, evidenced by the fact that it can be accessed via other 
modalities (e.g. language). 
(b) Normally, shape does not change at all, even if knowledge about 
object-meaning keeps accumulating. In other words, an initial "semantics-
free" shape representation generally remains unchanged. Witkin and Tenen-
baum (1983), for example, argue that a picture of the rings of Satumus does 
not look different after learning what these rings are made of: "(..) What is 
remarkable is the degree to which such naively perceived structure survives 
more or less intact once a semantic context is established (..)" (p. 481). Simi­
larly, when we know that we experience a "visual illusion", the initial shape 
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conflicts with what other sources of information tell us that we should see, 
but again the initial shape survives. This suggests that normally, without a 
conflict, the initial organization is incorporated in, rather than replaced by 
later interpretations. Many remarkable illusions are construed by Kanisza 
(1985), who poses that "the visual system resolves its 'problems' without 
regard to logic, expectations, and knowledge" (p. 31). 
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APPENDIX 
The percent correct recognition of Τ is separated in two components: the 
"true" detection (q) and the bias VQ,b) due to P(j) and response category 
R(h). In an iterative Chi-square minimization (program "Minuit", Cem, 
Geneva) best fitting q and V values are found: one q for each Τ pattern of a 
Figure Set in the context of nine combinations of Ρ and R, and one V for each 
combination of Ρ and R. Bias values are relative, so the bias for R(l) has 
been given a fixed value. 
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Evidence against a Predictive Role 
for Rhythm in Speech Perception 
Lucas H. Mens and Dirk-Jan Povel 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Some languages create the impression of being stress timed Claims have 
been made that this timing of stressed syllables enables the listener to 
predict the future locations of informative parts later in a sentence The 
fact that phoneme monitoring is delayed when targets in a spoken sentence 
are displaced has been taken as supporting this claim (Meltzer, Martin, 
Bergfeld Mills, Imhoff and Zohar, 1976). In the present study temporal 
displacement was induced without introducing phonetic discontinuities. 
In Dutch sentences a word just in advance of a target-bearing word was 
replaced by another one differing in length. Results show that the 
temporal displacement per se did not have any effect on phoneme-
monitoring reaction times. Implications for a theory of speech processing 
are discussed. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In many instances speech perception depends on the perceived relative 
timing of acoustic events. T h u s it is well established that at the local 
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identity of certain speech segments. T h e role and even the existence of 
global timing, however, is controversial. Nevertheless, the impression 
that English and several other languages are so-called "stress t i m e d " 
pervades a considerable n u m b e r of studies of speech production and 
perception. Stress t iming implies some sort of temporal s t ructurmg 
(rhythm) of the syllables carrying major stress in a sentence. 
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Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
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The most straightforward notion of stress timing is that of isochrony 
or equidistant timing of stressed speech events. It has been difficult to 
test this notion by physical measurements in part due to the uncertain 
localization of the center of the stressed syllable (Haggard, 1971; 
Lehiste, 1973; Ohala, 1975). For this reason, the possible role of 
isochrony in perception has been investigated (Allen, 1972; Donovan and 
Darwin, 1979). The results are inconclusive. As an example, the 
reproductions of perceived accent structures tend toward isochrony 
both for English (Donovan and Darwin, 1979), a stress-timed language, 
and for French, which is not regarded as a stress-timed language.1 It 
may be noted that isochrony seems not to be beyond the control of the 
speaker since when specifically asked to, speakers can control the timing 
of syllables with major stress (Fowler, 1983), and this controlled timing 
can be of perceptual relevance (Huggins, 1975; Fowler, 1981, 1983). 
In line with other studies, here rhythm in speech is taken to imply 
predictability. As in music, rhythm would impose well-defined and 
predictable timing constraints enabling the anticipation of future events 
of speech. Because of this predictability, not only a cue to the status of 
those elements (accented—not accented) but also a means to direct 
processing resources would be provided. Martin (1972) and Meltzer et 
al. (1976) developed a theory of perception that "describe[s] the listener 
in part as a sort of dynamic feed forward device, performing analysis by 
synthesis in a real time, anticipatory fashion, and who, given cues from 
early elements in an utterance, can (in effect) predict future vocal-tract 
movements of the speaker" (1976, p. 277). 
To test these ideas, Meltzer et al. (1976) assessed the effect of 
distortion of the temporal structure on sentence processing by tempor-
ally manipulating the signal in front of the target. Phoneme reaction 
times in three main conditions were compared to reaction times to the 
original recordings: "early", "late intact" and "on time". The three 
manipulated versions are shown in Table I using parts of one of Meltzer 
et al.'s sentences: "He laughed and laughed till his belly wiggled like 
jelly". To create the "early" version, 100 msec of the material im-
mediately in front of the target (phoneme /b/) was spliced out. To create 
the "late intact" version 100 msec of noise was inserted immediately in 
front of the target. The "on time" version maintained the same timing as 
the normal version, but 100 msec of white noise replaced the original 
signal in front of the target. The results offered no straightforward 
interpretation: reaction times for the early and on-time versions were 
' S Isard, D Scott and B. de Boysson-Bardies. The perceived rhythm of English and 
French as assessed by the tapping task Paper presented at the 10th meeting of ASA, 
Norfolk, Va , May, 1984. 
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Table I 
Sentences Used by Meltzer et al. {1976) and Results 
Condition Sentence Reaction time" 
normal: . . . till his Belly . . . 620 
early: . . . till hiBelly . . . 700 
late intact: . . . till his Belly . . . 562 
on time: . . . till hi*Belly . . . 630 
"In msec 
Note A representative selection of the 17 conditions in the original 
paper is shown The reaction time for the "on time" condition was 
estimated un the basis of comparable "early" conditions in Exper-
iments 1 and 2 and Experiment 4 of the same paper White noise is 
marked with an asterisk 
longer than for the normal version, but the late-intact version did not 
create a decrement. However, Meltzer et al. interpreted these outcomes 
as the result of deceiving the rhythm-based anticipation of accents. 
Although he considered that any aspect of the signal that departs from 
what a listener expects to be normal in an utterance most probably will 
have a disruptive effect on sentence processing, Meltzer et al. stressed 
that some of the late-intact conditions resulted in faster reaction times 
than did the normal sentences, "and hence [that] intervention effects by 
themselves probably cannot provide a sufficient account for slower R T " 
(1976, p. 278). Anyway, all that can be said is that apparently in these 
cases facilitating effects were greater than disruptive effects. The im-
portant point to note is that m all modified sentences used by Meltzer et 
al., the manipulation of the experimental variable (temporal displace-
ment) was confounded with a distortion of the phonetic material. 
The goal in this study was to test the anticipation hypothesis without 
introducing segmental distortions. In Experiment 1 the effect of pure 
temporal disruption on phoneme monitoring RT was examined. Buxton 
(1983) conducted an experiment very similar to the present one and 
found indications of rhythm, as did Meltzer et al. An exposition of her 
study will be postponed to the General Discussion. In Experiment 2 
temporal displacement was compared to distortions of the acoustic 
signal in order to make the results more comparable to those of Meltzer 
et al. 
E X P E R I M E N T 1 
If the temporal structure of the accents in a spoken sentence facilitates 
processing of the accented items, then an artificial displacement of an 
accent later m the sentence should become apparent as a relative set-
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back generating slower phoneme reaction times. In this experiment, the 
most important temporal modifications were brought about by replacing 
the pretarget word with another one of different length, taking care that 
this manipulation did not distort any other feature. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eighty-one students of psychology, about half of them female, half of them male, 
participated in the Experiment to fulfil their introductory course requirements 
Sentence Material 
Twenty-four pairs of sentences were spoken by a female speaker and recorded 
on audiotape. Each pair consisted of two identical sentences except for the 
pretarget word, which was short in one version and long in the other All short 
pretarget words contain one strong syllable, 19 of the 24 long pretarget words 
contain one weak and one strong syllable, 2 contain two weak and one strong 
syllable, whereas only 3 contain two strong syllables. In composing the sen-
tences, care was taken to maintain approximately the same level of semantic 
continuity in both versions. The speaker was instructed to keep the intonation of 
both versions as equal as possible and to maintain the same overall speaking rate. 
The target phoneme /b/ occurred only in word-initial position In 19 of the 24 
cases the target word was definitely accent-bearing. 
Precautions were taken to avoid any regularities that might signal the 
approach of the target First, the pairs of pretarget words occurred with equal 
frequency in a representative sample of speech (Uit den Boogaart, 1975). 
Second, while restricting ourselves to words beginning and ending with one of 
the stop-consonants /p/, /t/ or /k/ for easy splicing, the 24 pairs of pretarget 
words as a whole mirrored the frequency distribution of words beginning with 
/p/, /t/ or /k/ as well as the distribution of nouns and verbs. Word-final stop-
consonants of the verbs were all /t/, but this being the most frequent case for 
present-tense third-person verbs in Dutch, it should not provide a significant 
cue to the listener. Third, the predictability of the target was kept low by using 
rather long sentences. Meltzer et al. (1976) located their targets 0 to 8 syllables 
from the end of the sentences, which were about 18 syllables in length. In our 
case, location of the target varied from 3 to 16 syllables from the end in sentences 
with an average length of 22 syllables. 
The six conditions used are shown in Table II. The two original recordings 
made up Conditions 1 and 2. Starting with these two recordings, four other 
versions were constructed using digital signal processing techniques. Cutting 
points for word splicing were chosen just before the stop-consonant burst at the 
beginning of the pretarget word, and after this word just before the vocal 
murmur of the target. Two versions were formed by exchanging the pretarget 
word Condition 3 inherited its sentence frame from Condition 1 and its 
pretarget word from Condition 2. Condition 4 was formed in a likewise manner 
from Conditions 2 and 1 Conditions 5 and 6 both were derived from version 4. 
In Condition 5 just enough silence was spliced in between the short pretarget 
word to let the target word start at the same moment in time as it did in the 
original long pretarget versions (Condition 2). Finally, in Condition 6 the /b/ 
Table II 
Sentences, Manipulations and Results m Experiment 1 
Condition Sentence RT" S.E. 
1 normal short 
2 normal long 
3 displaced long 
4 displaced short 
5 silence on time 
6 silence later 
. stukje kurk bovenop de . 
. STUKJE KNOFLOOK BOVENOP DE . . . 
. stukje KNOFLOOK bovenop de . . . 
. STUICJE kurk BOVENOP DE . . . 
. STUICJE kurk BOVENOP DE . . . 
. STUKJE kurk BOVENOP DE . . . 
604.5 
566.4 
574.5 
604.4 
579.4 
587.5 
9.89 
9.82 
9.20 
10.80 
10.72 
10.93 
"In msec (averages of about 260 observations). 
Note Abbreviated example of one sentence, showing the relevant fragment and its subsequent manipulations Target 
phoneme is /b/. Upper and lower ι ase are used to depict the two different recordings. Sentences are in Dutch (see 
Appendix) 
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was preceded by two times the silence duration. These conditions were added in 
order to relate to Meltzer et al.'s condition "late-intact". 
The manipulated sentences sounded perfectly normal both with respect to 
articulation and intonation. A naive listener who was asked to indicate any 
irregularities listened to versions 1 to 4 of all 24 sentences. He reported six cases 
of sloppy pronunciations of consonants, all occurring at locations where no 
splicing had been performed, while in only one case splicing seemed to have 
resulted in an abnormally long pause before a /b/ target (sentence 11, version 4). 
Procedure 
All 144 experimental sentences plus 24 filler sentences (similar to the experimen­
tal sentences in all respects except lacking a /b/) were stored on a RK07 disk 
after digitization (sample frequency 10 kHz, 24dB/oct at 4,000 Hz), which 
provided random access. Stimulus presentation and response registration were 
controlled by means of a PDP 11/45 computer. The 144 (6 conditions times 24) 
sentences were split up into six blocks, each block containing only one of the six 
versions of a sentence. Each subject, run individually, was presented one block 
plus filler sentences in a unique random order. A set of 18 specially recorded 
sentences (half of them target-bearing) was administered for training purposes. 
The subject started each trial by pushing a key. The main task was to react as 
quickly as possible upon hearing a /b/ by pushing another key. To make the task 
linguistically more valid, the subject was also required to paraphrase the 
sentence. A microphone was placed in front of the subject to give the impression 
of being recorded. 
Response latencies were measured in msec from the beginning of the voice-
onset time of the target phoneme /b/. This location was established prior to the 
experiment with an accuracy of 10 msec. Sentences yielding reaction times 
beyond 1,100 msec and misses were repeated after all remaining ones. The 
experimenter immediately warned the subject in case of a miss by naming the 
target-bearing word. Fifteen of the initial 81 subjects were excluded because 
they missed the target more than 10 times. Thus 66 subjects remained, 11 
subjects in each of the 6 groups, each group assigned to one of the 6 different 
blocks of sentences. 
Results 
Introducing a temporal distortion by exchanging long and short pretar­
get words had no effect: Conditions 1 and 4 and Conditions 2 and 3 yield 
very similar reaction times (see Table II). A two-way analysis of 
variance on the raw data of Conditions 1 to 6 showed significant main 
effects of Conditions [F(5,1,397) = 2.652, p< 0.05] and Sentences [F(23, 
1,397) = 5.484, p<0.001). The interaction was significant [F(115, 
1,397)= 1.255, p<0.05] but can be ascribed to Conditions 5 and 6: 
Analysis of Conditions 1 to 4 alone yielded main effects of Conditions 
[F(3, 95) = 4.589, ρ < 0.01] and Sentences [F(23, 95) = 4.865, p< 0.001] 
but no interaction [F(69, 9 5 ) = 1.202, p > 0 . 1 ] . The lack of effect is 
supported by a multiple range test (Isd procedure of SPSS, α = 0.05): 
RTs in Conditions 1 and 4 on the one hand and 2 and 3 on the other do 
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not differ. Though irrelevant to rhythm, an effect of the length of the 
pretarget word is clearly present (same Isd procedure, p<0.05 for the 
differences between 1-2, 1-3 and 3—4:): Long pretarget words elicited 
shorter RTs. Conditions 5 and 6 did not differ from each other or from 
Conditions 1 to 4. 
Additional Analyses 
First, the sentences were divided into one set containing the target-
bearing words that are clearly accented (и= 16) and a second set (и = 8) 
containing the less clearly accented words. A t-test revealed that the 
average RTs (wl = 567.4; w2 = 624.4) differed significantly O<0.01). 
Second, a division with as criterion long versus short target-bearing 
words did not yield an effect (ml =594.2 and w2 = 580.8, г = 0.719). 
Third, no relation was found between frequency of the pretarget word 
and reaction times (Conditions 5 and 6 were excluded from this analysis 
as they are contaminated because of clear phonetic disruption) 
[F= 1.613, p>0.1]. Fourth, the number of times the target in a sentence 
was missed correlated significantly with the mean latency of correct 
responses to the target (r = 0.69), showing that difficult sentences were 
reacted to more slowly and were often missed. The number of misses 
was spread evenly over the 6 conditions. 
Discussion 
The main result of this experiment is that a deformation of the temporal 
structure of a sentence without concurrent phonetic distortions does not 
lead tu aiuwci Jcicciioii of a large: phoneme just after the deformation. 
This result calls into question the contention that a perceived accent 
structure allows for efficient look-ahead processing of forthcoming 
elements. 
In a survey by Cutler and Norris (1979), several effects that typically 
occur in phoneme-monitoring experiments are listed. Two of these 
effects are found in the present results. First, we found that Conditions 2 
and 3 with long pretarget words produced significantly faster responses 
than did short pretarget words (Conditions 1 and 4). Second, stressed 
target words evoked faster reaction times than moderately stressed 
words. A third effect mentioned by Cutler and Norris could not be 
established: we did not find the frequently reported faster RTs on short 
target-bearing words. This can easily be understood because of the 
disproportionately large number of function words with small semantic 
focus and perhaps a lower level of stress in the group of short target-
bearing words. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Temporal and Phonetic Alterations 
In the previous experiment two conditions examined by Meltzer et al. 
(1976) were not included. These were the conditions named "on t i m e " 
(noise added) and "ea r ly" (material deleted). In Experiment 2 we 
replicated these conditions. According to our interpretation of the 
effects, the noise should cause a negative effect due to the disruption of 
processing but a positive effect due to providing an anticipation combin-
ing to yield a small or zero effect. T h e early condition, in contrast, is 
expected to result in a retardation of reaction t imes due to the deletion of 
pretarget information (and not due to altering the perceived accent 
s tructure, as argued by Meltzer et al.). If replicated, these results would 
give extra evidence that Meltzer et al.'s and our findings are comparable 
and that differences in the outcome cannot be attr ibuted to gross 
differences in materials. 
Method 
Subjects 
Thirty students from the same population as in the first experiment were tested 
in groups of about four. 
Sentence Material 
This experiment comprised three conditions. The first version of the sentences 
of the previous experiment (Condition 1, short pretarget word) formed Con-
dition 1 ("normal"). Conditions 2 ("early") and 3 ("noise") were constructed 
starting with version 1 and employing the same techniques as discussed 
previously. In Condition 2 a 100-msec speech fragment just in front of the target 
was spliced out, and the two remaining parts were abutted, resulting in a 100-
msec advancement of the target. In Condition 3 this same 100-msec portion was 
not deleted but was replaced by 100-msec white noise (see Table III). The 
amplitude of the noise roughly matched the loudness of a stressed vowel. To 
prevent the noise from becoming a reliable target cue, in six of the 24 filler 
sentences noise was inserted at locations comparable to those in the experimental 
sentences. 
The sentences were recorded on tape. Three experimental tapes were 
constructed, each tape containing on one track a randomization of all 24 
sentences (each in only one of its three versions) and the filler sentences (so 
instead of the six blocks of the previous experiment, now three blocks were 
composed) A silence of about five seconds separated trials. 
Procedure 
The task was the same as in the former experiment, namely to react by pushing a 
button as quickly as possible on hearing a /b/. In the secondary task, subjects 
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Condition 
1 
2 
3 
Table I I I 
Sentences, Manipulations and Results in 
Sentence 
normal. . kurk bovenop . . 
early . . kurbovenop . . 
noise . . kur**bovenop . . 
RT° 
541.0 
595.4 
545.7 
Experiment 2 
S.E. 
9.37 
10.90 
9.94 
N misses 
10 
40 
21 
"In msec (averages of about 200 observations in each condition). 
Noie: In "early", the target is 100 msec advanced; in "noise", 100 msec of white noise 
(asterisks) replaces pretarget material. 
were now told that they would be presented with a written recognition test after 
the experiment to rest their understanding. Prior to the experiment, a practice 
tape of 16 trials (half of them with a target) was administered, followed by a 
recognition test. 
Presentation of the sentences was by headphones. Subjects sat separately 
with a response panel and a video display in front. In case of reaction times faster 
than 100 or slower than 1,000 msec, "error!" was immediately displayed on the 
video. Response collection was controlled by means of a PDP 11/34 computer. 
Results 
Overall, Conditions had a strong effect on RT [F(2,646) = 8.672, 
p<0.001] as shown in Table III . This effect is due to a significant 
retardation of reaction times in the condition "early" as compared to the 
"normal" and "noise" conditions. "Normal" and "noise" did not differ, 
LSD procedure, α = 0.05. 
Other Analyses 
The same division of the 24 sentences into two sets according to accent 
level, as in the previous experiment, again yielded significant results 
(j><0.05). Sentences that often failed to produce a reaction were reacted 
to more slowly (j><Q.0l) by the subjects who did respond. 
Discussion 
The results confirmed the prediction that advancing the target by 
deletion of pretarget material slowed RT. In fact, RTs to "early" 
sentences were 55 msec slower than RTs to normal sentences, close to 
the 60-msec difference that Martin reported. Moreover, there was a high 
number of misses (40), also implying that processing was disrupted. 
The effect of noise just before a target appeared to be inconsistent. 
Although the number of misses (21) was twice as large as for normal 
sentences, mean and variability of RTs was hardly increased. This 
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suggests that the search processes responsible for /b/ detection do not 
have direct access to the "raw" acoustic input. Instead, a perceptual 
separation of speech and noise seems an obligatory first stage. If it 
succeeds, normal detection is possible; if it fails, total ineffectiveness of 
the (distorted) /b/ features is the result. The separation appeared to be 
quite powerful: several subjects showed great surprise at the end of a 
session when asked about the 14 sentences with a noise burst. Although 
told to expect these, they had been totally unaware of extraneous sounds. 
This noninterference of extraneous sounds with perception of speech is 
in line with the "phonemic restoration" effect reported by Warren and 
Obusek (1971). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results presented here clearly indicate that temporal distortions by 
themselves have no effect on phoneme-monitoring reaction-times in a 
spoken sentence. The effects reported by Meltzer et al. therefore most 
probably resulted from phonetic distortions such as noise substitution, 
silence insertion and signal elimination in their speech material. 
On this basis, we would suggest that spoken sentences do not possess 
global rhythmical structures guiding the processing of the signal. 
Rather, we would contend that the production of speech is basically an 
incremental concatenated process in which the durations of speech 
events are determined by temporal constraints of local scope (voice-
onset times, long and short vowel distinction, the marking of clauses, 
etc.). This view is supported by several aspects of language production 
when it is spontaneous (note that all studies have used written material). 
We mention early starts of sentences due to role-keeping found in 
conversational analyses ("So I — eh — where I s tar ted. . . ") , repairs in 
mid-clausal position (Levelt, 1983) and the addition of sentence modi­
fiers at the end of a clause that is syntactically complete ("I travelled — 
by train — uh — in France. . . " 2 ) . All these imperfections with which 
language production is abundant point to a property of the constituents 
of spontaneous speech: each is in principle unfinished and open to 
further modifications in an incremental, piecemeal fashion. On this 
account, prosodie structures, temporal or intonational, are traces of local 
constraints of all possible sources and not themselves global plans that 
have to be mapped upon the preplanned sentence constituents (see also 
Kempen and Hoenkamp, in press). 
2
 С van Wijk Speaking, writing, and sentence form P h D dissertation, University of 
Nijmegen (forthcoming) 
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The fact that we observed several effects that are frequently reported 
in phoneme monitoring studies indicates an adequate sensitivity of our 
experimental procedure. Still, the experiment may have been ineffective 
in disturbing a rhythm-based anticipation. One could argue that the 
anticipation is a result of prosodie cues immediately in advance of the 
accented syllables. The pretarget words, the word as it was originally 
recorded and its spliced-in counterpart of different length, were both 
spoken as immediate precursors of the same accented syllable. Therefore 
one could claim that by exchanging these words we also transferred 
sufficient prosodie cues as to when the accented syllable was to be 
expected, as was suggested by Dr С. Darwin (personal communication). 
However, we think that this line of reasoning is in conflict with the 
essential role of rhythm, namely a source of global redundancy. In fact, 
the anticipated time frame would then be so dependent upon segmental 
information in the one or two syllables in advance of the target that the 
essential advantage of such an extra source of timing would seem to be 
lost. 
Reasoning along somewhat similar lines, Dr A. Cutler, in a review of 
this paper, supposed that rhythm may be confined to "clauses", such 
that temporal manipulation of a pretarget word located in one clause 
should have no effect on the processing of a target word in the next 
clause. In fact, in 15 of the 24 sentences a naive listener indicated a 
phrase boundary immediately before the target. If Cutler's suggestion is 
right, we ought to find a (small) effect from the temporal manipulation in 
the remaining 9 sentences (nos. 4, 8, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22 and 23). 
However, despite the relative coherence of the prosodie environment of 
these targets, no RT disadvantage was observed for the manipulated 
conditions (ml =023 msec) cuiiipareu LU die uuiiiauipuiaicu uuiiùitiuns 
(m2 = 628 msec). 
Clearly, much uncertainty seems to remain about the role of rhythm 
or temporal ordering in speech, both with respect to which events carry 
rhythm and with respect to the size of rhythmical structures: the 
sentence, clause or even group of words. Therefore, there is no consen-
sus between researchers as to which experimental effects do or do not 
count as evidence for rhythm. It is in the light of this problem that we 
want to discuss a study of Buxton (1983) who manipulated the temporal 
structure of spoken sentences in a manner very similar to ours. In all 
sentences Buxton cross-spliced between short noun phrases such as " . . . 
with the/blue toy . . . " and " . . . with the/blueish toy . . . " on the one 
hand, and " . . . with the/red toy . . . " and " . . . with the/reddish toy . . . " 
on the other hand (bars indicating points of splicing). She found long 
phoneme-monitoring RTs when a one-syllable word was replaced by a 
two-syllable word (blue-»reddish) or vice-versa (blueish-+red) and 
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short RTs when the exchanged words had an equal number of syllables 
(blue->red; blueish->reddish).3 Of course Buxton took this result as 
supporting Martin's idea. Two aspects of Buxton's results, however, 
attract attention. First, the effect was equally present very early (e.g. 
after only two short words) as it was late in a sentence; second, no effect 
of word length was obtained (long pretarget words should elicit shorter 
RTs, and this was found by us, see Table II). To what extent could the 
fact that she spliced within such phrases have caused local disruptions 
instead of the global effects appropriate for testing the existence of 
rhythm? There arc many dependencies between neighbouring syllables, 
even leading to the notion of "coproduction" (Fowler, 1981). 
"Coproduction" refers to a hypothetical superimposition of the produc-
tion of unstressed vowels on a stressed vowel. It is intended to explain 
the shortening of the stressed vowel and the anticipatory and carryover 
coarticulatory effect found in the timbre of the unstressed vowels that 
surround it. The shortening of a stressed vowel is well established: the 
duration of a syllable decreases with an increasing number of other 
syllables that are part of the same word (Nooteboom and Doodeman, 
1980) and even the same clause (Huggins, 1975). Tentatively, we argue 
that splicing within such phrases has the unwanted effect of damaging 
the tight articulatory/prosodie unity of these short phrases. Particularly, 
changing the number of syllables could result in a mismatch of 
durational features between the first and the second part of the copro-
duced entity. Problems in processing the pretarget word would then be 
the main cause of the RT delay to the targets. This local disruption can 
indeed be expected to overrule normal word-processing effects and to be 
equally strong early as it is late in a sentence. None the less, further 
research is needed because of the close similarity between Buxton's 
study and ours and the lack of explicit criteria of what qualifies as a 
rhythmic event and what as a manipulation of rhythm. 
Finally, the possibility should be considered that the sentences 
investigated in this study simply lacked the rhythmic properties that the 
material of Meltzer et al. (1976)—among others—did possess. In other 
words, rhythm may be language specific, even to the extent that it is 
present in one supposedly stress-timed language (English) and not in 
another one (Dutch). We do not want to exclude this possibility. Such a 
proposition, however, again weakens the notion of rhythm, making it 
'One might wonder whether we would have found an effect of temporal distortion if we 
had used pretarget words with the same syllabic structure as Buxton has. However, in 15 of 
the 24 sentences pretarget words were of the type "strong" and "strong-weak" as those of 
Buxton. The mean RTs of this subset were quite similar to the mean overall RTs. These 
15 sentences yielded for Condition 1: 601 ms; 2: 572 ms; 3: 577 ms; 4: 605 ms. 
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less fundamental and universal to speech perception than suggested by 
allusions to an "analysis-by-synthesis" theory (Mart in, 1972) or to it 
being an "integral part of the sentence comprehension process" and 
making "eminent strategic sense", even changing the left-to-right 
processing order (Cutler, 1976). 
In sum, given the results reported in this paper and our tentative 
interpretation of the results from the other studies discussed, we are 
inclined to conclude that speech production on a global level is a process 
of concatenation. Th i s view is in line with findings of Maassen and Povel 
(1984) and Osberger and Levitt (1979) showing that the artificial 
correction of the temporal structure of deaf speech has little positive 
effect on intelligibility. Moreover, it fits within the model of Povel ( 1981, 
1984) and Povel and Essens (1985), which states that the temporal 
structure in a serial pattern is only conceptualized accurately if the 
pattern, on the basis of its accent distribution, evokes some regular 
internal time-base reflected in a tendency to tap a regular beat along with 
the pattern. Listening to speech seldom seems to elicit such a tendency. 
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APPENDIX 
List of Experimental Sentences 
Nouns as pretarget words, 16 sentences. Target phonemes are in upper 
case. 
1. Jan heeft slordig gekookt want er dreef een stukje kurk/knöflook 
Bovenop de soep 
2. Het meesterlijk talent van de componist hoor je hier in een klank/ 
kenmerk Betoverend door zijn orginahteit 
Evidence against rhythm in speech 119 
3. Toen we hem in volle actie zagen viel de soepelheid van jullie kat/ 
kandidaat Best wel op 
4. Allereerst schoof hij een kast/kapstòk Binnen door de tuindeuren 
van ons nieuwe apartement 
5. Om in de kelder toch wat ruimte over te houden kun je het wijnrek 
en die kist/koëlkàst Beter aan de muur monteren 
6. Kris heeft potverdorie met het verkeerde gereedschap de kap/ 
koplamp Botweg achterstevoren gemonteerd 
7. 's Winters maakt Juultje van alle sneeuw in de tuin een pop/ 
puinhoop Buiten alle proporties 
8. Ik vind persoonlijk voor het vraagstuk van militaire oefenterreinen 
die plek/politiek Bepaald niet de goede keus 
9. Op oma's nachtkastje ligt sinds zijn dood ome sjaaks pet/pörtrët 
Binnen rijkwijdte voor als ze heimwee krijgt 
10. Wanneer uw financiële toestand ons dwingt moeten we wel het 
tekort uit uw pot/pröjëct Bij de amro zien te halen 
11. Dat pas twee dagen later mijn post/pispöort Binnengleed vind ik 
wel tekenend voor de ptt 
12. Die groningse popgroep lukt het toch weer om met een prima plaat/ 
productie Bovenin de hitlijst te staan 
13. Het was van Utrecht naar Maastricht toch eigenlijk wel een tocht/ 
transport Boven onze krachten 
14. Ik zie heel wat reactionair geschrijf maar dat is een tekst/tijdschrift 
Bij het fascistische af 
15. Als je eens nauwkeurig zijn taak/tikènpàkket Beoordeelt zie je dat 
hij eigenlijk een slimme vent moet zijn 
16. Gelukkig werd hij ziek anders had hij toch nog mijn tip/tijdstip 
Bijna doorgegeven 
Verbs as pretarget words, 8 sentences. 
17. Sinds zijn promotie is 'ie uiterst verwaand geworden en hij pikt/ 
presteert Bijna niets meer 
18. Hoe dan ook de ministerpresident perst/pàrkëën Binnenlandse-
zaken in een onmogelijke positie 
19. Vreemd dat hij het plan voor het stadhuis nu toch toont/töëlïcht Bij 
de raadsvergadering 
20. Ma heeft gezegd dat als hij toch zo nodi£ tikt/timmèrt Bovenop 
zolder dat hij dan het luik dicht moet doen 
21. Ik vind het wel in orde dat een coach z'n team streng traint/ 
toespreekt Binnen zekere fatsoensgrenzen 
22. De verknipte taalkundige aait stotterende duiven en knijpt/koestert 
Bilinguistische marmotten 
ЕРА : /2-в 
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23. Hongersnood vitaminetekort en vergaand longoedeem kwelt/ 
kenmerkt Biljoenen mensen elk jaar weer 
24. 't Is zeker dat al wat Jonst kookt/klaarmàakt Buitengewoon lekker is 
en zo vol van aandacht 
121 
Epilogue 
In the introduction three main issues were formulated: (he inherence of orga-
nization, (he completeness of structural representations and (he autonomy of 
primary perception of structure. We will start our present concluding discus-
sion by reviewing what the five studies presented in this thesis contribute to 
these issues. Then we will examine a possible reason for the lack of context 
effect reported in Part III, referring to recent discussions about the informa-
tional encapsulation of perceptual processes. Finally we will assess what 
these studies add to the value of Structural Information Theory as a model for 
human perception. 
Contributions to the three main issues 
Inherence. The perceived organization of the components within a (simple 
wire-like) pallem is not an aspect secondary to the perceptual representation, 
not derived in a post-access evaluation. In our studies using a fast presenta-
tion of a complete pattern and a subpattem, we eliminated post-access con-
foundings by looking at the interaction between order of presentation and 
type of subpattem (chapters 1 and 2) and by applying a bias correction (chap-
ter 2). In this way, we demonstrated that it is likely that perceived organiza-
tion is an integral aspect of the initial representation, or primary perception, 
of structure. SIT codes and SIT's selection criterion (the minimum principle) 
appeared to have predictive power as regards the early processing effects of 
chapters 1 and 2. Therefore, the first study could justifiable be called a study 
on "knowledge within perception". 
Completeness. In chapter 2 it was demonstrated that a non-preferred "hid-
den" representation is indeed concurrently present in primary perception, 
rather than being the basis of just another view alternating with the preferred 
one. This is in accordance with the theoretical incompleteness of the pre-
fened interpretation and the accessory role of a special "hidden" representa-
tion: the complementary code. The concurrent presence could be concluded 
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from the large effect of presentation order on the bias-corrected recognition 
scores of subpattems corresponding to that complementary representation. 
There is one minor discrepancy between the results presented in chapter 1 
and those in chapter 2. In contrast to the first study, the effect of presentation 
order reported in the second study appeared already upon the near-simultane-
ous presentation of complete and subpattem, which invalidates the hypothe-
sis formulated in chapter 1 that pattern interpretations would be developed at 
a rate of 30 ms. The presently used method may not allow a definite meas-
urement of processing times. In chapter 3 a special type of complementary 
code was tested. Subjects had to discriminate between arrays that varied only 
with respect the number of (identical) elements, which is a metrical rather 
than a structural aspect. The complementary codes proposed in chapter 3 
allow for a complete representation of the number of elements by means of 
the specification of the relative position of the elements. The complexity of 
these codes increases drastically when going from three to four elements. 
The reaction times of the subjects in a same/different task were in agreement 
with the code complexity. It was argued that "subitizing" (the seemingly 
immediate apprehension of the numerosity of a small number of elements 
compared to the difficulty encountered with larger numbers) can be under-
stood in terms of these metrical codes. 
Autonomy. The first three chapters show primary perception to be "smart": it 
seems to be capable of finding the single best or minimum code, while secur-
ing completeness of representation by means of a complementary code. In 
the last two studies, primary perception appeared to be isolated, or "autono-
mous", from information from sources other than the immediate stimulus. In 
other words, we only found an effect of "knowledge within perception" but 
not of "knowledge on perception". In chapter 4 prolonged processing, reason-
ing, beliefs etc. did have an effect on the recognition of subpallerns. How-
ever, when biases were properly controlled, no indications were found that 
expecting a particular subpattem altered the initial organization of the com-
plete pattern. In a control condition, expectancy did appear to allow for selec-
tive attention to local features of the complete pattern. The conclusion was 
that context effects on primary perception have to be discerned from biases 
and selective attention. In chapter 5 we reported a similar autonomy of con-
text for the domain of word recognition. The investigated "context" in this 
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case is the global timing pattern of the sentence. According to Martin (1972), 
the global timing pattern of sentences in stress-timed languages such as Eng-
lish and Dutch should lead to an active expectancy and therefore to a speeded 
word recognition. Again, local aspects of the stimulus (frequency and length 
of the word) did affect the results in contrast to the wider context. One word 
of caution is required: we tested the alleged predictive role of rhythm, instead 
of the question whether or not our sentences contained a rhythmic timing in 
the first place. In fact, in chapter 5 we argued against the hypothesis that 
speakers would be able to impose a regular timing upon their normal, sponta-
neous productions. If speakers do not impose timing, it is of course incorrect 
to speak of an autonomy from context: there would be no context to start 
with. 
Why autonomy? 
With respect to our conclusion that the primary perception of structure pro-
ceeds in an autonomous fashion, it is important to note that meaningless 
wire-like patterns were used. For other types of patterns, special-purpose pro-
cessing mechanisms may be effective (cf. Calis & Mens, 1985) which may 
or may not operate autonomous. However, in the absence of relevant data, 
we consider it plausible that the presently established autonomy will hold in 
general. Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that context is important for the 
prolonged processing of complex displays. Such effects, however, may be 
called post-access compared to the primary perception of objects that can be 
perceived in a single glance.1 
Concentrating on the studies on visual organization, two major conclu-
sions can be made. On the one hand, chapters 1 and 2 show primary percep-
tion to be an extremely efficient mechanism which succeeds in producing the 
complete set of the best and the complementary representation of an entire 
Indeed, there are well-known examples of mformed recognition, e.g., observed in 
R. James's picture of a well-camouflaged dog which remaias a meaningless array 
of blobs until the idea is bom that it might be a photograph of a dog. However, 
these are exceptions and require prolonged processing. Rather than proving that 
the border between "perception" and "cognition" is diffuse, these demonstrations 
may well be taken to demonstrate that in the absence of a stable primary shape 
organization, only scrutiny and selective attention can replace the normal effort-
less processing. 
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pattern, possibly within a temporal resolution as small as 30 ms. On the other 
hand, in chapter 4 primary perception shows its limitations by not taking into 
account relevant information from a stimulus shown just a few seconds ear-
lier. Why should such an efficient system be so "short-sighted"? Is auton-
omy an accident of nature, an advantageous property, or a necessity for any 
object-recognition to occur? 
Fodor (1983) proposes that perceptual processes can be fast and efficient 
because they are not burdened by every piece of knowledge that might be 
relevant to the situation at hand: perceptual processes are "informationally 
encapsulated". Thus, context-insensitivity in general is considered advanta-
geous, on this account. Indeed, everyone would agree that, for instance, 
shape perception cannot be based on an evaluation of all beliefs and yet be as 
fast as it is. Moreover, one may hold that normally, outside a priming task, 
one's beliefs are quite unreliable and seldom predictive (Fodor, 1985, p. 5). 
For example, one may expect to see a table but chances are that it is some-
thing else, for instance a chair. However, we found more than an autonomy 
with respect to relatively high-level knowledge of the world. The question 
now is: why should it be efficient for the process resulting in a pattern orga-
nization to be so completely isolated from prior information, even in case of 
the extreme compatibility of prior and new information that has been 
described in chapter 47 
Apart from the fact that one may mistakingly expect a particular object 
and/or event, there may be another reason why prior information may seldom 
be predictive. The number of ways that an object can present itself visually is 
enormous. For many objects, it even seems to be impossible to give one gen-
eral structural description. The set of chairs, again for example, seems to be 
expandable infinitely with structurally different exemplars.2 But even if 
prior information is structurally compatible with the input, there is still the 
simple fact that the visual information may vary dramatically on a lower 
level, where it is altered by changes in size of the object, orientation, illumi-
nation, interposition, type of contour, etc. In the Introduction we noted that 
object recognition is remarkably indifferent with respect to the lower-level 
2
 Biederman (1987) argues that the number of all "readily discernible" exemplars is 
limited. However, it may be questioned whether a "geon", his basic unit of which 
objects such as a chair are assumed to be composed, cover structurally identical 
patterns; considerable structural variation is possible within each geon-class. 
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variations. For example, a contour in drawings is generally reduced to a line 
(that often corresponds to a physically impossible contour; Koenderink & 
Van Doom, 1982); in comic strips detailed surface information (e.g., of the 
texture of the skin) is often replaced by a uniform colour. Indeed, object rec-
ognition is often quicker from schematic drawings than from photographs 
(Ryan & Schwartz, 1956). This may be interpreted to show that structure is 
recovered in a flexible way along many alternative routes, none of which is 
essential to recognition. Accordingly, students of computational vision now-
adays express the idea that an effective vision system probably employs 
many sources of visual information (quantitative and qualitative), as opposed 
to Marr who focussed on quantitative surface information. Witkin and 
Tenenbaum (1983), for example, stress the importance of structural proper-
lies, such as the direction of shading and texture gradients relative to bound-
ary contours, junctions, highlights, parallelism, symmetry and repetition. 
Given many alternative clues to shape, the effectiveness of background 
knowledge, and context in general, would seem questionable. In other words, 
an independent level of classification on the basis of structure may often be a 
necessity, in precedence to any classification in terms of meaningful objects, 
at least in situations that are not (artificially) restricted. 
It may be instructive to make the same point about the relative use of 
context with respect to auditory word-recognition. Shape organization may 
be compared to the identification of phonemes (or syllables, or whatever 
closed-class sub-word recognition-unit one favours), as has been done by 
Biederman (1987). What we now want to argue is that word recognition can 
only benefit from context (for instance, by matching highly activated entries 
first) above the phonemic level; below that level, there may be too many 
combinations to consider when linking a (semantic) expectation lo the acous-
tical signal. 
Fodor (1983) takes a somewhat different position by suggesting that 
informationally encapsulated systems are an accident of nature yielding an 
advantage in surviving: such systems allow fast responses ("a tiger! run 
away!") without confusion due to beliefs that may be wrong (such as: "tigers 
don't eat psychologists"). Indeed, one may note that there are two ways in 
which the visual system can be "flexible". Adapting to task demands and 
prior knowledge of our world is one type of flexibility. Sensitivity to and 
speed of processing of the (unexpected) immediate situation (whatever 
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"world" it may be!) is another one. The latter type of flexibility clearly may 
nol suffer from the first type. 
SIT and models of perception 
It is a basic research strategy of SIT to predict the perceptual interpretation of 
visual and auditory patterns by means of a specification of stimulus structure. 
In other words, the basic assumption is that an interesting part of choice 
behaviour in visual and auditory tasks can be understood from constraints 
imposed by SIT on the perceptual representation of structure. Thus, SIT as 
such is a theory of representation and not one about specific processing 
mechanisms which lead to the perceptual interpretation. In spite of the suc-
cess of this approach in many studies, the lack of a plausible process model 
has often been brought forward as a reason why SIT would not do as a com-
plete theory of perception (Kolers, 1983; Chase, 1986; Pomerantz & Kubovy, 
1986; Hatfield & Epstein, 1985). One might be tempted to think that the 
presently reported relevance of SIT to predict early processing effects may be 
an answer to this critique. However, this is not what we want to claim. 
Let us first try to formulate what makes a model a process model. An 
acceptable description may be that a process model is a model of which it is 
claimed that all of its essential entities (operations, stages) are based either on 
what currently is generally accepted knowledge of the psychological mecha-
nism, or are at least directly falsifiable in a psychological experiment. It may 
be clear that we have not tested all the essential operations and/or stages of 
SIT. In particular, we still do not know how the visual system arrives at the 
representations that we have probed in our experiments. The encoding 
scheme described in the Introduction still is not a process model.3 In the 
past, several widely varying types of processes have been proposed to com-
plement SIT: Resile (1982) considered a distributed relaxation process. Buf-
far! and Leeuwenberg (1982) compared codes with hypotheses and envisaged 
3
 Part of the encoding scheme has recently been implemented in a computer algor-
ithm that always finds the minimum code for each primitive code (Van der Helm 
& Leeuwenberg, 1986). What this shows with respect to the human visual system, 
is that such a reduction is possible. However, it does not show how the visual sys-
tem performs it (or even whether it performs something comparable in the first 
place). 
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a cyclic testing of increasingly better codes. Van Leeuwen, В uff art and Van 
der Vegt (1988) built a network memory on the generic relations between 
codes supplemented by a few assumptions about the spreading of activation 
within the network; again patterns are recognized in a "top-down" testing 
procedure. The latter approach has already been successful in simulating 
effects of viewing span and practice on the preference for other codes than 
the best code found in experiments with complex sequential patterns (see 
also Van Leeuwen & Buffart, 1987). In short, SIT does provide a fruitful 
context to formulate process models. It is interesting thai developments in 
this area do not exclusively build on the application of reduction rules and a 
sequential primitive code. Instead, inspiration comes from the general princi­
ples of SIT. Some of these principles were described in the Introduction: the 
maximal specification of regular identity relations and the incompleteness of 
the resulting representations. Some principles are still in statu nascendi: the 
stability of network nodes (Van Leeuwen, Buffar! & van der Vegt, 1988), 
hierarchical completeness (Buffart, 1987) and accessibility (Van der Helm & 
Leeuwenberg, 1988). And, of course, future investigations may yield other, 
perhaps even more fundamental insights. 
What the present results contribute to this issue is the following. Coding 
theories in general are developed to function as normative models of choice 
behaviour pooled over many trials and subjects under different states of 
learning, employing different (unknown) strategies. Indeed, an individual 
response in an experiment is subjected to extraneous factors, such as fatigue, 
or ideosyncratic associations, which from time to time may prevent the "best" 
code to be reached. Because of such factors, it has even been argued that SIT 
predicts "late perception", that is, it would not apply to "early perception" 
(Buffart, 1987; see also Restie, 1982, p. 33). Buffart described "early percep­
tion" as the first 5 seconds after stimulation needed to reach a stable final 
interpretation. Yet, both in chapter 1 and 2 specific predictions based on SIT 
were confirmed by early processing effects that could be ascribed to primary 
perception. This does not imply that SIT is a process model, but SIT does 
seem to be valid for understanding the format of early perceptual representa­
tions, at least within the constraints presently obeyed: using simple meaning­
less patterns viewed in a single glance. The representation of structure 
described by SIT, rather than just stemming from the realm of reasoning and 
fantasy, appears to have a bearing on primary perception. 
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Summary 
Theoretical accounts of stimulus structure can be used to predict the percep-
tual organization of stimuli. This thesis examines the perceived organization 
of simple line drawings using Leeuwenberg's (1971) Structural Information 
Theory (SIT) as a starting point. With respect to the recognition of spoken 
words, the importance of the rhythmic organization of sentences as predicted 
by Martin (1972) is investigated. 
Three issues are considered. The first question, addressed in Part I, is 
whether the organization is inherent in perceiving a pattern, or instead, 
added to (he initial registration, for instance by reasoning. To discriminate 
between these two possibilities in our experiments, effects of primary per-
ception of structure are distinguished from secondary effects due to pro-
longed processing. Primary perception of structure is defined in this thesis as 
the initial access of the representation of structure; post-access effects are the 
result of subsequent semantic, associative or other memory processes. Refer-
ring to "primary perception of structure" does not mean that there are a-priori 
reasons to believe that the representation of structure is (he result of a distinct 
process, separate from the rest of the system. Instead, the distinction 
between primary and secondary perception will turn out to be meaningful 
only for empirical reasons. 
In Chapter 1, a task is introduced to eliminate such post-access con-
foundings. As in the embedded figures test, a complete pattern is presented 
followed by one out of several possible subpatterns. Recognition of the sub-
pattem is measured at about threshold level: the complete pattern and the 
subpattem are each presented for only 10 milliseconds and they are separated 
by a very short interval. In chapter 1, the pairs are also presented in the 
reversed order. Pairs of a complete pattern and a subpattem are used which 
have a mutually exclusive organization when presented in one order. How-
ever, presented in the other order, the preferred representation of the first pat-
tern—according to SIT—is able to reinforce a latent interpretation of the sec-
ond one. By systematically varying the interval, a shortest interval of 30 ms 
is found at which the comparison between the two orders of presentation 
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results in a difference in the percentage correctly recognized subpattems. It 
is concluded that this interval is related to the time to process the stimuli 
from a sensory registration into an organized representation of stimulus 
structure. 
Considering this support for the inherence of organization in primary 
perception, a second and a third issue becomes relevant. The second issue, 
the focus of Part II, is about organization and the completeness of represen-
tations. Each pattern allows for alternative organizations that often cover dif-
ferent structural aspects of that pattern. This agrees with the theoretical 
incompleteness of a single code according to SIT. SIT assumes for most pat-
terns a second code (apart from the best or minimum code which corresponds 
to the preferred inlsrpretation). This second code, often the second-best, is 
called complementary because it covers all the structural regularities missing 
in the minimum code. In many earlier studies based on SIT the frequency 
with which the preferred and the second-best organization is reported (their 
respective "perceptual strength" or Prœgnanz) could be related to the com-
plexity of the minimum code relative to the complexity of the second-best 
code. The question is whether these two codes indeed relate to actual percep-
tual representations that are concurrently present. 
In chapter 2 it is shown that the complementary second-best representa-
tion is indeed concurrently present in primary perception instead of being the 
basis of another view of the pattern alternating with the preferred one. As in 
Chapter 1, early processing effects are investigated by presenting a complete 
pattern and a subpattem in a very fast sequence. These subpattems corre-
spond to the best, the second-best or an odd organization of the complete pat-
tern. The recognition scores are corrected in order to discriminate post-access 
effects (due to prolonged processing, demand-characteristics and other 
biases, for example in favour of the "better" subpattems) from effects in the 
primary representation of structure. The correction is based on the distribu-
tion of the erroneous recognitions of subpattems. The concurrent presence is 
evident in the corrected scores. A minor discrepancy is that the straightfor-
ward conclusion of chapter 1 about the rate of 30 ms at which pattern inter-
pretations would be developed is not confirmed by this study. Therefore, 
varying the interval in such a task does not seem to yield a reliable indication 
of central processing times. 
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A structural code may not only be incoi te ν, ah respect to the full 
structure of a pattern, it does not—by definition -cov letrical aspects. The 
task described in chapter 3 requires an accurati >erce ml representation of 
the number of identical elements: a more or less metrical aspect. Therefore, a 
special type of complementary code is considered. Tentatively, the relative 
position of pairs of elements is completely specified with binary ordering 
relations. Higher-level orderings can be made between pairs that form a per­
ceptual group. Subjects in the experiments have to indicate as fast as possible 
whether two successively presented arrays contain an equal number of ele­
ments. The reaction limes are in agreement with the abrupt increase in com­
plexity of the corresponding codes for arrays of three elements versus four 
elements. It is argued that "subitizing" (the seemingly immediate apprehen­
sion of the numerosity of a small number of elements compared to the diffi­
culty encountered with larger numbers) can be understood in terms of the 
present metrical codes. 
The third issue is addressed in Part III, consisting of chapters 4 and 5. In 
the preceding chapters, the visual system was shown to represent the internal 
structure completely. In the last two chapters it is investigated whether the 
"external structure" of a pattern—in the present case the wider context of ear­
lier perceived patterns—is equally important. In particular, our third question 
is whether primary perception can depend on context. This is called the issue 
of the autonomy of organization. In chapter 4, many experimental manipu­
lations are combined in an attempt to bias primary perception in favour of 
one or another organization of a simple line pattern. Subjects are led to 
expect a particular organization by starting a trial with a special prime: a pat­
tern in a segmented (exploded view) version corresponding to but one of the 
organizations of the complete pattern shown a few seconds later. The ques­
tion is whether this prime, and the expectation it should evoke, changes the 
initial organization of the complete pattern. Again the perceptual representa­
tion of the complete pattern is probed by looking at the recognition of subpat-
tems presented after a very short interval (30 ms). It is concluded that pro­
longed processing, reasoning, beliefs etc. may in part determine what 
organization a subject will prefer eventually, but that if biases are properly 
controlled, no indications are present that an expectation of a particular sub-
pattern alters the initial organization of the complete pattern. It is argued that 
context effects on perceived organization, reported in the literature, are either 
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due to a post-access evaluation of stimuli or to a task simplification leading 
to selective attention for a local feature. 
In chapter 5 a similar autonomy is reported for the recognition of spoken 
words in Dutch sentences. Dutch speakers as well as speakers of other so-
called "stress-timed" languages, appear to impose a certain rhythmical struc-
ture on their sentences. Martin (1972) claimed that such a rhythm provides a 
reliable context to the listener. Once locked into the rhythm of a sentence, a 
listener would be able to anticipate the important words to follow. In the 
present study, subjects had to react as fast as possible upon the occurrence of 
a specific phoneme. Such a phoneme monitoring task is relatively free of 
post-access confoundings. These phonemes were placed at the beginning of 
stressed words. The global temporal pattern was manipulated by replacing 
the word just in advance of the word with the target phoneme by another one 
differing in length. Local stimulus aspects (word length and level of stress) 
did affect reaction times; this in contrast to the manipulations of the temporal 
context which did not produce any effect upon the detection of the phoneme. 
The conclusion is that the recognition of spoken words is not guided by a 
global temporal organization of the embedding sentence. 
In the Epilogue two topics are discussed. In the first place, an under-
standing of the autonomy established in chapter 4 is sought in the possibility 
that contextual information is of little use for object recognition. An interme-
diate level of classification {structure) may be advantageous and even neces-
sary in precedence to any classification in terms of meaningful objects. In 
the second place, it is argued that the present results do contribute to the 
plausibility of SIT as a theory of perception. SIT, being primarily a theory of 
perceptual representations, has recently been criticized for the lack of a par-
ticular notion by what processes those representations are reached. This the-
sis shows that SIT is valid for understanding the format of early representa-
tions; SIT does appear to bear on primary perception. 
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Samenvatting 
Theoretische beschrijvingen van de structuur van stimuli kunnen gebruikt 
worden om de waargenomen organisatie van die stimuli te voorspellen. In 
dit proefschrift wordt de waargenomen organisatie van simpele lijnfiguren 
onderzocht met voornamelijk Leeuwenberg's Structurele Informatie Theorie 
(1971) als uitgangspunt. Ten aanzien van de herkenning van gesproken 
woorden wordt het belang onderzocht van de ritmische organisatie van 
zinnen zoals voorspeld door Martin (1972). 
Drie kwesties worden beschouwd. De eerste vraag, die wordt behandeld 
in Deel I, luidt: is organisatie inherent aan het waarnemen van een patroon 
of slechts toegevoegd aan de aanvankelijke perceptuele representatie, 
bijvoorbeeld door middel van redeneren? Om in experimenten hierop 
antwoord te kunnen geven, worden effecten van de primaire perceptie van 
structuur onderscheiden van secundaire effecten ten gevolge van 
verdergaande verwerking. Primaire waarneming van structuur wordt in dit 
proefschrift gedefinieerd als de eerste toegang (access) tot de 
structuurrepresentatie van de stimulus; post-access effecten zijn het resultaat 
van daaropvolgende geheugenprocessen van semantische, associatieve of 
andere aard. Het gebruik van de uitdrukking "primaire perceptie van 
structuur" betekent overigens niet dat er a-priori redenen zijn om aan te 
nemen dat de representatie van structuur het resultaat is van een duidelijk 
onderscheiden proces, apart van de rest van het systeem. Integendeel, het 
onderscheid tussen primaire en secundaire waarneming zal zijn betekenis 
proefondervindelijk vinden. 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt een taak geïntroduceerd welke post-access effecten 
dient uit te sluiten. Zoals in de embedded figures test wordt een complete 
figuur aangeboden en daarna één van enkele mogelijke deelfiguren. De 
herkenning van de deelfiguur wordt gemeten op drempelniveau: de complete 
figuur en de deelfiguur worden elk slechts 10 milliseconden aangeboden met 
daartussen een zeer kort interval. In hoofdstuk 1 worden deze paren figuren 
ook in de omgekeerde volgorde aangeboden. De paren van figuren die 
gebruikt worden hebben onverenigbare organisaties in de ene 
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aanbiedingsvolgorde. Echter, omgekeerd aangeboden kan bij deze 
paren—volgens SIT—de geprefereerde of minimum representatie van de 
eerste figuur een verborgen interpretatie van de tweede figuur aanspreken. 
Door het interval systematisch te variëren is 30 milliseconden als kortste tijd 
gevonden waarbij de vergelijking van de twee aanbiedingsvolgorden een 
verschil opleverde in het percentage correct herkende deelfiguren. De 
conclusie is dal dit interval gerelateerd is aan de tijd die het kost om de 
stimuli van een eerste ruwe opslag te verwerken tot een georganiseerde 
representatie van de stimulus structuur. 
Gezien deze ondersteuning van de hypothese dat organisatie inherent is 
aan primaire perceptie, wordt een tweede en een derde kwestie van belang. 
De tweede kwestie, die aan de orde komt in Deel II, is die van 
figuurorganisatie en de volledigheid van representaties. Elke figuur staat 
meerdere organisaties toe die ieder met andere structurele aspecten van die 
figuur overeenstemmen. Dit sluit aan bij de onvolledigheid van een enkele 
code volgens SIT. SIT veronderstelt dat voor de meeste figuren een tweede 
representatie of code voorhanden is, naast de beste of minimum code die 
overeenstemt met de geprefereerde interpretatie. Deze tweede code (vaak de 
op-een-na beste) wordt complementair genoemd omdat deze alle structurele 
regelmaat beschrijft die in de minimum code ontbreekt. In vele eerdere 
onderzoekingen kon het aantal malen waarmee de geprefereerde organisatie 
werd gerapporteerd (en daannee haar perceptuele sterkte of Prœgnantie) op 
basis van SIT voorspeld worden aan de hand van de relatieve complexiteit 
van de minimum code ten opzichte van die van de op-een-na beste code. De 
vraag is of deze twee codes daadwerkelijk overeenkomen met perceptuele 
representaties die gelijktijdig aanwezig zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt aangetoond dat de complementaire op-een-na beste 
code inderdaad overeenstemt met een representatie die gelijktijdig maar 
"verborgen" aanwezig is in de primaire perceptie, in plaats van dat het een 
andere interpretatie is die afwisselt met de geprefereerde interpretatie. 
Evenals in hoofdstuk 1 worden vroege verwerkingsstappen onderzocht door 
een complete figuur en een deelfiguur in een snelle opeenvolging aan te 
bieden. De deelfiguren passen of in de geprefereerde, of in de op-een-na 
beste, of in een vreemde organisatie van de complete figuur. De 
herkenningsscores werden gecorrigeerd om post-access effecten (ten gevolge 
van verdere verwerking, wellicht onbedoeld gestuurd door aspecten van de 
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taak of onder invloed van andere voorkeuren, bijvoorbeeld voor de "betere" 
deelfiguren) te scheiden van effecten die ontstaan in de primaire representatie 
van structuur. Deze correctie is gebaseerd op de distributie van de foutieve 
herkenningen van deelfiguren. De gelijktijdige aanwezigheid blijkt uit de 
gecorrigeerde scores. De conclusie van hoofdstuk 1 aangaande het tempo van 
één per 30 milliseconden waarmee figuurinterpretaties ontwikkeld zouden 
worden, werd helaas niet bevestigd in dit experiment. Het variëren van het 
aanbiedingsinterval blijkt daarom geen betrouwbare aanwijzing te geven 
voor de verwerkingstijd. 
Een structurele code beschrijft niet alleen meestal de structuur van een 
figuur onvolledig, maar verontachtzaamt—per definitie—metrische aspecten. 
De taak die in hoofdstuk 3 geïntroduceerd wordt vereist een nauwkeurige 
perceptuele representatie van het aantal van een reeks gelijkvormige 
elementen: een meer metrisch aspect. Hiervoor wordt een speciaal type van 
complementaire code voorgesteld: de relatieve positie van paren van 
elementen wordt volledig vastgelegd in binaire ordeningsrelaties; ordeningen 
op een hoger niveau zijn toegestaan tussen paren die een perceptuele groep 
vormen. In het experiment moesten de proefpersonen zo snel mogelijk 
aangeven of twee opeenvolgend aangeboden reeksen een gelijk aantal 
elementen bevatten. De reactietijden stemmen overeen met de abrupte 
toename in complexiteit van de codes van reeksen met drie elementen naar 
reeksen met vier elementen. Een stelling is dal "subitizing" (het schijnbaar 
onmiddellijk bevatten van het aantal van een kleine verzameling elementen 
vergeleken met de moeite bij grotere verzamelingen) begrepen kan worden in 
termen van de hier voorgestelde codering. 
De derde kwestie wordt behandeld in Deel III, bestaande uit 
hoofdstukken 4 en 5. In Deel II bleek het visuele systeem de "interne" 
structuur van een figuur volledig te representeren. In de laatste twee 
hoofdstukken wordt onderzocht of de "externe" structuur—in dit geval de 
context die gevormd wordt door eerder waargenomen figuren—evenzeer 
bepaalt wat de primaire perceptie is. Dit is de vraag naar de autonomie van 
de primaire perceptie van structuur. In het onderzoek dat wordt beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 4 worden vele experimentele manipulaties gecombineerd teneinde 
primaire perceptie te sturen in de richting van bepaalde organisaties van een 
eenvoudige lijn-figuur. De proefpersonen worden ertoe aangezet een 
bepaalde organisatie te verwachten door hun eerst een speciale prime aan te 
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bieden: een complete figuur opgedeeld volgens één van de organisaties van 
de kort aangeboden complete figuur die enkele seconden later volgt. De 
vraag is of deze prime, en de verwachting die opgewekt wordt, de 
aanvankelijke organisatie van het complete patroon bepaalt. Weer wordt de 
perceptuele representatie van de complete Figuur bepaald door te kijken naar 
de herkenning van deelfiguren die na een kort interval (30 millisecoondcn) 
aangeboden worden. De conclusie van dit onderzoek is dat verdergaande 
verwerking (redeneren, overtuigingen etc.) weliswaar mede bepaalt welke 
organisatie van de complete figuur uiteindelijk geprefeerd wordt, maar dat er 
na aftrek van antwoordvoorkeuren geen aanwijzingen zijn dat de 
verwachting van een bepaalde deelfiguur de aanvankelijke organisatie 
beïnvloedt. Vandaar dat gesteld wordt dat context-effecten die in de 
literatuur beschreven worden het gevolg zijn ofwel van een post-access 
evaluatie, ofwel van een vereenvoudiging van de taak welke aanleiding geeft 
tot selectieve aandacht voor (lokale) kenmerken van de stimulus. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een vergelijkbare autonomie gerapporteerd van de 
herkenning van gesproken woorden in Nederlandse zinnen. Nederlandse 
sprekers, evenals sprekers van andere "stress-timed" talen, lijken hun zinnen 
een bepaalde ritmische structuur mee te geven. Martin (1972) beweerde dat 
zulk een ritme een betrouwbare context verschaft aan de luisteraar. Eenmaal 
in het ritme van een zin gevangen zou de luisteraar in slaat zijn op 
belangrijke fragmenten te anticiperen. In de huidige studie moeten de 
proefpersonen zo snel mogelijk reageren wanneer zij een bepaalde 
spraakklank (een bepaald foneem) hoorden. Een dergelijke 
phoneme-monitoring taak is verhoudingsgewijs vrij van post-access 
neveneffecten. Het foneem vormt altijd het begin van een beklemtoond 
woord. De globale temporele context is gemanipuleerd door het woord vlak 
vóór het woord met het foneem te vervangen door een ander woord met 
datzelfde foneem maar met een andere lengte. Locale stimulus aspecten 
(woordlengte en mate van beaccentuering) blijken de de reactietijden wel te 
beïnvloeden, de manipulaties van de temporele context hebben geen effect. 
De conclusie is dat de herkenning van gesproken woorden niet gestuurd 
wordt door een globale temporele organisatie van de omringende zin. 
In de Epiloog worden twee punten besproken. Op de eerste plaats wordt 
gepoogd autonomie te begrijpen door te overwegen dat mogelijkerwijs 
informatie vanuit de context van weinig waarde is voor objectherkenning. 
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Een tussenliggend niveau van classificatie (te weten dat van structuur) zou 
voordelig kunnen zijn en wellicht zelfs noodzakelijk om tot classificatie in 
termen van betekenisvolle objecten te komen. Op de tweede plaats wordt 
beargumenteerd dat de resultaten gerapporteerd in dit proefschrift bijdragen 
aan de aanvaarbaarheid van SIT als een theorie over de waarneming. SIT is 
in eerste instantie een theorie over perceptuele representaties en is recentelijk 
aangesproken op het ontbreken van een aanduiding volgens welke processen 
deze representaties bereikt worden in het waarnemingssysteem. Dit 
proefschrift verschaft zulk een aanduiding evenmin, maar het laat wel zien 
dat SIT relevant is om de aard van representaties vroeg in het 
waarnemingsproces te begrijpen: SIT blijkt betrekking te hebben op primaire 
perceptie. 
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Stellingen 
1. Van de in dit proefschrift aangetoonde aanwezigheid van complemen-
taire interpretaties zijn we ons nauwelijks bewust. 
2. Voor de classifícatie en het onthouden van een patroon zijn de structurele 
Minimum code en Complementaire code voldoende; echter, voor het ver-
krijgen van een levendige voorstelling van dat patroon dienen deze codes 
omgezet en metrisch verrijkt te worden tot één enkele representatie. 
3. Kennis eerder verworven dan 30 milliseconden voor aanbieding van een 
patroon heeft geen invloed op de initiële perceptuele organisatie, maar 
wel op een secundaire evaluatie van dat patroon. Deze twee momenten 
zijn te onderscheiden door middel van een response-bias correctie. Dit 
proefschrift. 
4. Dat het verstaan van spraak niet afhangt van ritme is in overeenstemming 
met het feit dat een spreker een zin kan beginnen zonder dat het einde 
ervan voorbereid is. Dit proef schrift. 
5. Identiteit en expressie van een gezicht zijn scheidbare perceptuele ken-
merken. Het is namelijk met behulp van een zeer korte aanbieding van 
twee portretten mogelijk de lach van de een aan de identiteit van de 
ander te koppelen. Zie G. Calis & L· Mens, 1985. 
6. Bij vele theoriën op het gebied van de visuele vormwaameming waarbij 
het geldigheidsdomein is aangegeven dringt zich toch de vraag op hoe 
het visuele systeem voor een gegeven patroon kan bepalen of het tot het 
domein van die theorie behoort. 
7. Het is te vrezen dat een verondersteld begrip van de menselijke geest in 
termen van een connectionistisch model zelf in fragmenten over deskun-
digen gedistribueerd zal zijn. 
8. Bij de vormgeving van gehoortoestellen is het goed die van modieuze 
draagbare geluidsapparatuur te volgen. Aldus vermindert bet acoustiscb 
isolement van de walkmandrager het sociaal isolement van de gehoortoe-
steldrager. 
9. Met deze stelling bent u het zeker niet eens. 
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift: 
Lucas Mens, Primary perception of stimulus structure. Nijmegen, 31 Octo-
ber 1988. 


